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In the last few years, there has been a ple-
thora of arguments maintaining that by
combining Islamic behaviour with the quest
for self-determination, Muslim women are
attaining a more ‘culturally authentic’ path
towards a self-determination that rejects
westernization and the homogenizing pro-
cesses inherent in globalization.
In the context of migration, ‘multicultural’
perspectives reinforce this kind of under-
standing by perceiving Muslims as embody-
ing an essence, claiming respect for a set of
static and immutable traditions that they
would automatically and uniformly repro-
duce in continuity with supposedly past
practices and beliefs. Although disguised by
the narrative of respect for cultural differ-
ence, these representations ‘reduce the h i s-
t o r y of the present to the n a t u r e of an invari-
ant essence’ (Al-Azmeh, 1996 [1993]: 62).
This article draws upon extended research
conducted between 1996 and 1998 among
Muslim women, predominantly of Moroc-
can origin, residing in the Emilia Romagna
region in the north of Italy.1 One of the aims
of the larger research project was to show
how, far from being a shared identity, being
Muslim implies a battlefield for contesting
and opposing discourses on authenticity,
tradition and modernity. Very often at stake
in these representations are the definitions
of the boundaries that mark belonging to a
‘community’ or national group.
In the Middle East, secular oriented wo-
men’s movements have been historically ac-
cused of threatening the cultural homogene-
ity of the national community by introducing
Western models and behaviour, and there-
fore they were and still are labelled as cultur-
ally inauthentic, or ‘westernized’ by the es-
tablishment (see Al-Ali, 2000). For Muslim mi-
grants in Europe, the processes of contesta-
tion surrounding ‘authenticity’ and ‘tradition’
may be amplified, since the boundaries of
the ‘community’ are more in danger of being
jeopardized and, therefore, certain Islamic
symbols may be actively chosen or imposed
as crucial markers of cultural difference.
Indeed, an understanding of Muslim
women’s multiple attitudes towards Islam
could not dismiss the role played by migra-
tion and travel (Eickelman and Piscatori,
1990) and by the new place women inhabit
(Metcalf, 1996). The articulation between
Islam and discourses around authenticity
and tradition is also a significant arena
through for grasping, among other things,
the diverse processes of identity-renegotia-
tion through which Muslim women respond
to a new life in a new place (Salih, 2000).
Muslims and Islamists
For some Moroccan women, and indeed
also for some Italian or other Arab Muslim
women, Islam is the most crucial aspect of
their identity. These women are usually
young and well educated, wear a h i j a b, reg-
ularly meet in the mosque to study, and en-
dorse what could be defined generically as
an Islamist discourse.
These women could be defined as ‘Is-
lamist’. They interpret their involvement in
learning and knowing the religious texts as
the modern way of being a Muslim woman.
At the same time, it seems that only by
being truly Muslim can a woman be mod-
ern. Study is synonymous with knowledge
and modernity. But knowledge can only be
Islamic. As one woman stated:
The atmosphere in our families is not really
and completely Islamic. Instead of taking a
break in our days from our duties to read and
study the Qur’an, we are always watching
television, handling the remote control. If we
continue behaving in such a way, we will re-
main ignorant, at a low level. We won’t learn
a n y t h i n g .
Although Islamic practices are shaped by
the new local space they inhabit, Islamist
women claim that their life in a new country
where Muslims represent a minority did not
play a role in their rediscovery or reinforce-
ment of an Islamic identity. They perceive
themselves as part of the u m m a, an imag-
ined transnational community scattered all
over the world, and often insist on defining
Islam as a universal religion, with no local
v a r i a t i o n s .
For other women who are not involved
with activities in the mosque, who usually
do not wear a h i j a b, and only sporadically
practise some or all of the pillars of Islam,
being Muslim in Italy either remains or be-
comes a generic sign of belonging. They
might define themselves first as Moroccans
or Arabs, and then as Muslims, although
their reflections and thoughts about them-
selves and others often revolve around
Islam since in their day to day life in Italy,
Islam is the primary frame through which
their identities are filtered. These women
are nonetheless Muslim, as they consider
themselves spiritually, culturally and social-
ly as such. This is important since it is a first
way to stress that, although they negotiate
religion in various ways vis à vis the Italian
society, these women are neither hybrid, as
they are sometimes defined in other con-
texts (cf. Khan, 1998), nor westernized. The
term hybridity, used to describe these secu-
lar attitudes, is misleading for it assumes Is-
lamism is historically and naturally ‘authen-
tic’, denying its political and profoundly
modern nature, whereas women who adopt
secular stances are described as deviating
from the ‘norm’.
Confronting modernities
’Tradition’ and ‘Islam’ are often erroneously
seen as overlapping. By attributing different
meanings to Islam, women display and artic-
ulate different narratives of modernity. For Is-
lamist women, modernity is possible only
through knowledge and devout practice of
Islam, which is nonetheless presented as a
break with past traditions. This new Islam
represents their way to progress and to so-
cial, cultural and spiritual self-fulfilment.
Other women, on the contrary, are engaged
with modernity as a fracture, a process of on-
going crisis between past certainties and cur-
rent challenges, between the refusal of as-
similation and the impetus for secularization,
and they express this tension through a con-
stant negotiation of and reflection upon di-
verse cultural models and practices.
Women who embrace Islam in Italy do so
in an attempt to distinguish themselves
from Western society, asserting a project of
Muslim migrants in Europe are often represented as
people who move from a bounded cultural and phys-
ical location to the global world, where they are seen
as either resisting or absorbing global (Western) cul-
tural traits. This holds particularly true when it comes
to representations of migrant women from Islamic
countries. Indeed, in popular and often in academic
understandings, there is a growing tendency to per-
ceive Muslim women who adopt Islamic symbols as
embodying an ‘authentic’ and traditional culture, as
opposed to secularized women who, on the contrary,
are often seen as hybrid or westernized – and there-
fore ‘modern’. These discourses find an echo in a
trend that is forcefully taking place in the Middle East.
C o n f r o n t i n g
M o d e r n i t i e s
Muslim Women 
in Italy
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On 27 November 2000, sixty years after the Leiden Professor Cleveringa de-
livered a speech protesting against the dismissal of all Jewish professors by
the Nazi regime, the chair dedicated to the memory of this scholar was
granted to Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, the most well known refugee scholar in
the field of Islamic Studies. The prestigious Cleveringa Chair is awarded to
defenders of freedom of thought and conscience. 
Abu Zayd’s inaugural speech was devoted to the Qur'an ‘as a channel of
communication, where God and man meet without being one. I mean with-
out God being humanized, nor man being divined.’* In this speech he de-
signed a Qur'anic model inspired by the philosophical
system of the famous mystic Muhyi al-Din Ibn al- cA r a b i .
By presenting the Qur'an as a mode of communication
between God and man that goes beyond mere law and
politics, Abu Zayd sought to prevent locking ‘the Word of
God in the moment of its historical annunciation.’ Only
towards the end of his speech did Abu Zayd take a firm position in the con-
flict that forced him to leave his country; the polarization between Islamists
and secularists. He critiques the Islamist discourse, in particular literal inter-
pretations of the Q u r'a n, arguing that ‘if everything mentioned in the Q u r'a n
is to be literally followed as a divine law, Muslims should re-institute “slav-
ery” as [a] socio-economic system.’ But on the whole, Abu Zayd was careful
not to be too provocative. Since his audience consisted primarily of Dutch
university faculty and students, his few critical remarks directed against the
Islamists were received favourably. His having placed Cleveringa’s historic
speech in the context of the current violence inflicted daily upon Palestini-
ans was far more provocative for parts of this audience. 
Within the span of five weeks, Leiden University welcomed its second pro-
fessor from the Muslim World, Muhammad Khalid Masud having given his
inaugural speech on October 20 (see p. 5). Masud addressed the contradic-
tions between sharica ideals and social norms in Muslim societies. Similar to
Abu Zayd, Masud critiqued the divinization of the sharica by Islamists. In par-
ticular, he pointed to the problem of social norms that have been incorpo-
rated into the sharica now being ‘considered immutable or divine, due to the
conception of the Sharica as divine’. Masud called for a larger public partici-
pation in the process of law making. 
With the inaugural speeches (see p. 5) of Muhammad Khalid Masud, ISIM
Chair at Leiden University, and Martin van Bruinessen, ISIM Chair at Utrecht
University, the ISIM has confirmed its place within the
participating institutions, while at the same time profil-
ing its internationally oriented research programmes.
Van Bruinessen highlighted responses from among he-
terodox communities to modernity, focusing on the Ale-
vis of Turkey and the Kebatinan movement in Indonesia,
both being indicative of the rise of learned varieties of local traditions. 
With the appointment of Annelies Moors to the ISIM Chair at the Universi-
ty of Amsterdam (see p. 3), the ISIM is able to develop programmes in the
fields of ‘gender, state formation, and Islamic law', and ‘media, visual repre-
sentations and cultural politics’. 
The ISIM Chair at the University of Nijmegen (see vacancy announcement,
below) will pave the way for further expansion of the ISIM. Peter van der Veer
(see below) has joined the ISIM as co-director in order to help to sustain the
growth of the Institute. ◆
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The ISIM solicits your response to the ISIM Newslet-
t e r. If you wish to contribute to the ISIM Newsletter,
style sheets may be obtained upon request from
the ISIM Secretariat or on the ISIM website. In order
to offer update information on activities concern-
ing the study of Islam and Muslim societies, along
with news on vacancies, grants, and fellowships,
the ISIM relies on its readers. The information will
be made available on the ISIM website.
The ISIM Newsletter is published three times per
year by the International Institute for the Study of
Islam in the Modern World (ISIM). Responsibility for
the facts and opinions expressed in this publication
rests solely with the authors. Their views do not
necessarily reflect those of the Institute or its sup-
porters. The ISIM Newsletter is free of charge.
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Prof. Dr Peter van der Veer has been appointed co-
director of the ISIM, commencing 1 February 2001,
for a period of 2.5 years. His task will be to cooperate
with the ISIM Academic Director, Professor Dr
Muhammad Khalid Masud, in providing leadership
to the ISIM and enhancing its visibility in the Nether-
lands and Europe in general. His activities will focus
mainly on the development of relations with the
ISIM participating universities and the expansion of
relations with other national and international insti-
tutions. Furthermore, his function will include the
presentation and presence of the Institute in public
debates.
Van der Veer is professor of Comparative Religion
at the University of Amsterdam, director of the Re-
search Center Religion and Society (website:
www.pscw.uva.nl/gm), which he founded in 1993,
and dean of the Amsterdam School for Social
Science Research (website: www.pscw.uva.nl/assr/
reports.html).
Having initially studied Indo-Iranian languages at
the University of Groningen, Van der Veer obtained
his PhD in anthropology from the University of
Utrecht in 1986. He has conducted fieldwork in
South Asia (Ayodhya, Surat) and in the Netherlands
(The Hague) among Surinamese Hindus. His primary
research focus is the study of religion and national-
ism in South Asia. He has taught anthropology at the
Free University of Amsterdam, the University of
Utrecht and the University of Pennsylvania, USA.
Moreover, he has held visiting positions at the Lon-
don School of Economics, the University of Chicago
and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences So-
ciales in Paris. Among his numerous publications are:
Gods on Earth (London 1988), a study on Hindu pil-
grimage; Religious Nationalism (Berkeley 1994),
which is a study on Hindu and Muslim nationalism in
the Indian Subcontinent; Nation and Migration
(Philadelphia 1995); and Conversion to Modernities
(New York 1997). Together with Hartmut Lehmann,
he edited Nation and Religion (Princeton 1999). His
new book, Imperial Encounters , will be published by
Princeton University Press in June 2001.
V a c a n c y
ISIM Chair at the
University of Nijmegen
The ISIM and the University of Nijmegen invite
applications for the ISIM Chair ‘Social Processes
in the Contemporary Muslim World’ at the
University of Nijmegen. The chair is to be
established at the Department of the Middle
East of the Faculty of Arts in cooperation with
the Faculty of Social Sciences and the Faculty of
T h e o l o g y .
The International Institute for the Study of Islam
i n the Modern World (ISIM), based in Leiden,
promotes and conducts research on contempo-
rary social, intellectual, and religious trends and
movements in Muslim societies and
communities. The ISIM’s research approaches
are expressly interdisciplinary and comparative
and cover the Muslim world in its entirety,
including Muslim communities in Europe. The
Institute has already established ISIM chairs at
Utrecht University, Leiden University and the
University of Amsterdam.
The Faculties of the Arts, Social Sciences and
Theology at the University of Nijmegen organize
more than 20 degree programmes and conduct
a series of research programmes at 6 institutes.
Together these faculties employ over 750
permanent staff members and count more
t h a n 7000 students. 
Candidates should:
– have an established international reputation
in the study of contemporary Muslim societies
and communities;
– have extensive knowledge of one or more
regions and be well versed in comparative
social science research;
– have a strong record of field experience;
– have wide-ranging international academic
c o n t a c t s ;
– have an excellent command of languages
relevant to their field of research as well as
fluency in English; and
– have experience in teaching and supervising
r e s e a r c h .
The holder of the ISIM Chair will be expected to
carry out the following tasks at the University of
N i j m e g e n :
– initiate and develop research programmes
a n d conduct research within the framework of
the cooperation between the University of
Nijmegen and the ISIM;
– teach classes and provide supervision to
undergraduate and graduate students; and
– contribute to various other academic activities
such as conferences and special lectures in
cooperation with the other ISIM chairholders.
Foreign candidates are expected to acquire a
working knowledge of Dutch within two years.
This ISIM Professorship is a full-time position at
the University of Nijmegen for a maximum of
five years. Continuation of the chair after five
years will be subject to review by the University.
Female candidates are especially encouraged to
a p p l y .
Review of applications will begin on 27 April
2 0 0 1 .
Applicants should send a full CV, including
a list of publications, copies of three key
publications, and the names of two referees, to:
Prof. Muhammad Khalid Masud




For further information, please contact the ISIM:
Tel: +31 (0)71 527 79 05
Fax: +31 (0)71 527 79 06
E-mail: isim@rullet.leidenuniv.nl
Applicants may wish to consult the internet
sites of the ISIM (www.isim.nl) and the
University of Nijmegen (www.kun.nl).
A N N O U N C E M E N T S
W o rk shop  R epo r t
K I T T Y  H E M M E R
Every orthodoxy starts as a heresy’, as Abdullahi
Ahmed An-Na’im pointed out at the workshop
‘Human Rights and Islam’, organized by the ISIM
on 22 January 2001. With this remark, addressed to
an audience of Dutch ambassadors residing in the
Asian and Middle-Eastern Islamic countries, An-
Na’im wished to stress that the acknowledgement
of universal human rights by Islamic countries is a
process, and that Western diplomats should be at-
tentive to, and create spaces for, dissenting voices
from within. This stance was shared by the other
two speakers at the workshop: Cassandra Balchin,
Deputy Office coordinator of the NGO Women Liv-
ing Under Muslim Laws, and Karim Ghezraoui, co-
ordinator of regional projects for the Arab and
Asia-Pacific regions at the United Nations Office of
the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR)
in Geneva.
The workshop was part of the annual Ambas-
sadors Conference in which all Dutch ambassadors
convene at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The
Hague. Given that human rights are important to
Dutch foreign policy, the Ministry and the ISIM de-
cided to devote a morning session to the tension
between universal rights and local cultures, with
particular reference to the Islamic Middle East and
Asia.
An-Na’im opened the workshop with a strong
argument on the necessity of the legitimization of
human rights in Islamic societies, because without
strong political support governments are unlikely
to accept these rights as legally binding. More-
over, forcing human rights on other societies is
considered a violation of the basic right to self-de-
termination. According to An-Na’im, reconciliation
between the Islamic and human rights perspec-
tives is possible: the problem is not so much theo-
logical, but political. Those who challenge the pre-
vailing notions of Islam need human rights to pro-
tect them. An-Na’im, as did the other speakers,
also pointed out the disproportionate attention
given by the West to political and civil rights, with
disregard of the equally important economic, so-
cial and cultural rights (see p. 6 of this issue).
Karim Ghezraoui explained the lines of policy of
the UN concerning human rights in the Asia-Pacif-
ic region, including the Arab world. The OHCHR
believes in national capacity-building for promo-
tion and protection of human rights, but also fos-
ters regional exchanges of experiences between
national human rights institutions, and coopera-
tion with regional partners.
‘Human rights and domestic violence’ was the
theme of the last speaker, Cassandra Balchin.
Balchin offered significant examples of how the
West tends to view the Islamic world from a ‘liber-
al-relativist’ position, and often simplistically tar-
gets a particular culture or religion as the cause for
certain human rights violations. For instance, a
Netherlands-sponsored UN draft resolution on the
obligation of states to prevent honour crimes was
introduced to the delegations in such a way that it
pit some Arab and other Muslim countries against
industrialized countries, which consequently led
to the abstention of their votes. ‘Try to work out a
consensus instead of pushing governments
against the wall’, Balchin argued. Another general
misconception, she continued, is that secular laws
are viewed as less discriminating than Islamic or Is-
lamicized laws. Turkey, a secular state, acknowl-
edges mitigating circumstances for the perpetra-
tor of an honour crime, whereas in Pakistan, an Is-
lamic state, the law attaches a harsher punishment
for the same crime due to aggravating circum-
stances. It may be evident that violations of human
rights have nothing to do with religion or culture,
but everything with power.
The session was concluded with a forum discus-
sion which revolved around, among other issues,
how to build consensus while allowing for the ex-
pression of a critical voice, and how to develop
consistent policies. To all participants it was clear
that the acceptance of human rights as really uni-
versal is a time-consuming process. ◆
Kitty Hemmer is currently doing an internship at the ISIM.
S h e is finalizing her MA on modern history of the Middle
East at Leiden University. E-mail: kaka@wxs.nl
Summer  Ac ad emy
Seventy-five doctoral and postdoctoral re-
searchers from 33 countries have applied (the
deadline having been on January 15) to this year’s
international Summer Academy, co-organized by
the Working Group Modernity and Islam and the
International Institute for the Study of Islam in the
Modern World. The Summer Academy will be held
in cooperation with several European research in-
stitutes in Istanbul and the Department of Politi-
cal Science and International Relations of the
Yildiz Technical University, also in Istanbul.
The Summer Academy, which will take place
from 3-14 September 2001, will offer the oppor-
tunity to 24 young researchers to meet and dis-
cuss their research for two weeks in an interna-
tional and interdisciplinary setting. Martin van
Bruinessen (ISIM), Altan Gokalp (Centre Marc
Bloch, Berlin) and several faculty members of the
host University, including Professor Kemali Say-
basili, Dr Fulya Atacan and Dr Gencer Özcan, will
be joined by the following tutors:
– Professor John Bowen
(Center for the Study of Islamic Societies and
Civilizations, Washington University in St. Louis)
– Dr Ayşe Caglar
(Institut für Ethnologie, Freie Universität Berlin)
– Professor Dale Eickelman
(Dartmouth College/ currently a fellow at the -
Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin)
– Professor Anke von Kügelgen
(Institut für Islamwissenschaft und Neuere
Orientalische Philologie, Universität Bern)
– Professor Joergen S. Nielsen (Centre for the Study
of Islam and Christian- Muslim Relations;
Selly Oak Colleges; Birmingham)
– Dr Günter Seufert
(Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgen-
ländischen Gesellschaft in Istanbul).
The Academy will be mostly devoted to discus-
sions within working groups, of five to seven par-
ticipants and two tutors, where the projects of
the participants and the general themes are de-
bated. As the Academy should have the charac-
ter of a workshop, the major challenge for every
participant will be to present and rethink his or
her work, which in most cases is highly special-
ized, relating it not only to the overall topic of
the academy but also making it relevant to the
other participants. The discussions will be based
on the projects of the participants and a collec-
tion of essential readings. The project descrip-
tions of the participants will be made available in
a volume of the journal Istanbuler Almanach,
edited by Orient Institute of the DMG (Deutsche
Morgenländische Gesellschaft), and on the ISIM
w e b s i t e .
A number of guest lectures by Turkish scholars
will familiarize the participants with ongoing de-
bates in the host country on the theme of the
Academy. The cooperation with the Orient Insti-
tute of the DMG, the Institut Français d’Etudes
Anatoliennes, the Swedish Research Institute in
Istanbul, and the Netherlands Historical-Archae-
ological Institute will be an opportunity to be-
come acquainted with their researchers, re-
search facilities, and programmes. Tutors will be
asked to give one lecture related to the theme of
the Academy. These lectures will be open to the
p u b l i c . ◆
Requests for a programme of the Summer Academy may
be requested, no earlier than July 2001, from either
Georges Khalil (khalil@wiko-berlin.de) or Dick Douwes
( d o u w e s @ r u l l e t . l e i d e n u n i v . n l ) .
A p p o i n t m e n t s
Annelies Moors’ interest in the Middle East dates from
the 1970s when she travelled extensively in Turkey,
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Having spent
time with Arabic-speaking people in southern Iran,
she decided to study Arabic. Initially she did so
through an Arabic language programme at the Uni-
versity of Damascus. After returning to the Nether-
lands, she continued studying Arabic and Islamic stud-
ies at the University of Amsterdam, but soon decided
to make a disciplinary move to anthropology in order
to be able to work not only with texts, but also with
people. Her first fieldwork brought her to the Nablus
region (West Bank) where she conducted research on
transformations in family relations and the division of
labour in the rural areas. After graduation, she was ap-
pointed as part-time lecturer at the Department of An-
thropology at the University of Amsterdam.
ISIM Chair 
at the University of Amsterdam 
Annelies Moors
In 1987, she received a PhD research grant
and returned to the Nablus region to begin
her doctoral research on women and prop-
erty. This project set out to investigate
under what circumstances women claim
property rights, when they are prevented
from doing so, and in which contexts they
give up property in order to gain other ad-
vantages. While ethnographic fieldwork, in-
cluding the collection of topical life stories
of women from very different walks of life, is
central to this study, her use of court
records has enabled her to address major
historical changes in women’s ability to ne-
gotiate their rights to property. In 1992, she
obtained her PhD from the University of
Amsterdam; a revised version of her disser-
tation was published under the title:
Women, Property and Islam. Palestinian Expe-
riences 1920-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995).
The following years, Annelies Moors also
held appointments at the Department of
Anthropology at Leiden University and the
Department of Theology and Religious
Studies at the University of Amsterdam. Her
work on women and property led her to fur-
ther develop two lines of research. As gold
jewellery turned out to be a major form of
property that a large number of women
have access to, she further investigated the
material and emotional meanings of gold
jewellery to its wearers. Shifting notions
about the value of different types of gold
have not only implications for women’s eco-
nomic security, but are also central to
processes of identity formation and negoti-
ations of status. Next to this, her work on the
Nablus s h a ri ca court led her to continue
work on gender and family law, and, more
specifically, to address the relations be-
tween processes of state formation, the na-
ture of legal texts and women’s individual
and collective strategies.
In 1995 Annelies Moors obtained a re-
search grant to work on ‘the body politics of
photography’. Dealing with a great variety
of published photographs, such as early 20t h
-century picture postcards, Israeli and Pales-
tinian postcards from the 1970s-1990s, illus-
trations in National Geographic m a g a z i n e ,
and photo-histories published by various in-
terested parties, this project investigates
how such imagery represents Palestinian
women as emblems of national, religious,
class and local identities. In many, some-
times ambiguous and even contradictory,
ways these pictures are implicated in de-
bates about modernity and cultural authen-
t i c i t y .
Starting in 1998 Annelies Moors was invit-
ed to teach at the Women’s Studies Centre
of the University of Sana’a. She designed
and taught three intensive courses (in Ara-
bic) on qualitative social science methods
and on analysing gender in text and images.
Advising students about issues of method-
ology for a wide variety of research projects
was a great opportunity for her to be en-
gaged in Yemeni society. It also enabled her
to conduct research on women’s narratives
about covering or uncovering the face, and
to analyse how these changing styles of
dress relate to notions of modernity and
women’s involvement in the public sphere.
Apart from her publication on W o m e n ,
Property and Islam, Annelies Moors is the co-
editor of Discourse and Palestine: Power, Text
and Context (1995). She has also published
numerous articles on Islamic family law, vi-
sual representation, cultural politics, and
the biographic method. Her appointment to
the ISIM Chair at the University of Amster-
dam commenced on 1 January 2001. ◆
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Human Rights and I s l a m The Local Production 
of Islamic Knowledge
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Po st -Do c tor a l  Pr o jec t
K A R I N  VA N  N I E U W K E R K Migrating Islam
Changes in Religious Discourse
What is at stake in discourses about religious
difference is an underlying concept of a rei-
fied and essentialized culture. According to
Bauman (1999), there are two theories of cul-
ture: the essentialist and the processual theo-
ry of culture. That is, culture is comprehend-
ed as something one has, or as a process one
s h a p e s .
The interesting point Bauman makes is that
the social scientist should not make a simple
choice between the ‘wrong’ essentialist and
‘right’ processual notion of culture, but
should study the reasons and processes by
which people change from an essentialist
discourse into the processual discourse and
vice versa. People are endowed with a ‘dual
discursive competence’. They know when to
reify their own religious identity and when to
query their own reification.
The study on ‘Migrating Islam: Changes in
Religious Discourse among Moroccan Mi-
grant Women in the Netherlands’ focuses on
the ‘discursive competence’ of the study
group. The religious perceptions, practices
and identifications of female believers are
relatively neglected in current research.
Women often symbolize and demarcate
boundaries between social, religious and
ethnic groups. In many studies, women are
therefore particularly analysed as symbols.
‘Women as religious actors’ is a less well-
documented phenomenon. This study per-
ceives women as agents who actively shape
religious practices.
‘Migrating Islam’ will be investigated at
two intertwined levels: that of speaking
about Islam and its central tenets and that of
religious practice. Upon migration, Islam un-
dergoes a dual process of universalization
and localization. Among young generations,
there is a tendency to reject the parents’
conformity to pre-migration cultural tradi-
tions. They strive for an authentic universal
Islam. Thus, the change in religious dis-
course among the generations should be
systematically compared.
This research consists of two parts. The
more general part will analyse the main
changes in religious experience and practice
as a result of migration to the Netherlands. It
focuses on the way women speak about
Islam, its perceived adaptability to new cir-
cumstances, its changing meaning in daily
life. It will particularly focus on such central
conceptions as halal and haram and docu-
ment changes among the generations.
The second part provides an in-depth
study of the religious concept of a j r ( r e l i-
gious merit). A j r points to the spiritual com-
pensation one obtains for meritorious
deeds. Collecting a j r is particularly impor-
tant in the religious experience and practice
of women. There are indications that this
central concern of spiritual life in Morocco
changes upon migration to the Netherlands.
In general, it appears to be more difficult to
collect a j r in the Dutch context. Several
means of gaining merit, such as by visiting
graves, is almost absent in the new context.
New forms of meritorious deeds, mostly re-
lated to dress code, appear to gain promi-
nence in the new secular circumstances. Dis-
tinctions between the universal and essen-
tial versus the cultural and non-essential in
religious doctrines appear to be sorted out.
Changing practices of collecting merit thus
provide insight into processes of localization
and universalization of Islamic discourse.
New local productions of Islamic discourse
appear to take on a universal form. ◆
Karin van Nieuwkerk is a lecturer in social anthropol-
ogy, Middle East Studies and Mediterranean Studies
at Nijmegen University, the Netherlands, and is a fel-
low at the ISIM. She is author of A Trade Like Any
Other: Female Singers and Dancers in Egypt, T e x a s
University Press (1995).
E-mail: K.v.Nieuwkerk@let.kun.nl
Dr Matthijs van den Bos studied Cultural
Anthropology in Amsterdam and Iranian Studies in
Utrecht. His PhD dissertation comprises a fieldwork-
based study on the comparative, modern social and
cultural history of two Iranian, S h ici t e Sufi orders
(entitled Mystic Regimes). The author welcomes any
suggestions on his post-doc research project
d e s c r i p t i o n .
E-mail: m.e.w.vanden.bos@freeler.nl
Po st -Do c tor a l  Pr o jec t
MA T T H I J S  V A N  DE N  B O S
The anthropological research about to undertaken in
this project centres around modern Shicite Sufi iden-
tity in Iran, which will be dealt with by exploring the
construction of modern self in the Soltanca l i s h a h i
order. This and possibly other Iranian orders will be
compared. Also compared will be two instances of
modernity: the coming into being of the nation-state
in early 20t h-century Iran (particularly 1905–1911 and
1921–1941), and the re-emergence of a civil society
since the last decade of the 20t h century (especially
since 1997). It is presumed that the former periods
evidenced state-oriented identity formations, while
the latter period witnessed more anti-statist ones.
These are two variations of a modern Sufi orientation
towards the Iranian nation.
Anthropological Exploration
o f Modern Self
Many classical monographs in the anthropol-
ogy of Islam have, explicitly or implicitly, jux-
taposed Sufism and modernity. At first sight,
the contemporary construction of Shicite Sufi
self and the modern nation-state may seem
unrelated: Sufi representations of the self ap-
parently have been marked by a persistent
distancing from the ‘here and now’, while
(Iranian) nation-state modernity has been
characterized by an activist appropriation of
it. It can be argued, however, that the two
have been intimately related.
The construction of self in modern Iran has
been closely related to ‘alterity’, taking the
shape of either a nativism that demonized
the West, or an appropriation of Western tra-
ditions in order to – paradoxically – attain
‘authenticity’. This latter line of reasoning
was expressed by an early 20t h-century Sufi,
Keyvan-e Qazvini, who criticized the follow-
ing of Sufi masters and proposed rational au-
thority on a Western educational basis that
would benefit the Iranian nation. The back-
ground to these concerns was the percep-
tion of Western success in social, military and
administrative order. In propagating worthy
subjects of the Iranian nation-state, Qazvini
epitomized Reza Shah’s modernity.
While the case of a state-oriented ‘positive
alterity’ seems well represented by early 20t h-
century Sufis such as Qazvini, the nature of
the attitude towards the West in present-day
Iranian Sufism remains, in the first instance,
an open empirical question. However, there
are several indications that allow for calculat-
ed guesses. ‘Mysticism’ has been used by
Iranian intellectuals such as Ahmad Fardid
and Reza Davari – both paradoxically influ-
enced by Heidegger – to argue for the au-
thentic legitimacy of the Islamic Republic v i s -
à-vis the West. A contrary trend has been es-
tablished in the writings of Iran’s most fa-
mous intellectual, cAbdolkarim Sorush, who
identified authentic Shicite religiosity in Su-
fism while simultaneously defending West-
ern traditions of pluralism and civil society.
Sorush favours the Soltancalishahi order, hav-
ing even made a trip to its centre in Khorasan
to meet with the spiritual master.
In the Saficalishahi order, I witnessed a re-
cent trend in which freedom and personal
choice were made central in informal ses-
sions that allowed for an atmosphere of free
debate and implicit criticism of authoritarian-
ism in the state. My analyses will focus on
practices surrounding and discourse about
the most important article of faith in Shici t e
Sufism: Friendship with God/guidance (w a l a-
y a t). Practices of and discourse about w a l a-
y a t are the locus per se for studying Sufi self
because they potentially clash with juridical
(and state) conceptions of spiritual authority.
For this reason, they provide a view on what
particularizes Sufism within Shicism. Al-
though Friendship with God is by definition
an individual, non-social affair, I hold that dis-
course on and practice of Sufi spiritual au-
thority in fact incorporate the context of the
nation. Lastly, studies of modern uses of
w a l a y a t are as yet unavailable. This project
aims at providing such a study in an anthro-
pological exploration of modern self.  ◆
In the Western nation-state, the government, the
media and the dominant culture determine who is re-
garded as a minority and what constitutes differ-
ence, whether ethnic, religious or otherwise. The at-
tributes of groups used as markers of difference can
change over time, but increasingly religion is used as
an immutable marker.
ISIM Fellowships
The ISIM invites applications and research
proposals for various programmes. Applications
from candidates in the social sciences, humanities,
and religious studies will be considered.
Applicants should be competent in academic
E n g l i s h .
The ISIM fellowships and their respective
application deadlines include the following:
– PhD fellowships (1 September 2001)
– Post-doctoral fellowships (1 Sept. 2001)
– Visiting fellowships (1 Sept. 2001)
– Sabbatical fellowships (1 Sept. 2001)
For more information on the various fellowships, please
consult the ISIM website: http://www.isim.nl/
All those interested are invited to apply. Application forms
may be downloaded from the website or obtained upon
request from the ISIM secretariat:
ISIM Fellowship Programmes, P.O. Box 11089,
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ISIM Annual Lecture
Talal Asad
On 24 October 2000, Prof. Dr Talal Asad gave the
Annual ISIM Lecture at Leiden University. The full
text of his lecture, entitled ‘Thinking About Secular-
ism and Law in Egypt’, will soon be available as the
second publication of the ISIM Papers Series (n.2).
The following is part of his introduction, which ex-
pressed the main objectives of his presentation:
‘I want to talk about secularism and law reform in
Egypt, a subject about which I have recently begun
to think in a systematic way. I shall stay clear of
contemporary political debates about instituting
the shari ca as the law of the nation-state – although
I shall say something on that matter briefly. In-
stead, I shall take up some theoretical questions re-
lating to changes in the 19th century and the first
few decades of the 20th century. In my view, an an-
thropological approach to such a theme requires
one to pay attention to social concepts and institu-
tional arrangements that derive from Western his-
tory. This is not because they are standards for
measuring the progress of Egypt, nor because they
have polluted the purity of Egyptian culture, but
because they were inserted into Egypt’s modernity
in singular ways. I want to see the reform of that
law neither as a story of progressive liberalization,
nor as a reflection of continuing failure to modern-
ize properly. I want to see it as a dimension of secu-
larization – in particular, of how ‘secularization’ re-
flects changing connections between state power,
legal institutions, moral norms and religious au-
thority.’
Talal Asad teaches anthropology at the Graduate Center
o ft h e City University of New York.
ISIM PhD News
Three new ISIM PhD students have joined
t h e ISIM from 1 M a r c h 2001 onward:
– Joseph Alagha
(American University of Beirut, Lebanon)
Hizbullah and Iran: Holy Matrimony or Strategic
A l l i a n c e ?
– Egbert Harmsen
(University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands)
The Social Challenge of Political Islam in Jordan:
The Jordanian Islamist Movement in Civil Society
– Mareike Winkelmann
(University of Kampen, The N e t h e r l a n d s )
T h e Construction of Knowledge in a W o m e n ’ s
Madrasa in Modern India ( s e e p. 1 4 )
For more information on the PhD students and their research
projects, please consult the ISIM website: http://www.isim.nl/
ISIM Papers Series
The ISIM is inaugurating its ISIM Paper Series
w i t h the publication of Islam, Islamists, and
t h e Electoral Principle in the Middle East by Prof. Dr
James Piscatori, a fellow at the Oxford Centre for
Islamic Studies and at Wadham College, Oxford.
This publication began as a paper given at the
ISIM conference on ‘Islam and the Electoral
Process’, which took place in Leiden in Dec. 1999.
For more information on this publication,
p l e a s e contact the ISIM Secretariat.
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M U H A M M AD  K H A L I D  M AS U D
Muhammad Khalid Masud, ISIM Chair at Leiden Uni-
versity and Academic Director of the ISIM, delivered
his inaugural lecture on ‘Muslim Jurists’ Quest for the
Normative Basis of Sharica’ on 20 October 2000. In
the lecture, he argued that the conception of the
S h a r ica as divine law has problematized the binding
nature of law in Islam because it conceals its material
bases in the social norms. It also obscures Muslim ju-
rists’ continuous efforts to maintain general accep-
tance of Islamic law by bringing the legal norms clos-
er to social norms. He argued that the current de-
bates on the Sharica are also triggered by this con-
ception as it ignores the inner contradictions be-
tween legal and social norms emerging in contempo-
rary Muslim societies. The following contains a few
excerpts from this lecture.
Muslim Jurists’  Quest for the
Normative Basis of S h a r i ca
women, non-Muslims and slaves, became
unavoidably conspicuous only in the 19t h
century. As one may notice from the de-
bates on the abolition of slavery in the early
1 9t h century in the Muslim world, the con-
ception of S h a r ica as divine did not allow re-
form in the Islamic laws on slavery. The
problem is that when these social norms
were assimilated into the S h a r ica, they also
came to be considered immutable or divine,
due to the conception of the S h a r ica as di-
v i n e.
On a religious level, the Sufis, pietist Mus-
lim mystics, were the first to point out the
contradiction between legal norms and Is-
lamic ethical values. The Sufis were critical
of the jurists’ literal and legalist approach to
religious obligation. They suggested an em-
phasis on the inner meanings of the S h a r ica
and personal commitment as a motive for
obedience to S h a r ica laws, instead of pun-
ishment and coercion. They criticized jurists’
reliance on worldly power. Contrary to the
jurists, who lived in the world of text, the
Sufis were closer to the masses and their
norms. In most Muslim societies, Sufis repre-
sented a popular and liberal view of Islam.
It should be noted that although ideas of
liberalism, democracy, and public reason
have certainly progressed from the me-
dieval period, they are still too absorbed in
discussing the phenomenon of law making
and are thus less focused on the acceptabil-
ity of law and its role for the general masses.
Rawls, who stresses the significance of the
role of liberal and reasonable people in the
development of law, found it difficult even
to include non-Europeans in this category.
He had to create a new category of ‘decent
people’ to include Muslims. Lawyers,
philosophers, and Muslim jurists are not
ready to include the masses in the category
of reasonable people. Fred D’Agostino, the
author of a 1996 Oxford publication on F r e e
Public Reason, dismisses the role of the gen-
eral public and proposes a ‘community of
interpreters as the custodians of public rea-
s o n . ’
The basic element in a legal system is its
being accepted by the people to which it
applies. For this reason, public participation
in law making and law reform is inevitable.
In Muslim societies today, the construction
of the S h a r ica is no longer an intellectual ex-
ercise conducted by specialists. In fact, an
increasing proportion of the Muslim popu-
lace is already participating in this exercise.
N o n -u l a m a, neo-u l a m a and lay persons in-
cluding women and the youth are con-
tributing their voices to legal issues. In Mus-
lim communities that live as minorities, new
constructions of the S h a r ica and Fiqh have
e m e r g e d . ◆
This lecture is soon to be published by the ISIM. For
more information, please contact the ISIM
S e c r e t a r i a t .
Ina ugura l  Le ctur e
M A RT I N  V A N  B R U I N E S S E N
On 21 November 2000, Martin van Bruinessen, ISIM
Chair at Utrecht University, delivered his inaugural
lecture entitled ‘Muslims, Minorities and Modernity:
The Restructuring of Heterodoxy in the Middle East
and Southeast Asia’. The lecture compared Alevism
in Turkey with k e b a t i n a n in Indonesia, where adher-
ents of heterodox folk belief and practice – rather
than gradually shifting towards scripturalist, s h a ri ca-
oriented Islam – were transformed into distinct reli-
gious minorities deliberately distancing themselves
from orthodox Islam. The following is composed of
excerpts from the lecture.
Transformations of Heterodoxy
The related processes of urbanization, mass
education and the rapid development of
print and electronic media have completely
changed the structures of authority and be-
lief in the Muslim world. Among the believ-
ers, there appears to be a general trend
away from various heterodox beliefs and
practices and towards conformity with
scripturalist Islam, although scriptural au-
thority is contested. The authority of the cu-
l a m a, the guardians of orthodoxy, is chal-
lenged by other categories of learned men
(and women).
Some Muslim communities have rejected
not only the authority of the cu l a m a but or-
thodoxy as such, in the name of a deviant,
esoteric interpretation of Islam. Alevism in
Turkey and k e b a t i n a n mysticism in Java, In-
donesia, represent two varieties of ‘folk’
Islam that, under the influence of political
developments, reversed an earlier shift to-
wards scripturalist Islam and defined a
sharp boundary to separate themselves
from it. Both have fought for recognition as
distinct religious minorities on equal
grounds with Sunni Islam. Both have been
seen as potential allies against the rise of
political Islam by the secular nationalist
elites of their countries and have been
praised as representing an authentic na-
tional tradition. At the same time, however,
they both have been politically suspect be-
cause of their perceived predilection for the
left and extreme left. Heterodoxy, after all, is
always potentially subversive.
In the early 20t h century, Java witnessed
the appearance of the first k e b a t i n a n m o v e-
ments. Mystical teachers with a smaller or
larger following had been a common phe-
nomenon, but now several such followings
were organized into formal associations
that outlived their founders. They estab-
lished rules for membership, regular meet-
ings at set times, and standardized medita-
tion exercises. Some movements estab-
lished chapters in other towns and even vil-
lages, organized by a mystical bureaucracy
that institutionalized itself. The teachings
were – and this is another novelty – written;
several have their own sacred scripture.
Reading and studying these texts became
part of the practice of k e b a t i n a n adepts –
something I like to think of as the scriptural-
ization of k e b a t i n a n.
After independence, most k e b a t i n a n
movements joined in a confederation that
lobbied for official recognition with a status
comparable to religion. In the context of the
political struggle between the Muslim par-
ties and the Communists and Nationalists,
the boundaries separating k e b a t i n a n f r o m
Sunni Islam were sharpened, most k e b a t i-
n a n movements affiliating themselves with
the Communist or Nationalist parties. The
Islamic element in their belief system, which
had always existed, was often deliberately
played down.
The name Alevi is a blanket term for a vari-
ety of heterodox communities, formerly rel-
atively isolated one from the other, that are
found all over present-day Turkey. Islam has
strongly marked their belief system, but
they have distinctive rituals that are very dif-
ferent from those of Sunni Islam. A long his-
tory of oppression made Alevi identity a
stigma that many wished to conceal. Some
communities assimilated, at least formally,
to Sunni Islam; most Alevis enthusiastically
embraced Turkey’s secularism that ap-
peared to give them equal rights.
It was as recently as the late 1980s that
there suddenly emerged a strong and suc-
cessful movement to redefine, reconstruct
and perhaps reinvent Alevism as a religious
identity. This movement may be seen as a
response to two developments that deeply
affected the Alevis: the radical left, in which
many Alevis had found a political home, was
destroyed after the military coup of 1980;
and in an attempt to pre-empt radical Islam,
the new regime embraced a conservative
brand of Sunni Islam which it imposed –
though unsuccessfully – even on Alevi citi-
z e n s .
In response to this, a new type of organi-
zation emerged: the Alevi cultural associa-
tion, spearheaded by intellectuals of Alevi
background and financed by Alevi business-
men. It was these associations that reinvent-
ed Alevi ritual in the new urban context. The
Alevis’ traditional religious authorities, a
caste of holy men whose status was inherit-
ed, were involved in the process but no
longer in leading roles. Lay intellectuals
published numerous books and articles
defining what Alevism was and what Alevis
believed, interpreting their rituals, develop-
ing something of an Alevi theology. From a
largely orally transmitted folk religion, Ale-
vism appears to be developing into a scrip-
turalist version of itself, a distinctly modern
p h e n o m e n o n .
The cases of Alevism and k e b a t i n a n r e p r e-
sent an interesting variation on the gradual
but inexorable shift from folk Islam to scrip-
turalist Islam predicted by, for instance,
Gellner’s well-known model of Muslim soci-
ety. The emergence of a learned variety of
the local tradition appears to be an alterna-
tive. In both cases, political developments
were of crucial importance in the process.
Under other circumstances, it may not have
occurred. And even in establishing this al-
ternative, the communities concerned had
to engage scripturalist Islam and were to a
large degree shaped by it. ◆
Islamists regard the S h a r ica as binding for all
Muslims simply because it is divine. This con-
ception of Islamic law is quite close to the
theories of legal positivism. It is not by coin-
cidence that those who hold this view also
believe in the necessity of the Islamic state
and define sovereignty in the framework of
law and authority. For Sayyid Qutb, a major
Islamist ideologue, the sovereignty of God is
synonymous with the sovereignty of the
S h a r ica. The Islamists call for a reconstruction
of the S h a r ica, which is not founded on the
traditional Fiqh, but rather on a new inter-
pretation of the Sunna. They insist on the
elimination of the artificial legal norms creat-
ed during the colonial period and under the
dictates of nationalism and modernity. In
order to understand the modernity of the Is-
lamist view, it must be compared with the
traditionalist view of the S h a r ica.
On the social level, slaves, women and
non-Muslims suffered most from the inner
contradictions between S h a r ica ideals and
social norms in Muslim cultures. The ideals
of S h a r ica called for freedom, equality and
justice, but social stratifications in Muslim
societies on the basis of status, sex and reli-
gion did not allow these ideals to be ful-
filled. Under the impact of these social
norms, Islamic law developed a legal struc-
ture of multiple personal status. As the then
global legal culture also adhered to a similar
hierarchical approach to legal rights, the
contradictions remained unchallenged.
The contradictions in S h a r ica law, as mani-
fested in the differential treatment of
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While the reasons for the political and social reality
of tension between religion, human rights and secu-
larism are to be appreciated, an argument can be
made for focusing on the interdependence of these
three paradigms in the Islamic context, rather than
making a choice between them. Each of the three
paradigms needs the other two for fulfilling its own
rationale, and sustaining its relevance and validity
for its own constituency. The difficulties facing this
proposition can be overcome through an i n t e r n a l
transformation within each paradigm. This process
should be deliberately promoted in order to achieve
political stability and development as well as individ-
ual freedom and social justice.
Islam, 
Human Rights
a n d S e c u l a r i s m
Does it have to
b e a C h o i c e ? 1
The obvious reason for avoiding any refer-
ence to religion in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights of 1948 is the exclusive na-
ture of religious traditions. Since religion di-
vides rather than unites human beings, the
argument goes, it is better to avoid it alto-
gether in order to find common ground for
the protection of human rights among reli-
gious believers and non-believers. But this
does not mean that human rights can only
be founded on secular justifications, be-
cause that does not address the question of
how to make human rights equally valid and
legitimate from the perspectives of the wide
variety of believers and non-believers
around the world. Rather than viewing sec-
ular and religious foundations of human
rights as incompatible rivals, it is suggested
here that we emphasize the interdepen-
dence of all three.
For the limited purposes of this discus-
sion, secularism can be defined as a princi-
ple of public policy for organizing the rela-
tionship between religion and the state in a
specific context. Since historical experience
has shown that the exclusivity of religion
tends to undermine possibilities of peaceful
co-existence and solidarity among different
communities of believers, secularism has
evolved as a means of ensuring the possibil-
ity of pluralistic political community among
different religious groups. The problem is
that the same minimal normative content
that makes secularism conducive to inter-
religious co-existence and solidarity dimin-
ishes its capacity to support the universality
of human rights without reference to anoth-
er source of moral foundation. That neces-
sary quality of secularism fails to address the
need of religious believers to express the
moral implications of their faith in the pub-
lic domain.
The transcendental aspect of religion
should refer to the actual experiences of be-
lievers, and can only be understood in the
concrete historical context and material cir-
cumstances of each religious community.
Competing interpretations of religious doc-
trine and their normative and behavioural
implications are bound to reflect existing
human power relations within each reli-
gious community. Human rights and secu-
larism are critical for the fair and sustainable
mediation of these competing claims within
the framework of prevalent power relations
within and between different communities.
The consequent religious transformation, in
turn, would facilitate the interdependence
among all three.
The approach proposed here is premised
on a belief in the ability of human agency to
promote understandings and practice of re-
ligion, human rights and secularism that are
conducive to mutual interdependence of all
three of them. One challenge is to prevent
the purported moral superiority of a reli-
gious community from diminishing the
human dignity and rights of those who do
not subscribe to that faith. Secularism is crit-
ical for maintaining the equal human digni-
ty and rights of believers and non-believers
alike, but its ability to play a role in political
communities depends on its legitimacy
within all segments of the population, in-
cluding religious believers.
To play its constructive role, secularism
also needs the normative guidance of
human rights and moral justification of reli-
gion. The importance of human rights stan-
dards is obvious because secularism, by it-
self, may not be enough for safeguarding in-
dividual freedoms and social justice, as illus-
trated by recent experiences with totalitari-
an secular regimes, from Nazism in Germany
to Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union
and beyond. What is not sufficiently appre-
ciated is the importance of a religious justifi-
cation and rationale for secularism. While
the material conditions of co-existence may
force a level of religious tolerance and diver-
sity, this is likely to be seen as temporary po-
litical expediency by believers unless they
are also able to accept it as at least consis-
tent with their religious doctrine. Thus, sus-
tained secularism needs a religious justifica-
tion for believers. This is not as difficult as it
may seem, for secularism and religion are, in
fact, fundamentally overlapping and inter-
acting, as is true regarding Islam.
Interdependence in
t h e Islamic context
Islamic societies should affirm their princi-
pled commitment to the protection of
human rights and openly acknowledge the
realities of secularism in their religious as
well as political life. But this can only hap-
pen through internal transformation, and
not external imposition. There is a theologi-
cal and political dimension to internal de-
bates about these relationships. On the the-
ological side, while such debates need to
occur within an internal frame of reference
(Q u r ' a n and Sunna), human agency has al-
ways been central to Muslims’ understand-
ing and practice of Islam. Muslims believe
that the Q u r ' a n is the literal and final word
of God, the Sunna being the second divinely
inspired source of Islam. But the Q u r ' a n a n d
Sunna have no meaning or relevance in the
daily life of individual believers and their
communities except through human under-
standing and behaviour. The Q u r ' a n was re-
vealed in Arabic, which is a human language
that evolved in its own specific historical
context, and many normative parts of the
Q u r ' a n were addressing specific situations
in Mecca and Medina when they were con-
veyed by the Prophet. The Sunna had to re-
spond to the immediate issues and con-
cerns that emerged in that context, in addi-
tion to any broader implications it may
have. It is therefore clear that human
agency was integral to the process of reve-
lation, interpretation and practice from the
very beginning of Islam in the 7t h century. 
The right to self-
d e t e r m i n a t i o n
In this light, it is apparent that a sharp dis-
tinction between the religious and secular is
misleading. Religious precepts necessarily
respond to the secular concerns of human
beings, and have practical relevance only
because those responses are believed to be
practically useful for the people they are ad-
dressing. In other words, religious doctrine
is necessarily implicated in the secular, and
the secular is perceived by believers to be
‘governed’ by religious doctrine. Muslims
who find this proposition disturbing tend to
think that it undermines the divine quality
of the sources of Islam. But that apprehen-
sion fails to recognize that the Q u r ' a n a n d
Sunna are intended to redress human im-
perfections, and are not simply manifesta-
tions of the divine in the abstract. This point
is critical for the theological basis of the re-
lationship between Islam and both human
rights and secularism.
One cause of the commonly presumed in-
compatibility of Islam and secularism is the
tendency to limit secularism to the experi-
ences of West European and North Ameri-
can countries with Christianity since the 18t h
century. In fact, there are significant differ-
ences in the terms and operation of the rela-
tionship between religion and the state/
politics among European and North Ameri-
can countries due to historical and current
experiences in this regard. Each of those so-
cieties also continues to struggle with the
social and political role of religion in public
life, as none of them has attempted to –
much less succeeded in – eliminating that
r o l e .
From this perspective, it is suggested that
secularism be understood in terms of the
type of relationship between religion and
the state, rather than a specific way in which
that relationship has evolved in one society
or another. It should also be emphasized
that the form that relationship should take
in pluralistic societies has to be the product
of organic development over time, and be
accepted as legitimate by the population at
large, instead of expecting it to drastically
change immediately by constitutional en-
actment or political rhetoric. This view of
secularism would redress much of the ap-
prehension about the concept as a tool of
Western imperialism, thereby facilitating
possibilities of internal transformation to
promote the proposed interdependence
with human rights and religion.
It is commonly claimed that Islam man-
dates the establishment of an ‘Islamic state’
which will implement and enforce the
s h a r ica as the law of the land. It can be ar-
gued that the notion of an Islamic state is a
contradiction in terms since the s h a r ica
ceases to be the normative system of Islam
by the very act of enacting it as the law to be
enforced by the state.2 Because there is so
much diversity of opinion among Islamic
schools of thought and scholars, any enact-
ment of s h a r ica principles as law would have
to select certain opinions over others, there-
by denying believers their freedom of
choice among equally legitimate, compet-
ing opinions. Moreover, there is neither a
historical precedent of an Islamic state to be
followed, nor is such a state practically vi-
able today. The fact that there was never an
Islamic state accepted as such by all Mus-
lims, is beyond dispute once it is appreciat-
ed that the state the Prophet established
and ruled in Medina was too exceptional to
be a useful model in practical terms. The im-
plementation of the s h a r ica as the official
state law is also untenable in economic and
political terms for the modern nation-state
in its global context, as revealed by the re-
cent experiences of Iran, Pakistan and the
S u d a n .
Islamic societies certainly have the right
to self-determination, but that can be real-
ized only when exercised with due regard to
the realities of their national and global con-
text, and through viable constitutional and
political institutions. In my view as a Muslim,
the realization of this right should be found-
ed on a clear and categorical acknowledge-
ment of the interdependence of Islam,
human rights and secularism. ◆
The ISIM would like to solicit your reactions to the de-
bate found on this page. We ask that you please com-
municate your response via E-mail or regular mail to
one of the addresses mentioned on the front page of
t h i s ISIM Newsletter.
N o t e s
1 . This article is a drastically abridged version of a
longer draft that can be requested from the author
by E-mail.
2 . Abdullahi A. An-Na’im (1998-1999), ‘S h a r ica a n d
Positive Legislation: Is an Islamic State Possible or
Viable?’, Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern
L a w 5, pp. 29-41.
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Civil Liberties, Human Rights and International
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T r a n s l a t i o n
D AL E  F .  E I C K E L M A N
Until 1996, six years after the publication of Muham-
mad Shahrur’s Proposal for an Islamic Covenant, his
sense of public was as austere as that expressed by
Immanuel Kant in his famous essay on the Enlighten-
ment. Kant argued that the printed word, unlike di-
rect speech, offers the ‘public’ the possibility of
judging ideas independently from the status or au-
thority of their authors. Muhammad Shahrur ac-
knowledges his lack of credentials in Islamic schol-
arship. Despite this deficiency, his courage in enter-
ing an arena of public discussion, previously re-
served for trained jurists, has incited strong interest
in his ideas among many educated speakers of Ara-
bic throughout the world.
Born in 1938, Shahrur attended primary and
secondary school in his native Damascus,
and was sent to Moscow at the age of nine-
teen to study engineering. He returned to
Syria in 1964, but left again in 1968 to study
for MA and PhD degrees in soil mechanics
and foundation engineering at the Universi-
ty College in Dublin. Upon his return to Syria
in 1972, he became a faculty member at the




His first book, al-Kitab wa a l - Q u r ' a n: Q i ra'a
M uca s i r a (The Book and the Q u r ' a n: A Con-
temporary Interpretation),1 immediately be-
came a best seller in 1990. The first printing
in Damascus sold out in three months. By
1993, sales of the authorized editions pub-
lished in Damascus, followed by Beirut in
1992, totalled nearly 30,000 copies. To these
figures must be added the thousands of
photocopies circulating in countries where
the book was banned, such as Saudi Arabia.
By 1994, an attractively produced pirate ver-
sion had appeared in Cairo. In addition to
his first book, Shahrur published two se-
quels in 1994. A fourth book, concerned
with jurisprudence related to women, in-
cluding inheritance, appeared in 2000.2 T o-
gether these four volumes total approxi-
mately 1,600 pages – daunting even for
dedicated readers. The first book received
numerous reviews and newspaper com-
mentaries. It also generated works oppos-
ing Shahrur’s interpretive approach and
challenging his authority, usually on the
basis that he ignores centuries of estab-
lished jurisprudence and commits errors of
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .3 Shahrur responds in kind,
explaining that he has chosen to continue
articulating his comprehensive project of in-
terpretation rather than engage in time-
consuming responses. As for f i q h, he refers
to the juridical tradition that was solidified
in the early Islamic centuries as the ‘oppres-
sion of [systems of] knowledge’ (a l - i s t i b d a d
a l - m acr i f i) .4
English: Shahrur lite
In spite of recent appearances on an Egypt-
i a n satellite channel with clerics from al-
Azhar and several public appearances,
Shahrur’s basic method of communication
remains the printed word. Until recently,
few of his writings have been available in
English. His Proposal for an Islamic Covenant
is the first readily available public statement
of his views in English.5 The document was
originally produced upon the invitation of
the International Forum of Islamic Dialogue
in London in mid-1999 as part of its ‘Islam
21’ discussion group formed to create a
‘morally binding’ charter to implement Is-
lamic principles in the contemporary world.
Shahrur’s P r o p o s a l is blunt. In the Arab
Muslim world, he argues, ‘entrenched op-
pressive regimes’ flaunt slogans of moderni-
ty, science, and development, but accom-
plish nothing. The Islamic ‘revival,’ for its
part, is ‘hopelessly lost in protest and bar-
gaining over secondary issues such as the Is-
lamic veil, the republication of ancient texts
by the millions, and in perpetrating sense-
less acts of violence with obscure goals’ (p.
5). Shahrur argues that the role of human
reason, as exercised by individual believers,
is key to moral and civic development. God
has a covenant (m i t h a q) with humankind
based on reciprocal, binding trust in which
compulsion plays no role (p. 11).
Shahrur is especially harsh in his condem-
nation of the traditional f i q h literature. He
treats it as homogeneous, characterizing it
as failing to explain the concepts of ‘free-
dom, knowledge, and legislation’ so central
to God’s covenant with humanity. This clear
contractual covenant ‘is distorted and badly
explained in heritage literature (t u r a t h) and
by those traditional jurists (f u q a h a) who
were closed to the participation of the laity
and satisfied with reductive notions of free-
dom.’ They saw freedom merely as the ex-
emption from slavery, commonly practised
in an earlier historical era, and did not ex-
plore its more basic meaning – ‘to choose
between belief and disbelief’, and ‘obedi-
ence and disobedience’ (pp. 12-13).
Yet societies in different historical periods
need freedom, knowledge, and legislation
‘according to their level of understanding’
(p. 12). From Noah to the Prophet Muham-
mad, anyone who commits themselves to
believing in God as the only God, to believe
in Judgement Day, and to ‘do right (y acm a l u
s a l i h a n) among themselves and for the rest
of mankind’ is a Muslim (pp. 14-15). Diversi-
ty in religious practices, including pilgrim-
age, ‘is a natural law affirmed by God Him-
self: “Had your Lord willed, He would have
made mankind one nation: but they will not
cease differing”’ (Sura 11, Hud, v. 118) (p.
17). In this sense, all believers – be they
Christian, Muslim, Jewish, or the followers of
other faiths – are Muslims. Islam as a faith
(i m a n) is a specific covenant between God
and believers who specifically follow the
prophecy of Muhammad.
Shahrur bases the authority of his ap-
proach entirely on his interpretation of the
Q u r ' a n: 79 verses are cited in 43 pages, near-
ly one-third of the text. Having established
the role of reason in understanding Islam
and the diversity of Islamic religious prac-
tices in his first 22 pages, Shahrur’s proposal
for an Islamic covenant takes up the latter
half of the book. Basic to this project are the
‘absolute values’ of justice and freedom,
which ‘man practices in his society in a rela-
tive way’ (p. 27). These include consultation
(s h u r a), the encouragement of good and the
prohibition of evil.
In his expression of these moral principles,
Shahrur reads like any number of Islamic
modernist thinkers. The strong divergence
begins when he unequivocally identifies
s h u r a with democracy, stating that it is ‘the
best relative form of government in which
humankind can practise shura’ (p. 28).
Democracy unequivocally means the pres-
ence of genuine opposition, ‘political plural-
ism, freedom of opinion and expression,
and the freedom to express ideas peacefully
through the available means of communica-
tion, and unbribed and non-corrupt com-
mittees that can freely oversee state appa-
ratuses.’ Without such institutions, ‘one can-
not adhere to the Islamic precepts of en-
couraging what is good and forbidding
what is wrong, and consequently one can-
not establish the optimal democratic gov-
ernment’ (p. 29).
Shahrur makes a strong argument for the
necessary and essential use of reason and
public debate. The sanctity of the Q u r ' a n ’ s
legislative verses is eternal, but the interpre-
tation of ‘what is valid for one era may be ir-
relevant for another.’ Consequently, ‘the in-
terpretation of the legislative verses and
their application is a human activity.’ Inter-
pretation is therefore always fallible and can
only be ‘relatively right’. It can never be ac-
cepted without discussion, and no individ-
ual, political party, or institution is above
questioning (p. 30). Islam – in the sense of
God’s covenant with all humankind – is not
subject to time or place, but states and soci-
eties always are in need of ‘adaptive legisla-
tion that does not exist in the Q u r ' a n i c t e x t . ’
The Prophet Muhammad did this for the
conditions in Medina in the 7t h century, and
it remains for people and their democrati-
cally constituted parliaments to establish
civil law suitable for other places and times.
Beyond norms
Compared to most other Islamic thinkers,
Shahrur is a radical. He dispenses entirely
with the f i q h tradition and invites all Mus-
lims to commit themselves to those ele-
ments least developed in traditional ju-
risprudence – democracy, adaptive legisla-
tive institutions, and human freedom.
Shahrur’s P r o p o s a l was originally written in
Arabic. In the English version, which
Shahrur reviewed with care, he explicitly
reaches out to Muslims outside the Arab
world, urging them to think beyond norma-
tive statements of Islamic doctrine. An hon-
est legislature, capable of mistakes and er-
rors of judgement but also self-correcting, is
the ultimate statement of Islam. In its full re-
alization, Islam in the sense of God’s
covenant with humankind, there is no place
for the state regulation of belief or cultic
practice. Like Immanuel Kant, Shahrur be-
lieves that the unadorned printed word
speaks for itself. He leaves to others the im-
plementation of his call for a greater voice
for discussion and debate in public and civic
life. One can challenge his blanket rejection
of the f i q h tradition as a timeless monolith.
Views such as Shahrur’s may not constitute
the dominant voice in public debates about
the role of Islam in society, but they are in-
creasingly acknowledged as an important
element in the public sphere, even if only to
be contested and challenged. ◆
M u h a m m a d
Shahrur and
t h e Printed Word
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P e r s p e c t i v e s
J OH N  C A L VE R T
One of the most interesting and least-examined
episodes in the career of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966),
the influential Egyptian ideologue of Islamism, is his
sojourn in the United States from November 1948 to
August 1950. Egypt’s Ministry of Education had sent
the 42- year-old Qutb to the US to investigate Ameri-
can instructional methods and curricula, a task for
which his career as an educator in Egypt had well pre-
pared him. A number of materials exists that allow
the researcher to reconstruct the main lines of Qutb’s
itinerary in the US and to explicate his thoughts on
the essential nature of American society and culture.
These include articles, ‘letters home’ written by Qutb
and published in the Egyptian periodicals a l - R i s a l a ,
al-Kitab, a n d a l - H i l a l and, interestingly, documentary
materials available at the University of Northern Col-
orado, where Qutb studied in 1949.1
Sayyid Qutb
i n A m e r i c a
What becomes evident upon examining
these sources is that Qutb infused his re-
portage of life in America with commen-
taries and images designed to distance
Egyptian culture conceptually from the civi-
lization of the West. Although Qutb accept-
ed many features of modernizing the Egypt-
ian nation-state, he also believed that histo-
ry in general, and the Qur’an in particular,
had stamped Egyptians and other Muslim
peoples of the East with a ‘spiritual’ outlook
on life. This differed appreciably from what
he felt to be the abject materialism of West-
ern and, more particularly, American life.
Such a stance was consistent with Qutb’s
long-standing concern with the identity of
the national Self, which he believed was en-
dangered by the steady encroachment of
Western political and cultural power on
Egypt. As early as the 1930s, Qutb had com-
posed articles that severely questioned the
Mediterranean and Western identities graft-
ed onto Egypt by writers such as Taha
Husayn. By honouring the indigenous and
the culturally authentic over the foreign,
Qutb constructed a classic boundary mech-
anism that marked off politically marginal-
ized and economically distressed Egyptians
from the westernized political culture
favoured by elements within the dominant
order. In so doing, he provided the quest for
Egyptian national empowerment with a
‘cultural affect’, grounded in the self-vali-
dating sentiments of pride and identity. We
need not agree with the often-repeated
contention that Qutb’s stay in the United
States was the formative experience that
converted him to Islamism. Yet the trip did
contribute to his sense of national excep-
tionalism by generating experiences that
confirmed the vertical lines of distinction
that he had long believed separated his au-
thentic, moral self from erosion by Western
‘ o t h e r n e s s ’ .
’The taste of Americans’
Qutb’s first direct experience of America
was in New York City, where he arrived by
sea during the Thanksgiving and Christmas
season of 1948, only months after the com-
pletion of his first explicit Islamist work, a l -
cAdala al-Ijtimaci y y a fi al-Islam. Although
Qutb had never before travelled to a West-
ern country, his previous journalistic efforts
to evoke, from afar, the essential character-
istics of Western civilization provided him a
template with which to understand and as-
sess what he was now seeing and experi-
encing first hand. In a published letter, Qutb
described New York as a ‘huge workshop’,
‘noisy’ and ‘clamouring’, and explained how
he pitied the city’s pigeons which, like its
people, were condemned to live their lives
joylessly amidst the traffic and hustle of the
urban landscape. In much the same way as
many modern-era Europeans who travelled
to and wrote about the ‘Orient’, Qutb either
purposefully ignored or simply did not see
anomalies that contradicted his view of
America as the moral ‘Other’.
Early in 1949, Qutb enrolled at the Wilson
Teacher’s College, presently the University
of the District of Columbia. His priority there
was to improve his English language skills.
In Washington, Qutb appears to have suf-
fered his first real pang of homesickness. In
a letter penned to the well-known Egyptian
author Tawfiq al-Hakim, Qutb explained
how he yearned for the ‘spirit of the East’
and for a friend with whom he could discuss
literature and the world of ideas. As Qutb
writes, ‘How much do I need someone to
talk about topics other than money, movie
stars and car models.’ Americans, Qutb
opined, were crass people, generally disin-
terested in life’s aesthetic and spiritual di-
mensions. As evidence, he painted for al-
Hakim a vivid picture of an American youth
seated at a nearby table whose torso, barely
concealed by his sweater, was covered with
the gaudily coloured tattoos of a leopard
and an elephant. ‘Such’, says Qutb to his
friend, ‘is the taste of Americans.’
G r e e l e y
Qutb’s feeling of estrangement from his
host society deepened as he made his way
westward to Colorado. After a short stay in
Denver, he travelled to Greeley, a prosperous
agricultural and ranching community shad-
owed by the Front Range of the Rockies,
where he enrolled at the Colorado State Col-
lege of Education. He spent the summer ses-
sion following an elementary English compo-
sition course, which appears to have further
enhanced his competence in English, for, as
he wrote in a letter, it was during his Col-
orado stay that he began for the first time to
feel comfortable with the language. Qutb in-
volved himself in campus life. He was a mem-
ber of the college’s International Club and
contributed a short article to F u l c r u m, the
magazine of the English Department’s liter-
ary society. In the simply written article, Qutb
castigated the West for its support of Zionism
and alerted his college hosts to Egypt’s rich
spiritual and intellectual heritage.
Greeley was obviously very different from
New York and Washington DC. Established
as a utopian community in 1870, the city
proudly maintained in the 1940s the moral
rigour, temperance, and civil-mindedness
that were the hallmarks of its founding fa-
thers. Greeley’s highly touted civic virtue,
however, made very little impression on
Qutb. In his mind, the inhabitants of Gree-
ley, far from representing a kinder and gen-
tler population of Americans, carried within
themselves the same moral flaws of materi-
alism and degeneracy that were characteris-
tic of Occidental civilization in general. He
explained, for example, how the care Gree-
ley’s citizens devoted to their residential
lawns was symptomatic of the American
preoccupation with the external, material,
and selfishly individual dimensions. He also
explained how the pastors of Greeley’s
many churches would compete for congre-
gants in much the same way that store own-
ers competed for customers. He recounted
how he once attended a church dance and
was scandalized by the occasion’s ‘seduc-
tive atmosphere’. As Qutb wrote, ‘the danc-
ing intensified,’ and the ‘hall swarmed with
legs’. In order to create a ‘romantic, dreamy
effect’, the pastor dimmed the lights and
played on the gramophone the popular big
band dance tune, ‘Baby, it’s cold outside’.
Qutb’s American writings are laced with
such anecdotes, which reveal a strong con-
cern with moral issues, especially concern-
ing matters of sexuality.
The shallow American
After departing from Greeley, Qutb spent
time in the Californian cities of San Francis-
co, Palo Alto, and San Diego. Judging from
his essays and letters, Qutb saw much of the
United States during his 20-month visit. He
was genuinely taken by the vastness of the
land and by the inventiveness and organiza-
tional expertise of its people. But all of these
traits and accomplishments, he believed,
had been gained at the expense of basic
human values and moral and aesthetic
depth. ‘High culture’, Qutb says, ‘must be
imported from Europe, and it is only Ameri-
ca’s great wealth that makes this possible.’
In his view, it was ‘logical’ that the one art
form in which Americans excelled be the
movies, combining, as they do, ‘craftsman-
ship and primitive emotions’. Qutb admit-
ted taking a liking to select films such as
‘Gone with the Wind’, ‘Wuthering Heights’,
and ‘The Song of Bernadette’. Yet he derid-
ed the Westerns and police thrillers that
were the staple of the American movie in-
dustry. He condemned white America for its
racist attitudes towards black Americans. He
wrote about how he was astounded at the
bright, vivid colours of American fashion,
which ‘were more outrageous’ than any-
thing to be found in the Nilotic countryside.
‘I am afraid’, Qutb summarized, ‘that there is
no correlation between the greatness of
American material civilization and the men
who created it.’
It would be easy to dismiss Qutb’s charac-
terizations of American society as simplistic
and even cartoonish. Yet for all of its carica-
tures and gross generalizations, his dis-
course on the United States bore a degree
of logic, for beneath the exaggerations and
historical reductionisms lay a number of
truths that discomfited Qutb and other
Egyptians. These truths included the domi-
nance of the Western-oriented elite, which
was either unable or unwilling to push ef-
fectively for Egypt’s full independence. Ad-
ditionally, they included the post World War
II emergence of the United States as a
power with global interests and reach. Qutb
was particularly chagrined by America’s
support of Zionism. As the British philoso-
pher Terry Eagleton has said of the myths
that gird other examples of nationalist and
communal struggle: ‘However retrograde
and objectionable [these might be] they are
not pure illusion: They encapsulate, in how-
ever reductive, hyperbolic a form, some
substantial facts.’ Following Eagleton, we
may regard Qutb’s discourse on America as
providing opposition-minded Egyptians
with a motivating mythology for their strug-
gle against political and cultural forces that
they considered responsible for the desper-
ate condition of Muslim peoples in modern
times. For, Eagleton continues, ‘men and
women engaged in such conflicts do not
live by theory alone…it is not in defense of
the doctrine of base and superstructure that
men and women are prepared to embrace
hardship and persecution in the course of
political struggle.’ They require collective
symbols that encapsulate and define their
social being.2 Qutb appears to have recog-
nized this fact, if only intuitively, in fashion-
ing portrayals of America that facilitated the
setting of community boundaries. In so
doing, he laid the groundwork for his later,
radical Islamist equation of the moral uni-
verse of Abd al-Nasir’s secular Egyptian Re-
public with the j a h i l i y y a, the ‘cultural bar-
barism’ of the peninsular Arabs prior to the
advent of Islam.  ◆
N o t e s
1 . For a study on Qutb in the US, see Calvert, J.
(2000), ‘“The World is an Undutiful Boy!”: Sayyid
Qutb’s American Experience,’ Islam and Christian-
Muslim Relations 11 (no. 1), pp. 87-103.
2 . Eagleton, Terry (1991), Ideology: An Introduction,
London: Verso, p. 190.
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The article is taken from a longer publication by
t h e same name, which appeared in Shami, S. and
Herrera, L. (eds.) (1999), Between Field and Text:
Cairo Papers in the Social Sciences, Cairo: American
University in Cairo Press.
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Re sea rc h Ap pr o ac hes
H A N I A  S H O L K A MY
The political difficulties of writing anthropology and
ethnography in Egypt persist despite the newly found
fame of certain anthropological methods. These diffi-
culties are about readership and about the consump-
tion – not just the production – of texts. Missing from
the ‘universal’ anxiety over power and representa-
tion, often referred to as post-modernism (Clifford
and Marcus 1986; Rabinow 1991; Said 1991, 1989),
are considerations of the anthropologist in her/his
national setting when this is a non-Western one. Also
missing is the problematization of audience and read-
ership for the non-Western national working at home.
The consequences of such collegiate exclusion can be
explored by examining the structures and considera-
tions marking the borders of anthropological re-
search written by locals working locally.
Why is
A n t h r o p o l o g y
s o hard in Egypt?
An implicit assumption in recent post-mod-
ernist contemplation is that all researchers
are writing for the same kind of audience.
But how different is the problematic of
power and representation in the absence of
a Western readership and in an often less
than sympathetic, sometimes oppressive
national context? And how does the possi-
bility of an other-than-academic/Western
audience condition the diversity of dis-
courses that could emanate from ethno-
graphic and anthropological inquiries in
Egypt? The possibility presents a double
challenge. It challenges current theories in
anthropology on writing, representation,
and power. It also challenges the accep-
tance of anthropology and its qualitative
methods by policy makers, development re-
searchers, and other players in Egypt.
To make the point here, it is important to
discuss the experiences of researchers who
seek an audience and presence in places
other than the corridors of Western acade-
mia. Many would like to engage in a dia-
logue with peers, executives, projects, and
publics in our local, national, or regional
contexts. In the absence of the traditions of
reading and writing established in Western
intellectual, political, and academic circles,
from where can we derive security, support,
and where can we engage in serious criti-
c i s m ?
The Egyptian setting
The travails of anthropologists in Egypt
have been dwarfed by the tragedy endured
by a fellow sociologist. The recent case
brought against Dr Saad-Eddin Ibrahim, the
prominent Egyptian sociologist, has brought
into sharp focus the problems of research in
Egypt, and perhaps elsewhere. This article is
not about the merits of the case or the lack
thereof. It is also not about the civil and basic
human rights of which Dr Ibrahim has clearly
been deprived. The intention is to voice con-
cern in light of this and many other incidents
for the viability and mere possibility of social
science research, particularly for a discipline
as amorphous and vibrant as anthropology.
The issue at hand concerns the right of
representation and the authority to shape
and give currency to ‘truth’. The Egyptian
press has atrociously covered the case of Dr
Ibrahim. Coverage not only demonized the
accused, it also criminalized his whole pro-
fession. They conveyed that it was not only
Dr Ibrahim who was guilty of wrong doing,
but all those like him who conduct research
in towns and villages, defame the national
image of their country and attend confer-
ences abroad where they describe and share
their research findings.
This sad situation expresses a crisis in the
understanding of research and in the pro-
scription of a censorship of its findings. It
dramatically illustrates common misunder-
standings prevalent among circles of reader-
ship in Egypt. Many appreciate the verbatim
quotes that interviews and observations
supply, with their ‘straight from the horse’s
mouth’ colour and freshness. Focus groups
are favourites because they can cram many
subjects into busy schedules and because
they are supposed to capture conflict, deci-
sion-making processes, and the complexity
of human interaction. But venturing into the
naturalistic context is unpopular, as are
questions of multiplicity and relativity of
truth and meaning. These tools are used in a
positivistic framework and are made to ren-
der the same kinds of enduring facts and in-
formation that numbers are made to do.
Leaving aside the misuse of methods and
looking at the difficulties of ethnographic
and anthropological research, we can easily
trace three reasons why it is held suspect.
The first is the reign of modernist ‘scientistic’
thinking that finds strength and meaning in
lots of numbers. This ideology of undisputed
facts and streams of numbers is still preva-
lent in many academic and public discours-
es. This is in spite of, or perhaps because of,
the way qualitative methods have inched
their way into a degree of recognition as sci-
entific, perhaps credible, and often useful.
The powerful few
The second reason for suspicion is a case
of misconstrued intentions that politicize
qualitative data collection and its use. Here
the sensitivity lies in the details and the
voices that are the flesh and blood of quali-
tative methods. Descriptions of poverty or
of divergence from the norm are often seen
as acts of denuding and exposition, as chal-
lenges to structures of authority such as the
government or the family, or to idealized
norms and customs. Moreover, the words of
the poor, the dispossessed, or the suffering
are too much, too vulgar, too disturbing.
But they are the research subjects with
whom many of us work. After all, an inter-
view with an urban slum dweller is research;
with a minister or another official, it is a
proclamation to be read in the daily papers.
While anthropologists have always been
interested in both the rich and the poor and
have studied the mundane as well as the
profound, the common along with the rare,
they have always done so from critical per-
spectives that retain the potential to unset-
tle and question. Hence even the few stud-
ies that exist of the not-so-poor are still
studies that question and, for some, are
ones that expose.
The preference for ‘scientific’ research
methods and the distaste for subjectivity
and details are part of the third major prob-
lem, that of readership. Public consumption
of social science research is very low for sev-
eral reasons. The first is that reading is not a
popular pastime among even the literate of
the still largely illiterate public in Egypt. An-
other obstacle is that of the Arabic language
and social science. Perhaps because of the
practice of importing social science con-
cepts or the lack of effort invested in using
concepts in a reader-friendly manner, social
science, anthropology included, makes for
very unattractive reading in Arabic.
As long as readership is limited and spe-
cialized, and texts about daily life are dis-
tant, the current situation in which anthro-
pologists do not write in Arabic – and when
they do, as did Dr Ibrahim (through author-
ship or translation) they are judged by a
powerful few – will continue. The term
‘powerful few’ implies here people who
have access to and/or control of various
public forums and media. This means acad-
emics, politicians, journalists, and policy
makers; people who can dismiss work as
being subversive, slanderous, Orientalist, bi-
ased, or dangerous in some other way. This
proxy readership is perhaps the most ob-
structive element to the publication of
ethnographies in Egypt and perhaps else-
where. This brings to mind all the research
that is written up in Egypt in English, but
that goes un-translated because it is too
‘sensitive’ or because it is liable to be ‘mis-
understood’. Some of the examples cited in
the longer paper, from which this article is
taken, illustrate the perils of powerful and
limited readership.
In Egypt, it is as though qualitative meth-
ods and insights are acceptable if they are
constructive and complacent, but not if
they are unsettling or critical. Policy makers,
journalists, senior and not-so-senior officials
and development workers are interested in
knowing that mothers-in-law influence de-
cisions concerning female fertility, for exam-
ple, but are less keen on facing facts con-
cerning the political threats posed by street
sub-cultures. To re-phrase once more, one
could say that the observations of anthro-
pologists are fine but their analysis is un-
w a n t e d .
Rendering readership problematic can
draw attention to the serious dangers of
limited readership whereby the powerful
few read and can censor on behalf of the
many. If more anthropology was written
and read by specialists and non-specialists
in Egypt, the sensationalism of intimate de-
tails and the impact of graphic renditions of
daily life would lose their sting and become
normalized in the democracy of interpreta-
t i o n s .
Why is anthropology so hard in Egypt? My
very personal answer is because I am as yet
unable, whether due to circumstances or ca-
pabilities, to share my work with others in
Arabic in Egypt without making changes
and accommodations. If these changes
were made to accommodate the privacy or
sensibility of my studied community, that
would be advancement. But they have been
made on behalf of a readership that pre-
sumes the right to control and censor quali-
tative work by virtue of power or position.
Meanwhile my fellow sociologist, who often
chose not to make such concessions, is
being prosecuted. ◆
Saad behind bars
at the trial with
his wife Barbara
next to him.
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G e n d e r
AS M A S AY E E D
A modern-day visitor to Jamic Amr ibn al-cAs mosque
in Cairo during the month of Ramadan can not miss
the overt female presence in the women’s quarter.
That Muslim women of all ages attend this and other
congregational mosques throughout the world is a
fact that clearly contravenes a legal consensus ar-
rived at during the formative period of Islamic law.
After deliberation on the legality of women’s atten-
dance at mosques for congregational prayers, the
majority of jurists, both Sunni and Shi'ite, concluded
that women – particularly young, attractive women –
should avoid mosques for fear of the social unrest
(f i t n a) associated with their presence there.
Early Sunni Discourse on
Women’s Mosque
A t t e n d a n c e
The prescriptions of the legal consensus
may not have been universally followed and
have been modified and tempered by some
jurists in the modern period. Nonetheless, it
is important to revisit some of the early de-
bates on women’s presence in mosques as
they clearly reveal the social forces and
mentalities that shaped one area of juridical
discourse regarding women’s mobility in
the public sphere.
The i j m ac of major Sunni and Shi’ite m a d h-
h a bs, from the second century AH to the
modern period, on women’s prayer at home
being preferable to their prayer at the
mosque, is certainly in keeping with other
Shari’a injunctions that limit women’s visi-
bility in public spaces. This i j m ac, however,
contradicts numerous h a d i t h that indicate
that women did attend mosques in the time
of the Prophet, and that they were not dis-
couraged from doing so. We are thus faced
with what appears to be a discrepancy be-
tween the Prophet’s practice and Shari’a
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
The first indicator of Islamic law, the
Q u r ' a n, does not directly address the issue
of women attending mosques to perform
the five daily prayers. In contrast to the ab-
sence of Q u r ' a nic references, a number of
h a d i t h either explicitly or implicitly deal
with the issue of women’s presence in
m o s q u e s .1 These h a d i t h can be arranged
into the following categories: those indicat-
ing women’s presence in mosques during
the time of the Prophet; those favouring
permission for women to go to mosques;
those prescribing proper behaviour for
women who go to mosques; and those dis-
couraging women from praying in
mosques. The h a d i t h in the first three cate-
gories – those indicating that women can
and did attend mosques – outnumber those
in the final category in which women are en-
couraged to pray at home. Moreover, the re-
ports in the last category do not occur with
great frequency in the six well-known col-
lections and are often narrated via problem-
atic i s n a ds. Nonetheless, the h a d i t h in the
final category have played a greater role in
guiding and justifying early Sunni discus-
sions regarding the legality of women’s par-
ticipation in j a ma ca t.
Various Sunni stances
Of the four main Sunni schools, the
Hanafis, the Malikis, and the Hanbalis can be
grouped together as their reasoning is
largely similar. They differ primarily in the
severity of their prescriptions: the Hanafis
emerge as the most restrictive, the Hanbalis
as more lenient, and the Malikis as adopting
a more moderate position. In general, all
three schools are opposed to the presence
of women at congregational prayers. F i t n a
resulting from women’s presence at the
mosque is the primary reason cited for this
disapproval. Jurists of these schools further
specify that young women, in particular, are
to avoid j a ma ca t while older women can at-
tend if there is no fear of f i t n a from their
presence. Finally, in the case that older
women do go to the mosque, they should
do so at darker times of the day, for the Fajr,
Maghrib or Isha prayers. During these times,
the darkness provides a natural veil for the
women and their presence in the public
arena is therefore less conspicuous than it
would be otherwise. The various jurists re-
ferred to for this research focus resolutely
on the disorder that may result from
women’s attendance at mosques and pay
little or no attention to domestic duties that
may prevent a woman from joining congre-
gational prayers. Thus, they are more con-
cerned with preserving a sense of public
order or morality rather than with address-
ing how a woman may balance her religious
and spiritual duties with her material,
specifically domestic, obligations.
The fourth main Sunni school, the S h a fici s,
maintain a position – as articulated first by
a l -S h a fici (d. 204) himself – that is perhaps
the most elaborate rationalization of the
view that women can indeed be prevented
from attending mosques. Al-S h a fici says that
the h a d i t h which advise men not to prevent
women from attending mosques are not
general h a d i t h. He argues that other h a d i t h
that prevent women from undertaking jour-
neys without m a h r a m necessarily limit the
application of the following h a d i t h: ‘Do not
prevent the women of God from the
mosques of God.’ Interestingly, according to
a l -S h a fici’s deductions, the K aca b a is the only
mosque to which men must permit women
to go. Because Hajj is a f a r d imposed on
every capable Muslim, male or female, a
man cannot prohibit his wife or daughter
from undertaking the journey to the K aca-
b a.2 A l - S h a f ici also points out that the oblig-
ation of attending j umca h is dropped for
women and contends that since this is not
required, their attendance at the five daily
prayers as well as the voluntary prayers is
also not required. The S h a f ici opinion con-
forms to that of the aforementioned m a d h-
h a bs, meaning that congregational prayers
for women in mosques are neither obligato-
ry nor recommended.
Ibn Hazm
In contrast to the chorus of the four major
Sunni schools, the Zahiri m a d h h a b p e r m i t s
and even gives preference to women’s par-
ticipation in j a ma ca t at mosques. In an artic-
ulate exposition of the Zahiri view, Ibn
Hazm (d. 456) first clarifies that prayer in j a-
maca t is not a f a r d for women. Ibn Hazm’s
brief convergence with the four Sunni
schools terminates at this juncture. In his
characteristically unequivocal style, Ibn
Hazm condemns those who hold that
women’s prayer in the home is preferable,
thereby preventing women from going to
mosques. His proof is found in the h a d i t h
which affirms that congregational prayers
are preferable to solitary prayers by 27 de-
grees. This report is general and cannot be
applied only to men. Ibn Hazm also refers to
several h a d i t h that confirm women’s prayer
in mosques during the Prophet’s lifetime.
Thus, the Prophet’s Sunna provides Ibn
Hazm with further proof that women at-
tended congregational prayers with men
and that they should not be prevented from
continuing in this fashion. Two arguments
in Ibn Hazm’s discussion render his treat-
ment of this subject unique. The first in-
volves the often-quoted h a d i t h of A'i s h a
which holds that had the Prophet seen the
corruption which occurred after him, he
would have forbidden women from going
to the mosques.3 Contrary to the positions
of other Sunni jurists, Ibn Hazm argues that
this h a d i t h cannot serve as proof for pre-
venting women from going to mosques. Ac-
cording to him, God Himself has knowledge
of the future, and He did not inspire His
Prophet to prevent women from going to
mosques. Since the Prophet did not forbid
this and in fact continued to allow women
to attend j a ma ca t until his death, cA ’ i s h a ’ s
report does not suffice to abrogate the
Prophet’s practice. Also, z i n a, the worst type
of corruption, existed during the Prophet’s
time, and this did not lead the Prophet to
ban women from the mosques. Ibn Hazm,
through his elaboration of this view,
emerges as the lone advocate for women’s
participation in congregational prayers. His
is perhaps the only early juridical stance
that does not allow the concern for f i t n a t o
prevail in formulating a h k a m on this topic.
This discourse, to a certain extent, influ-
enced the historical practices of Muslims.
However, as in all other areas of law, prac-
tice did not always conform to theory. The
architectural layout of many mosques
throughout the Muslim world clearly indi-
cates that provisions were made for
women’s attendance and supports the view
that women attended mosques in spite of
the weight of legal discourse which discour-
aged them from doing so. In addition, the
fact that f a t a w a throughout Muslim history
address this issue further attests to women’s
mosque attendance. Presumably, if the
issue had been laid to rest by early Sunni
discourse, there would be no need for f a-
t a w a on this topic.4
In summary, the issue of f i t n a prevails in
shaping the early legal discourse on
women’s participation in j a ma ca t. While this
fear of social disorder has determined the
outcome on most legal discussions when it
comes to women’s mobility in the public
sphere, it is particularly interesting when it
comes to women’s presence in mosques. In
this case, the traditional sources for Islamic
law are subverted to an overarching purpose
of limiting f i t n a as defined by the predomi-
nantly male jurists. The h a d i t h that strongly
indicate a positive preference for women at-
tending mosques are only minimally consid-
ered by most jurists in favour of preserving a
general sense of social order. In the more re-
cent legal discourse, those h a d i t h w h i c h
were earlier conferred secondary impor-
tance are being recalled to reclaim women’s
rights to attend mosques. In this sense, h a-
d i t h become handmaidens in the service of
jurists who wish to advocate a temporally
determined sense of social order and social
good. Depending on how jurists choose to
incorporate these ascriptions, h a d i t h can ei-
ther serve to support women’s participation
in mosques, or to discourage it. ◆
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ISIM Online
The ISIM website (www.isim.nl) is in the process of establishing itself online in the field
of the study of Islam and Muslim societies. One of the main functions of the ISIM website
is to provide a ‘cyber-secretariat’, offering the latest on ISIM activities and programmes.
This means that, even more than the ISIM Newsletter, the ISIM website offers update in-
formation on calls for papers and application deadlines, as well as specific and more
elaborate information on workshops and conferences. Moreover, after such events have
taken place, the ISIM publishes the outcome and papers on the website so as to further
the dissemination of results and follow-up activities.
Application forms for all ISIM activities can be downloaded from the site. Furthermore,
the ISIM questionnaire, which serves as the basis for the ISIM database and mailing list,
can be printed out from the site and sent to the ISIM. The ISIM aims at offering its inter-
net services to all relevant institutes world-wide. In order to do so, we ask that you send
any relevant hyperlinks to the following E-mail: isim@rullet.leidenuniv.nl
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M o d e r n i t y
M A RK  S E D G W I C K
There are many varieties of traditionalism in the
West, but only one that really deserves a capital ‘T’,
and only one that modified the understanding of
both Islam in the West and modernity in the Islamic
world. This is ‘Guénonian’ Traditionalism, the fruit of
the marriage of 19t h-century oriental scholarship
with the Western esoteric tradition, a movement es-
tablished by the work of the French religious
philosopher René Guénon (1886-1951). Born in the
provincial French city of Blois, Guénon lived the last
twenty years of his life in Egypt, where he died a Mus-
lim and an Egyptian citizen just before the 1952 Rev-
olution. Despite this, his books and articles draw far
more heavily on Hinduism than Islam, and were all
written in French and published in Paris. At first, Tra-
ditionalists were all Europeans, mostly converts to
Islam; today, their number includes born Muslims in




Traditionalism is at its heart a view which re-
verses the usual connotations of the terms
‘traditional’ and ‘progressive,’ so that ‘tradi-
tional’ is good and ‘progressive’ bad – or
rather, an illusion. There is indeed a progres-
sion in human affairs, but the direction is in-
variably one of decline, and ‘progressive’
thus becomes a synonym for ‘corrupt’. The
impact of Traditionalism derives from this
essence; once the modern world is under-
stood in terms of decline rather than
progress, almost everything else changes.
For a Traditionalist, truth is to be found not
in the future or in the trivial discoveries of
natural science, but in the past. That this is
so little recognized today is a natural conse-
quence of the final Dark Age in which we
live – an age identified with the Hindu final
age, the kali yuga – where (in many senses)
quantity reigns and quality is eclipsed. To
the extent that it is possible, salvation lies in
salvaging what remains of the past from the
general collapse of the present. For the indi-
vidual, this means following an orthodox
master in a valid ‘initiatic’ tradition. Guénon
believed that the last chance of the West as
a whole lay in the influence of a spiritual and
intellectual elite composed of such individ-
u a l s .
Traditionalism appeals almost exclusively
to disenchanted intellectuals, some of
whom join – or form – Traditionalist groups.
For others, the encounter with Traditional-
ism may be a stepping stone to some other
religious or political destination, often
mainstream Islam.
Traditionalist groups commonly take the
form of institutes or centres, and – in the
case of Muslim Traditionalists – of Sufi or-
ders. Some sort of institute is often the pub-
lic face of a Sufi order, occasionally connect-
ed with a Masonic lodge. Many institutes
have websites* or publish books or journals;
members of these groups often write books
of their own for the general public, teach at
universities, or engage in other public activ-
ities. When addressing the general public,
however, Traditionalists rarely identify them-
selves as such.
The Maryamiyya
In institutional terms, the most important
result of the encounter of Traditionalism
and Islam is without question the Marya-
miyya, a Traditionalist Sufi order which de-
rives from an Algerian order, the Alawiyya of
Ahmad al-Alawi (1869-1934). Most other im-
portant Traditionalist Sufi orders begin their
history with the Maryamiyya, and all major
Muslim Traditionalist writers were at some
point associated with this order or one of its
derivatives. The Maryamiyya would, it was
hoped by some, be the spiritual and intel-
lectual elite that might save the West.
The Maryamiyya was established by
Frithjof Schuon (1907-1998), a Swiss who
joined the Alawiyya in Algeria in 1932, and –
under somewhat controversial circum-
stances –established his own branch of this
order in France and Switzerland in the years
before the Second World War. Among his
early Muslim followers were his contempo-
raries Michel V â l s a n (1907-74), Titus Burck-
hardt (1908-84), and Martin Lings (born
1911) – a Rumanian, a Swiss and an English-
man. V â l s a n later established his own order;
both Burckhardt and Lings remained with
Schuon, and wrote books on Islam which
were well received by the general public,
books in which Traditionalism is rarely ex-
plicit but is nonetheless very present.
By the end of the Second World War,
Schuon’s Alawi branch had become his own
order – the Maryamiyya – and V â l s a n h a d
parted with Schuon and established his own
Alawi branch in Paris. V â l s a n ’ s influence is
limited to France, where his followers have
written for both academic audiences and
the general public, and are chiefly responsi-
ble for the surprisingly large number of
French translations of classic Sufi texts
which have been published by general pub-
l i s h e r s .
Schuon did not begin to attract a follow-
ing among scholars in the United States
until the final decades of the 20t h c e n t u r y ,
when a number of professors of religious
studies and of other subjects in American
universities became followers of his. The
two most famous of these are probably
Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Huston Smith,
whose The Religions of Man (1958) has now
sold over 1,750,000 copies under its original
title and its current title, The World’s Reli-
g i o n s. As is the case with other best selling
works by Traditionalists, The Religions of
M a n is not overtly Traditionalist, but is in-
spired by and permeated with Traditional-
ism. Nasr is one of the most publicly promi-
nent Muslims in the United States, and the
author of various well-known books. He is
also remarkable as the first major Tradition-
alist to be Muslim by birth rather than con-
v e r s i o n .
The consequences of
Traditionalism in the West
Muslim Traditionalists have had little im-
pact on the development of Western civi-
lization, but have been successful in provid-
ing an alternative understanding of Islam to
that normally found in the West, one with
which most Westerners find it far easier to
sympathize. Although this has rarely been
recognized, it has sometimes been more of
a Traditionalist than an Islamic alternative.
In addition to the books on Islam written
by Traditionalists such as Nasr and Lings,
there have been events such as the ‘World
of Islam Festival’ held in England in 1976,
the message of which – Islam as a beautiful
and traditional civilization – reached a wide
public: the Festival involved many of Lon-
don’s major museums as well as the Arch-
bishop of Canterbury and Queen Elizabeth
II, and received wide media coverage. Major
events such as this are infrequent, but
nonetheless significant. Ten years later (in
1986) for example, an Italian Traditionalist,
Felice Pallavicini, happened to be part of the
Muslim delegation to a Day of Prayer held in
Assisi by Pope John Paul. As a result of this,
he received wide and sympathetic coverage
in the Italian press for some time. Much of
what was then reported as the view of Islam
was in fact more Traditionalist than Islamic.
Traditionalism in
the Islamic world
Western Traditionalists tend to be reticent
about both their Islam and their Traditional-
ism, especially when they are academics. In
contrast, Traditionalists in the Islamic world
feel no need to be reticent about their Islam,
and have little choice but to be open about
their Traditionalism, since the background
knowledge of their audiences means that
they are unlikely to mistake Traditionalist in-
terpretations of Islam for mainstream inter-
pretations. Traditionalism in the Islamic
world also differs from that in the West in
terms of its organization. A Western Tradi-
tionalist in search of a Sufi order is likely to
choose a Traditionalist order for geograph-
ic, linguistic and cultural reasons. In the Is-
lamic world, a Traditionalist has plenty of
existing mainstream orders from which to
c h o o s e .
The most important Traditionalist organi-
zation in the Islamic world was not a Sufi
order but the Imperial Iranian Academy of
Philosophy, established in 1974 by Seyyed
Hossein Nasr with the support of the Shah.
This Academy was a well-financed body,
which not only began a project for the study
and restoration of Traditional sciences, but
also attracted major figures from overseas.
Although Nasr fled Iran at the Revolution
and has never returned, the Imperial Acade-
my survived with a change of name, and
Iranian Traditionalists today participate in
debates such as that on religious pluralism,
and are regularly interviewed in a number
of publications. Their views are regarded
with some sympathy from circles within the
Basij militia to the Qom seminary.
Traditionalism is also important in parts of
the Islamic world where there are no Tradi-
tionalist organizations, as for example in
Turkey. Large numbers of Traditionalist
works were translated into Turkish during
the 1980s and 1990s; whilst they have not
achieved massive sales, they are widely
available, and present a direct if subtle chal-
lenge to the fundamental principles and
values of the modern Turkish state. They are
generally read not by old-fashioned Turkish
Muslims but by the educated elite. In the
same way that in the West Traditionalism
generally appeals to intellectuals, in the Is-
lamic world it generally appeals to Western-
ized intellectuals, or at least to intellectuals
familiar with Western currents of thought.
Traditionalism and Islam
In Western terms, Traditionalism is primar-
ily an intellectual explanation and justifica-
tion of that alienation from contemporary
modernity that certain Westerners feel, and
a path into Islam for many of those who find
this explanation convincing. In Islamic
terms, it is not just a condemnation of West-
ern modernity, but also a reaffirmation of
one particular variety of Islam. It is of little
interest to radical or political Islamists, en-
dorsing as it does what may be called pre-
Salafi Islam. Even in these terms, however, it
differs somewhat from mainstream inter-
pretations, most obviously in its emphasis
on the so-called ‘transcendent unity’ of reli-
gions. For a Traditionalist, Islam is but one
among many expressions of an essential re-
ligious truth that is in certain senses greater
than Islam. Such views have caused real ten-
sion between Muslim Traditionalists and
other Muslims. ◆René Guénon 
in Cairo shortly
before his death.
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Southe ast  As i a
N O OR H AI D I  H A S A N
A young student wearing ripped jeans, with long hair
and an earring, was called on by a group of people
wearing long flowing robes while he was having din-
ner at a food stall in a street of Yogyakarta. The
group of people harassed him and forced him to
leave his food. They accused him of being the trou-
blemaker of the crisis and disaster facing Indonesia
today. This situation occurred at the beginning of
August 2000, when the first national congress of mu-
jahidin was to be held on the re-establishment of the
s h a ri ca in Indonesia.
Islamic Radicalism
and the Crisis
o f t h e N a t i o n - S t a t e
Approximately two thousand people repre-
senting various ‘radical’ groups that are par-
ticularly in the public eye at moment, at-
tended the congress. Amongst the partici-
pants were Laskar Santri (Santri Paramilitary
Troops), Laskar Mujahidin (Mujahidin Para-
military Troops), Kompi Badr (Badr Compa-
ny), Brigade Taliban (Taliban Brigade), and
Pasukan Komando Mujahidin (Mujahidin
Command Force). A number of influential
Muslim figures gave talks at the congress,
such as Deliar Noer, Mansyur Suryanegara,
Syahirul Alim, and Alawi Muhammad. They
discussed one central theme: the applica-
tion of the Islamic s h a ri ca as highly neces-
sary in order to solve various problems and
disasters occurring in Indonesia today.
Recently, almost every week in Jakarta,
the Front Pembela Islam (The Front of the
Defender of Islam) conducts r a z z i a. They go
to cafés, discotheques, casinos, and other
venues which they accuse of being dens of
iniquity and break up the on-going activi-
ties without being hampered by security
agents. A few months ago, a major force
called Laskar Jihad (Jihad Paramilitary
Troops) even openly trained its members to
engage in combat and stated its readiness
to go to the battle field in the Moluccas. Sev-
eral times, similar groups wearing white
long-flowing robes and turbans took to the
streets in protest against President Abdur-
rahman Wahid’s policies, such as his pro-
posal to withdraw the MPR (People’s Con-
sultative Council) decree on the banning of
the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). They
also recently protested against the position
taken by KOMNASHAM (National Commis-
sion for Human Rights) in dealing with cer-
tain crucial issues.
Islamic radicalism
The phenomenon of Islamic radicalism in
Indonesia has emerged since the multi-di-
mensional crisis facing the country in 1997,
which resulted in the collapse of Soeharto’s
regime. This movement marked a new
phase of the relationship between Islam
and the state, after the severe long-term re-
pression of political Islam by the state. Since
then, the existence of radical groups on the
political scene has become increasingly re-
markable and even ‘attractive’. But what is
the background of the emergence of such
groups and is there any link between them
and the changing socio-political and eco-
nomic situations within the historical course
of the nation?
The efflorescence of Islamic radicalism in
Indonesia cannot be disassociated from the
fast current of modernization and develop-
ment projects run by the state during the
last 30 years. In the past, the state has not
provided sufficient space for all segments of
society to express themselves and their in-
terests in terms of modernization and devel-
opment. The expression of political Islam,
for instance, was often marginalized and re-
pressed by the authoritarianism of the state.
However, this apparently could not be
maintained, as there were moments when
the state had to face the so-called legitima-
tion crisis, which has increasingly expanded
since the end of the 1980s. In order to re-
strain the spread of this crisis, the state
should seek out new means such as, for ex-
ample, promoting a strategy of conservative
Islamization, particularly focused on the ac-
centuation of the Islamic symbols in the
public discourse, or accommodating the re-
ligious socio-political powers. A number of
organizations and institutions using Islamic
symbols have come to the fore. The Islamic
Court Bill was introduced, followed by the
presidential decree on the Compilation of
Islamic Law. Islamic s h a ri ca banks and insur-
ance companies were created everywhere,
and thousands of mosques were built under
the sponsorship of the state. In a very short
time, the state drastically moved away from
its former secular position and Muslim fig-
ures began to run the political scene.
Behind the conservative Islamization pro-
ject run by the state at that time, there were
many groups which, after losing hope, affili-
ated themselves to the project, or at least
felt that they were going in that direction.
Indeed, many groups saw this as a promis-
ing opportunity. Muslims who had been
forced to remain in the periphery and who
were given limited space in national politics
found a new way to enter the political, so-
cial and economic arenas of the state. Those
Muslim groups that had lost hope were bu-
reaucrats, politicians, merchants, business-
men and even military, to name but a few.
They believed that in this way they would
be able to change the fate of their society,
their nation, and their state – not to men-
tion their own.
Within these groups, there were also sub-
groups which had been active in their resis-
tance to the state before the mid-1980s and
had struggled to give voice to the establish-
ment of an Islamic state. At certain times
they resorted to violence, as demonstrated
by a group of young people led by Abdul
Qadir Djaelani, calling themselves the Pola
Perjuangan Revolusioner Islam (The Pattern
of Revolutionary Islamic Struggle), who
rushed the People’s Consultative Council’s
assembly in March 1978. Two years before,
the actions of the Komando Jihad (Jihad
Command), led by H. Ismail Pranoto, erupt-
ed but were suppressed only in 1981. In that
same year, a group of people who were
loyal to Imran M. Zein carried out a set of at-
tacks on police stations and other govern-
mental services. The attacks culminated in
the hijacking of a Garuda Indonesia aero-
plane on 28 March 1981. Yet another attack
took place in 1984 in Tanjung Priok, North
Jakarta, when hundreds of people, com-
manded by Amir Biki, demanding the libera-
tion of their four colleagues were fired at by
military troops. This tragedy cost dozens of
lives. They did not stand a chance in the face
of the state repression. The peak of their im-
potency occurred when the state forced all
socio-political organizations to accept the
Pancasila. As a result, many, hiding their real
faces, became active in the underground. 
Radical neo-fundamentalism
When the crisis erupted, all that they had
worked to achieve was suddenly put to an
end. A number of sub-segments within the
wave of conservative Islamization began to
experience deep frustration due to this dra-
matic turn of events. Their aspirations of
slowly taking control over the economy
were shattered and their hopes of running
the political scene were destroyed. Despite
the last general election having demon-
strated attempts to accommodate all socio-
political powers, not all groups were satis-
fied. This was mostly due to a general feel-
ing of not having acquired sufficient repre-
sentation. They felt they were being margin-
alized again in the current of reformation,
which led Abdurrahman Wahid to the presi-
d e n c y .
Taking the aforementioned historical
processes into account, we can regard the
phenomenon of Islamic radicalism in In-
donesia as a site of resistance to the hege-
mony of the state by marginalized seg-
ments of society within the context of major
political, social and economic change. The
aim of this radicalism is to make these mar-
ginalized voices heard in the public sphere.
Since hegemony functions through dis-
course, Islamic radicalism often attempts to
produce a counter-discourse by criticizing
secular-national expression and offering al-
ternatives to it.
Olivier Roy, a French political scientist, has
encountered a similar phenomenon in
many Muslim countries today, which he
calls ‘radical neo-fundamentalism’. He de-
fines it as a movement attempting to re-Is-
lamize society at the grassroots level,
through the re-establishment of the Islamic
s h a ri ca, without being formed within an Is-
lamic state. This phenomenon arose from of
the failure of Islamism, a modern political Is-
lamic movement which claims to re-create a
true Muslim society, not merely by the ap-
plication of the Islamic s h a ri ca, but also by
creating a new Islamic order through the
revolutionary and militant political actions,
if necessary. The proponents of the move-
ment do not see Islam as a mere religion.
Rather, they see it as a political ideology
that should be integrated into all aspects of
society. However, Roy adds that even
though Islamism has failed since the 1980s,
particularly in terms of its original target of
creating an Islamic state, its resistance and
criticism to the authoritarianism of the state
have succeeded in forcing the latter to in-
troduce a conservative Islamization policy.
Ironically, such policies did not succeed in
eliminating Islamism; on the contrary, they
have broadened its constituency and sup-
p o r t e r s .
Roy indicates that radical neo-fundamen-
talism combines political and militant jihad
to protest against the secular West, with a
very conservative definition of Islam. He
also purports that it is a supra-national
movement, working beyond the borders of
the nation-state. There is a sort of interna-
tional network in which the actors of the
movement are trained and given financial
support. Furthermore, the movement at-
tempts to demonstrate the failure of the na-
tion-state, seen as caught between national
solidarity and globalization.
In the recent bombings in several major
cities in Indonesia these days, many suspect
the Indonesian Islamic radical groups. Presi-
dent Wahid even commanded the chief of
police to arrest an influential figure of the
Front of the Defenders of Islam, Sayyid Ali
Baaqil. No one knows what the future holds
for Indonesia, but one thing is clear: the vio-
lence, to quote Roy, ‘is more a sign of weak-
ness than the harbinger of a new wave of Is-
lamic militancy’. Because political Islam re-
mains in the periphery, it may never suc-
ceed in changing the strategic landscape of
the Muslim world. ◆
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So uthea st As i a
C L A U D I A  DE R I C H S
The ruling party in Malaysia, the United Malays’ Na-
tional Organisation (UMNO), has set up a website to
demonstrate its various jihad efforts. The mere act of
creating such a website – regardless of its content –
reveals much about the competition for ‘being Islam-
ic’ in Malaysia these days. Since it is primarily politi-
cal parties that are the protagonists in this competi-
tion, Islamization in Malaysia has become a highly
political issue rather than a direct outcome of Islamic
social movements. UMNO and PAS, the Islamic Party,
oppose each other vehemently.
Politicizing Islam
in Malaysia
There is an underlying societal demand for
stronger Islamic commitment on the part of
Malay politicians. The term ‘Malay’ should
be stressed in this context, as it is mainly the
ethnic Malays (55% of the Malaysian popu-
lation) who consider themselves t h e M u s-
lims of the country. Among the other ethnic
groups – Chinese (30%), Indians (7%) and in-
digenous people – Muslims form a minority.
A Malay is defined by the religion of Islam,
and since the political power is in the hands
of the Malays, Islam has been constitutional-
ly declared the official religion of Malaysia.
The semantics of Islam have transcended
the aura of Malaysia’s mosques, s u r a u s, and
private Muslim spaces and entered into the
realm of the political public as a whole.
In a column headlined ‘Dr M: PAS "jihad" a
disservice to Muslims’ in the (government-
friendly) mainstream newspaper, The Star,
on 12 August 2000, the Prime Minister Ma-
hathir Mohamad was quoted complaining
that what PAS committed was not a holy
war, but were rather activities that advocat-
ed a split in the (Malay) community. On the
other hand, he held that UMNO’s struggle
could be considered a real jihad, ‘more
structured and long term in nature, and
aimed at both developing the country and
empowering the community with the latest
knowledge and skills to ensure that Muslims
were respected by others.’ The reason for
hoisting the battle flag is the fear of disunity
among the Malay community. A disunited
Malay community poses a potential threat
to political stability, hence to the balance of
ethnic power relations.
Loss of hope
Responsible for the change of tide are the
recent domestic developments which have
affected the Muslim as well as the non-Mus-
lim public. In particular, the sacking of and
verdict on former Deputy Prime Minister
Anwar Ibrahim provoked a cry of indigna-
tion. When Anwar was co-opted into UMNO
in 1982, he had been known in the country
as an extraordinarily charismatic leader of
the Islamic Youth Movement ABIM. In view
of the multi-ethnic society in Malaysia,
Anwar introduced a model of a civil society
that was devoted to the acceptance of the
diversity of religions and traditions. In his
writing on masyarakat madani, he empha-
sized that a multi-ethnic nation-state such
as Malaysia necessitates civil and societal in-
tegration, while at the same time accentuat-
ing his personal affiliation to Islam which
has played a pivotal role in his political ca-
r e e r .
A Muslim youth leader, Anwar could be in-
tegrated perfectly into the programme of
modernization and Islamization the
Malaysian government sought to carry out.
Until Anwar’s being dismissed in 1998, the
Mahathir and Anwar orchestra performed a
symphony of mutually sustainable and ben-
eficial concerns. By the mid-1990s, Malaysia
had become considerably Islamized without
getting caught in the trap of Islamist ex-
tremism. When Anwar joined the govern-
ment as Deputy Prime Minister, the domi-
nant reference in the state’s agenda was a
combination of ‘Malay’ and ‘Islamic’ with a
developmentalist orientation. It was ur-
bane, modernist and democratic in charac-
ter, and bound to an Islamic and ethical
framework. The ousting of Anwar from gov-
ernment and from UMNO is still viewed as a
dismissal of reformist Islamic and democrat-
ic principles. Muslim morale has been se-
verely affected by the fact that Anwar was
accused of sodomy. Malays cried shame on
Prime Minister Mahathir for this accusation
– regardless of whether there was some
truth to it or not – non-Malays also joined in
supporting Anwar as the most integrative
figure of the ethnically heterogeneous soci-
ety. Putting him in jail for 15 years symbol-
ized the loss of hope that half a nation had
until then maintained for political change
embedded in Islamic moral principles.
The spreading
o r t h o d o x m o o d
During field work in Malaysia, two years
after this watershed-like incident, it became
clear that changes had taken place but in
quite another direction than was intended
in the late 1990s. Observing the scenes at
public universities, the drastically increased
number of female students wearing the
t u d u n g (headscarf) and male students wear-
ing the k o p i a h (skullcap) was striking.
Teachers admit that a trend of demonstrat-
ing one’s Muslim identity has emerged and
that it has become exceptional even for fe-
male Malay teachers not to wear the t u d u n g.
Campus events such as annual gatherings
are accompanied by loud n a s y i d music, the
Malay version of Islamic pop music, whereas
proposals to celebrate the Chinese lantern
festival on the campus are declined by uni-
versity authorities. The ‘new juvenile theoc-
racy’ at the public universities, as political
scientist Farish Noor has dubbed them, mir-
rors the atmosphere of a rapidly growing Is-
lamic assertiveness and conviction among
the Malay populace. In a do-it-yourself man-
ner, ultra-conscious Muslims seem to be de-
termined to counterbalance the indecent
liberties that are expected to arrive with the
free use of IT and the internet. In a Malay-
dominated primary school, new rules on
n o n -h a l a l food have been declared which
remind the non-Muslims not to bring in
such food during break time. This continued
to the extent that reminder notes were
placed on the canteen pillars. On the other
hand, no one shows concern when Muslim
pupils happily munch their beef sandwiches
while sitting next to classmates of Hindu-In-
dian origin.
The spreading orthodox mood and asser-
tion reflect non-material demands of a soci-
ety which has become increasingly aware of
the arbitrariness of state power in times of
crises. Asking young urban Malays why they
are fond of the Islamic party, the reply is that
PAS leaders are able to attract the people
spiritually. Spiritual attraction can translate
beliefs into action, and for many Malays this
is exactly what is required to lead the nation
out of its current crisis. Non-Muslims also
appear to appreciate the rhetoric of PAS, de-
spite some highly provocative remarks of
party leader Nik Aziz Nik Mat. Nik Aziz al-
most regularly draws the attention of the
nation and the media towards himself by
expressing that, for example, pretty women
should not apply for good jobs because
they can be married by rich men who are
able to care for them, and that women who
expose their belly buttons in public must
not be surprised when they are raped by
men. He does not have to wait long before
the voices of protest make themselves
heard, but still his party enjoys an increasing
number of followers and huge audiences
wherever PAS leaders address the people. A
popular saying holds that UMNO leaders
pay the audience for attending a conven-
tion, whereas in the case of PAS, the audi-
ence pays for attending.
New opportunities
For those who want to discuss and to be
informed but do not have access to non-
mainstream media, let alone the internet,
the mosque is the place to go. Censorship is
hardly extendable into the mosques, and if
it were, a mass exchange of i m a m s w o u l d
have to occur to replace the current ones
with exclusively ‘non-political’ ones. The hu-
miliating fate of Anwar Ibrahim and the con-
sequent formation of a large opposition
movement have given birth to a coalition of
forces opposed to the government – and
PAS is an important part of it. Together with,
among others, the Chinese-dominated De-
mocratic Action Party (DAP), the multi-eth-
nic People’s Party (Parti Rakyat Malaysia,
PRM), which is preferred by many intellectu-
als, and the National Justice Party (Keadi-
lan), PAS forms the Alternative Front
( B a r i s a n Alternatif). What keeps the coalition
together is the opposition to the ruling
coalition (of which UMNO is the de facto rul-
ing party) and the struggle for an account-
able, transparent, and pluralist political sys-
t e m .
Holding such divergent parties together is
not an easy task, particularly when multi-
ethnicity is to a large extent associated with
a multi-religious setting. The government
camp tries to take advantage of the internal
conflicts in the opposition coalition and re-
unite the Malays under UMNO’s roof. For
this reason, the ruling party is now commit-
ted to jihad.
The current competition for religious and
ethical merit and distinction forms a fertile
ground for all sorts of religious-political ide-
ologies to spread, be it in the direction of Is-
lamic radicalism or politically-enriched cults
and mysticism.
The possibility of articulating interests in
an Islamic rhetoric and the aggregation of
these interests through parties, organiza-
tions, and networks offers a political oppor-
tunity structure which the existing political
system does not provide. Functioning as a
valve to release emotions that have been
bottled up, non-Muslims can utilize this op-
portunity structure as well. Through a
process of ‘Islamic lingualization’ (islami-
sche Versprachlichung, R. Schulze), a politi-
cal discourse that lacked public recognition
has now been brought before a mass audi-
ence. By way of a coalition, a symbiosis of re-
form movement and Islamic movement has
evolved. Whether this symbiosis is heading
in an ‘exclusive’ or ‘inclusive’ direction re-
mains to be seen. An exclusive direction
would mean that the Muslims and non-Mus-
lims in Malaysia remain separate from each
other once the aim of toppling the current
government has been achieved. This would
no doubt add fuel to the fire of those who
sternly believe that politics in Malaysia are
ethnically divided – and they are many. An
inclusive direction would mean that the op-
position forces would be able to form a vi-
able multi-ethnic coalition. For the time
being, the nation is witness to a competi-
tion between the two major Malay parties,
UMNO and PAS, both seeking to win the
‘best Muslim party’ award. Sadly, the ethni-
cally and culturally integrative and progres-
sive ideas of a civil society, embedded with-
in an Islamic ethical framework, are increas-
ingly ridiculed in politically instrumental-
ized jihads and by radical ideologues that
take advantage of the attractiveness of Is-
lamic rhetoric. ◆
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South As i a
MA R E I K E  J U L E  W I N K E L M AN N
Can a woman become an a l i m a? While there is a vast
amount of information and literature on the subject
of Muslim men’s learning in m a d r a s as, this is not the
case for the women’s religious schools. A visit to a
women’s m a d r a s a called Jamiatul Banaath, located
in India’s sixth largest city, Hyderabad, is the basis
for further research on this topic.
Visiting a Women’s
Madrasa in Southern India
upcoming exams the students were given a
day off, he nonetheless offered a guided
tour and a meeting with the faculty mem-
bers. A long rickshaw drive through one of
the more backward areas of Hyderabad fol-
lowed; and the narrow streets generated
anxiety as well as curiosity with a view to this
first meeting.
The Jamiatul Banaath is located in a resi-
dential area. The already narrow road that
leads to the building is flanked by school
buses that pick up and bring home those
among the more than 1200 students who
live in the more far-off areas of the twin cities
of Hyderabad and Secunderabad. The buses
look out of place on this particular day, as
there are no students around. With a friend-
ly and welcoming smile, one of the teachers
offers me a handful of brochures about the
school, adding that he would appreciate
their distribution abroad, so that people
would come to know about the school’s mis-
sion. He then begins to lead the small group
– the rickshaw driver, a reporter of the S i a s a t
and myself – on a guided tour. Every now
and then a glimpse could be caught of
women wearing their b u r q as and n i q a bs ,
crossing the extensive inner court in the di-
rection of the staircase. Respectfully and qui-
etly they greet the teachers.
The first stop is the library, where books
are stacked in padlocked glass cases. The
shelves are filled with numerous Q u r ' a n v o l-
umes in Arabic, h a d i t h collections, and books
on f i q h in Arabic and Urdu. This is all there is
time to identify, since only moments after
entering the cool hall, a veiled woman
comes rushing in. Only by her eyes one can
tell that she is smiling. The group is urged to
go upstairs, in the direction of the staff
room, which is situated at the end of the
long gallery. On the way, an unveiled
woman who is obviously not a student lifts
the heavy curtains separating the class-
rooms from the gallery, allowing us to look
inside the small, empty rooms. One of the
male teachers kindly lifts the curtain that
separates the staff room from the gallery, his
gestures stating politely that he has to stay
behind. Some of the women who are gath-
ered inside speak English as they point to an
empty chair. There is a lot of giggling in the
room now, bringing me to the realization of
how difficult it is to guess the age of a
woman who wears a n i q a b. Apparently the
women in the staff room are still very young.
This guess is confirmed when a number of
them suddenly take off their n i q a b s, expos-
ing their broad smiles to the outsiders. One
of their first questions is neither about my
name, nor about my home country or pro-
fession, but why I, as a foreigner and non-
Muslim, am so interested in conducting re-
search on a women’s m a d r a s a. The question
seemed important to them and to me it was
a relief that they asked it so directly. Once
the young women were given the answer
that someone coming from a different cul-
tural and religious background could still be
genuinely interested in this project, we went
on to talk about the school. The girls can
study up to the university level at the Jamiat-
ul Banaath and are awarded the a l i m a d e-
gree after four years of Islamic studies and
the f a z i l a degree after two more years. The
syllabus encompasses subjects similar to the
standardized syllabus of the m a d r a s a s f o r
men. In other words, the girls study Arabic
and Arabic literature, the Q u r ' a n, t a f s i r, the
h a d i t h traditions and fiqh, but in addition to
these subjects the teaching includes English
as well as ‘Home Science’ (childcare, sewing
and cooking). Most of the teachers are for-
mer students of the Jamiatul Banaath.
It seems that the aim of the Jamiatul Ba-
naath is not merely to shape the students
into good housewives, caring mothers and
good preachers; they are encouraged to
take up a profession. One of the main ques-
tions in subsequent research will be to what
extent this encouragement is limited to a
separate female sphere in society. This sepa-
rate female sphere can be asserted, because
in their roles as teachers, doctors and social
workers, which seem to be the most promi-
nent professions among young educated
Muslim women, they mainly work among
other women. ◆
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Making an appointment to visit the m a d r a s a
requires a great deal of patience. For a week,
almost every phone call went unanswered,
and those that were answered often re-
vealed that the person in charge was absent.
On the last possible day, with the help of an
editor of the local Urdu newspaper S i a s a t,
which is also known for its affiliated educa-
tional trust, some goodwill materialized as
one of the teachers of the Jamiatul Banaath
voiced a welcoming invitation over the
phone. While making clear that due to the
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So uth As ia
Y O G I N D E R  S I K A N D
Early in the year 2000, a series of bombs went off at
twelve places of worship, mostly churches, in differ-
ent towns in South India. Police officials claimed to
have discovered evidence that a hitherto little-
known Muslim group, the Deendar Anjuman, was in-
volved in masterminding the blasts. Leaders of the
Deendar Anjuman based at the group’s headquar-
ters in Hyderabad strongly denied the allegations,
claiming that the Anjuman was actually set up for the
purpose of promoting peaceful relations between
people of different faiths.
The Deendar
A n j u m a n
Between Dialogue
a n d C o n f l i c tThe present controversy concerning the An-
juman’s alleged role in the bomb blasts
must be viewed in the context of the sect’s
origins. Siddiq Hussain, founder of the Anju-
man, was born in 1886 at Balampet in the
Gulbarga district, then part of the Nizam’s
Dominions. As a young man, he joined the
Qadiani community, but soon renounced
his membership, accusing the Qadianis of
being k a f i r s for considering Mirza Ghulam
Ahmad as a prophet. It is likely that he, at
this time, moved closer to the rival Lahori
branch of the Ahmadis, who split off from
the main Ahmadi j a ma ca t over the question
of the status of the Mirza. Unlike the Qadia-
nis, the Lahoris, led by the well-known Is-
lamic scholar Maulana Muhammad cA l i, in-
sisted that the Mirza was not a prophet but
simply a m u j a d d i d (renewer of the faith). It is
possible that Siddiq Hussain might actually
have formally joined the Lahori j a ma ca t, for
in his tract, ‘Aca d a - i - I s l a m’ (‘Enemies of
Islam’), dating back to the mid-1920s, he
wrote that he and members of his Anjuman
believed that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had
been sent by God as the m u j a d d i d of the 14t h
Islamic century. He also indicated that he
continued to hold the Mirza in great esteem.
Launching of the Mission
In early 1923, the Arya Samaj, a militant
Hindu chauvinist group, launched a massive
drive to bring into the Hindu fold hundreds
of thousands of Muslims. Muslim leaders re-
sponded by launching efforts at countering
the Aryas through various Islamic mission-
ary (t a b l i g h) groups. Alarmed by the grow-
ing success of the Aryas, Siddiq Hussain set
about launching his own missionary cam-
paign among the Hindus, seeking to bring
them into the Muslim fold. He first turned
his attention to the Lingayats, a group of
Shiva-worshippers living mainly in the Kan-
nada-speaking districts of the Nizam’s Do-
minions. Once, while on a trip to the shrine
of Kodekkal Basappa, known to his Muslim
followers as Muhammad Sarwar, a Sufi high-
ly venerated by the local Lingayats, he re-
portedly heard that the Sufi had predicted
the arrival of a saviour of the Lingayats, in
the form of ‘Deendar Channabasaveswara’,
who would be born in a Muslim family and
would ‘make the Hindus and Muslims one’.
This, he announced, was a prophecy herald-
ing his own arrival, claiming that in a dream
God informed him that he had been ap-
pointed as an avatar of the Lingayat saint
Channabasaveswara to bring all the Hindus
of India to Islam. He now also claimed to be
the saviour of the Hindus, the Kalki Avatar,
who would herald the arrival of the age of
truth (sat yug) in 1943, with only those who
accepted Islam being saved. The Deendar
Channabasaveswara, along with his army of
Pathan followers would, as he claimed that
the Hindu scriptures foretell, ‘empty the
treasuries of the [temples of] Tirupati and
Hampi’, and ensure that ‘there is not one
idol left standing in any temple’ in the coun-
try. He would then set about ‘uniting all the
101 castes [z a t]’, by making all Hindus Mus-
lim. In the process, the power of the Brah-
mins would be completely destroyed. Final-
ly, the Deendar Channabsaveswara would
be recognized as the ‘king of kings’ (b a d s h a-
hon ke badshah) .
It is possible that, not finding a warm re-
sponse to his appeals among the Lingayats,
Siddiq Hussain turned his attention to other
Hindu groups as well. As in his missionary
work among the Lingayats, Islam was pre-
sented here not as the negation, but rather
as the fulfilment of Hinduism. In a booklet in-
tended for a Hindu readership, Siddiq Hus-
sain wrote that God had sent prophets to all
peoples, and that they all taught the same re-
ligion (d i n), al-Islam, and that the last of these
was the Prophet Muhammad. All the previ-
ous scriptures, he claimed, had predicted the
arrival of Muhammad as God’s last prophet
for all mankind. Therefore, it was the duty of
all non-Muslims to accept Muhammad and
his teachings in accordance with what their
own prophets had predicted about him. He
argued that the coming of Muhammad as
the universal saviour had been predicted in
many Hindu scriptures. Quoting liberally
from them, he remarked that the arrival of
Muhammad as ‘the World Teacher’ had been
‘prophesied so vividly and in such detail’ in
the books of the Hindus as ‘cannot be found
in any other religious texts’. Hence, Hindus
had to convert to Islam if they were to be
saved and if they were to remain true to the
commandments of their own scriptures.
The Muslims, whom Siddiq Hussain had
looked to for support in his mission, seem ei-
ther to have ignored him or to have come
forth in open opposition. Numerous cu l a m a
issued f a t a w a of k u f r (infidelity) against him
on account of his claims to being an avatar
of Channabasaveswara, declaring him to be
a crypto-Qadiani, an allegation that he
strove hard to refute. An enraged Muslim
even went so far as to attempt to kill him.
Despite this, Siddiq Hussain persisted in try-
ing to convince Muslims of the legitimacy of
his claims and of the importance of his mis-
sion, presenting his work as being in line
with orthodox Islam. Siddiq Hussain stressed
that he had been sent on a divine mission,
declaring that the Prophet Muhammad him-
self had appointed him as the imam ul-nas
(imam of the people) and the i m a m - i -
a q w a m - i-ca l a m (imam of all peoples of the
world) and, in that capacity, as the ‘brother
(b h a i) of all Muslims’. Despite his efforts, Sid-
diq Hussain seems to have been greatly dis-
illusioned with the lukewarm support he re-
ceived from the Muslims of Hyderabad,
which may have been the main reason for
his subsequent decision in 1932 to leave the
state and head northwards to Yaghestan, in
the Pathan borderlands.
Hijra and Jihad
Anjuman sources describe Siddiq Hus-
sain’s migration, along with several of his
close followers, to Yaghestan as an emula-
tion of the Prophet’s Hijra from Mecca to
Medina in order to stir up the Pathans. Then,
at the head of a grand Pathan army, he
would descend to the Indian plains, pre-
sumably to fight the British and establish Is-
lamic rule in the country, with himself as the
imam. According to an Anjuman source,
some 6,000,000 Pathans are said to have
joined his mission of jihad. In 1934, he an-
nounced that he had received a divine reve-
lation (i l h a m) that all of India would shortly
convert to Islam. ‘Rejoice! Oh Musalmans!’,
he declared to the obvious delight of his fol-
lowers, ‘the whole of India will soon turn
Muslim’. Presumably, the time was now ripe
for the jihad. His rousing up of the Pathans
for war was now taken seriously by British
authorities, who arranged for his arrest in
1936 and sent him back to Hyderabad,
where he spent the next few years in jail.
In 1939, following his release, he set up a
military training centre for his followers in
Hyderabad, the Tehrik J a m ica t - i - H i z b u l l a h
(The Movement of the Party of God). At this
time, he also penned two tracts: ‘The Practi-
cal Science of War’ and ‘The Principal Armies
of Asia and Europe’. Alongside these prepa-
rations for war, he kept up his missionary
work, dispatching letters to several Indian
and British leaders, including Gandhi, the
Viceroy and King George V, asking them to
convert to Islam.
1947 and after
By the end of 1946, fierce rioting between
Hindus and Muslims had spread all across
India, and Hyderabad was not left unaffect-
ed. Large-scale massacres of Muslims in the
western districts of the Nizam’s Dominions
were reported. Reacting to this, Siddiq Hus-
sain appealed to his followers to commence
‘defensive fighting’ against ‘the enemies of
Islam’. In late 1948, Indian troops invaded
and took over Hyderabad. According to An-
juman sources, Siddiq Hussain and his fol-
lowers fought the Indian forces on 27 differ-
ent fronts, but were soon captured at their
headquarters at Asif Nagar and taken into
custody. Siddiq Hussain was later released,
remaining alive for barely two months, a pe-
riod in which he prepared an ambitious pro-
gramme for missionary work in India. In re-
sponse to the changed political context, he
prepared a new method of missionary work
for his followers to adopt. This he gave the
name of the Panch Shanti Marg (The Five Pil-
lars of the Way of Peace). This Sanskrit name
was, it seems, deliberately chosen to com-
mend the Anjuman to the Hindus, although
it appears to have been modelled on the
‘five pillars’ of Sunni Islam, including eko ja-
g a d i s h w a r (t a u h i d, belief in the One God);
eko jagat guru (belief in Muhammad, the
‘seal of the prophets’ (khatm al-nabiyyin), as
the ‘World Teacher’); sarva avatar satya ( b e-
lief in all the prophets as true); sarva dharma
granth satya (belief in all religious scriptures
as true); and sammelan prarthana ( ‘ c o l l e c-
tive prayer’, the Islamic form of worship). In
this manner, the missionary agenda of the
Anjuman was played down and an impres-
sion was created that the Anjuman was gen-
uinely committed to a generous ecumenism
transcending all religious barriers.
Siddiq Hussain died in April 1952, and was
succeeded by Sayyed Amir Hussain as the
head of the community. Under Amir Hus-
sain, the Anjuman continued the missionary
activities begun by its founder, projecting
itself as a peaceful group, committed to
inter-communal harmony, which organizes
regular inter-religious dialogue confer-
ences. It was estimated that by the late
1990s, the Anjuman counted some 15,000
members, mainly in Hyderabad and in sev-
eral towns and villages in South India, in-
cluding some 100 full-time roving mission-
a r i e s .
Thus, militancy and pacifism seem to have
characterized the missionary strategy of the
Anjuman at different times depending on
the broader socio-political context. If there
is any truth at all to the allegations that the
Anjuman was involved in the recent bomb
blasts, it would point to a return to Siddiq
Hussain’s jihadist strategy of the 1930s as a
response to the growing challenge of Hindu
militancy in India today. ◆
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Ce ntra l  As i a
J I L L I A N  S C H W E D L E R
In 1995, many Islamists seemed torn about the poli-
cies and practices of the emerging Taliban in Afghan-
istan. On the one hand, the Taliban could be seen as
freedom fighters struggling against infidels (and for-
eign intervention) to create an Islamic society gov-
erned according to strict adherence to Islamic law, or
s h a ri ca. On the other hand, Taliban leaders were im-
plementing extremely repressive measures not only
against the Jews, Hindus, and Sikhs – that had long
coexisted with Afghanistan’s majority Muslims – but
also against Afghani Muslims. Why did the Taliban
create such uneasiness among Islamists? The follow-
ing examines transnational dialogues among Is-
lamists as they debated whether or not to support
the Taliban.
T r a n s n a t i o n a l
Islamist Debates
about the Taliban
The late 20t h century was marked by a wide
range of Islamist frames – incorporating
anti-colonialist, anti-leftist, integrativist, rev-
olutionary, and even Marxist ideas – that
sometimes competed and sometimes ac-
commodated each other. The integrativist
frame, which focuses on working within ex-
isting political structures to realize a more
Islamist society, dates back at least to Has-
san al-Banna in the 1920s. Those who
adopted and developed these ideas have
been characterized as integrativist because
the norms of dialogue, debate, and consen-
sus are embraced as key mechanisms for
achieving social change. When, by the mid-
1980s, a number of Arab regimes were faced
with economic and other crises that
brought increasing political dissent, many
opted for limited liberalization as a mecha-
nism for channelling dissent into control-
lable institutions. A number of Islamist
groups, many with affinities for Banna’s in-
tegrativist thinking, opted to enter into
these political systems and contest public
elections for state offices. They formed po-
litical parties, created civil society organiza-
tions, and formulated party platforms. Over
the next two decades, a distinct public
sphere emerged around the dialogue
among these integrativists, with such wide-
ly heard and engaged voices as those of
Rashid Ghanoushi, Hassan Turabi, and Abd
al-Karim Soroush.
Within this transnational Islamist public
sphere, a consensus began to emerge
around the central norms of this integra-
tivist frame. Innumerable voices weighed in
on the question of Islam and democracy,
while newly formed Islamist political parties
shared their experiences, both successes
and failures. The late 1990s also saw the
emergence of a network of Islamist research
institutes, many of which are open to for-
eign and non-Muslim researchers in an ef-
fort to demonstrate their integrativism in
practice. Along with mechanisms such as
the internet, these research institutes have
begun to play a significant role in shaping
the content of the transnational dialogues
through their conferences and reciprocal in-
vitations to sister institutions in other coun-
tries. With such exchanges, transnational
debates emerge around ‘hot’ topics such as
civil society, the role of women, local gover-
nance, and the environment.
By the time the Taliban emerged in Sep-
tember 1994, integrativist voices were
widely heard within transnational Islamist
debates. While the dialogue focused on the
most appropriate means of bringing about
an Islamic society, integrativist arguments
demonstrated a significant level of accom-
modation. Armed struggle, for example, re-
mained acceptable in anti-colonialist and
authoritarian settings. When Islamists are
not given the opportunity to work within
the system, they reasoned, they have no al-
ternative but to struggle against that sys-
tem. Thus integrativist Islamists have no dif-
ficulty justifying the political violence, for
example, of Hamas and Hizbollah against Is-
rael (an occupying force), or of the FIS and
its many militant offshoots in their struggles
against Algeria’s repressive military regime.
The problem for integrativist Islamists was
not that their strategies directly conflicted
with the policies of the Taliban since the
contexts of each political struggle were
quite different. Rather, difficulties arose
around the boundaries of justifiable behav-
iour. Working through democratic institu-
tions, even if it entails accepting the right of
secular or leftist groups to coexist, is justifi-
able in terms of the Islamic norms of consul-
tation and consensus; political violence is
justifiable in contexts in which such oppor-
tunities are not available. The contention
around the Taliban arose not because of the
Taliban’s armed struggle to establish a state,
but because of its highly repressive domes-
tic policies toward Afghani Muslims. In this
regard, three issues of contention stand out
as significant in integrativist debates about




A decree issued in November 1996 by the
Taliban’s religious police, for example, placed
the following restrictions on women:
Women have been subjected to virtual
house arrest, and movement in public is
highly restricted, even when wearing the
mandatory head-to-toe b u r k h a. Women are
forbidden to visit tailors, and tailors are like-
wise forbidden to take the measurements of
female customers. Girls’ schools have been
closed entirely, as were many boys’ schools
following the prohibition of female teachers
in male classrooms. And of course, women
are forbidden not only from political partici-
pation, but also from even voicing issues
within the public sphere.
This treatment of women has been be ex-
tremely problematic for integrativist Is-
lamists not because they hold liberal views
toward women, but because they have
sought to extend the norms of participa-
tion, consensus, and consultation to include
the voices of women, who make up half of
the Islamic community, or u m m a h. In this re-
gard, the education of women is widely
viewed as desirable. While the question of
women’s political participation is somewhat
more contested, the policies of the Taliban
toward women are simply not justifiable for
integrativists on either strategic or Islamic
grounds. While the Q u r ' a n does state that
no woman can lead the community, it also
praises women whose efforts had been inte-
gral to the survival of the first Muslims. Such
debates have unfolded in transnational Is-
lamist public spheres including on the inter-
net, at conferences and workshops, and in a
Women, you should not step outside your
residence. If you go outside the h o u s e ,
you should not be like women who used
to go with fashionable clothes wearing
much cosmetics.1
range of publications available across na-
tional borders. Numerous Islamist web sites,
for example, circulated petitions and decla-
rations condemning the Taliban’s repressive
policies toward women. ‘This is not true
Islam’, they declared to an audience of Mus-
lims and non-Muslims alike.
Pluralism within transnational
Islamist debates
The question of women is related to an-
other contentious issue: pluralism. The cur-
rent integrativist frame was shaped partly in
response to the opportunities that opened
to Islamist groups beginning in the 1980s.
As these ‘moderates’ deliberated over when
and to what extent an Islamist programme
can be reconciled with the norms of liberal
democracy, they focused on such Islamic
notions as consensus ( i j m ac) and consulta-
tion (s h u r a). In the process, the norm of a
plurality of voices became central to the in-
tegrativist Islamist frame. Of course, all of
society should be Islamic, but within such
confines a plurality of voices is both desir-
able and necessary.
Although 90% of Afghanis belong to the
Sunni Hanafi sect, Afghani society has al-
ways been marked by the presence of nu-
merous minority groups, including Shi’i
Muslims, several Pashtun tribes, Tajik clans,
Ismaelis, Bukharan Jews, Hindus, and Sikhs.
Integrativists’ contextual reading of Islam
not only allows for a diversity of Muslim
voices, but calls for actively engaging other
voices in the public sphere. The Taliban, in
contrast, are extremely intolerant of even
alternative frames within Muslim dia-
logues. While the debate about the limits
and meaning of pluralism has long been
prominent within transnational Islamist
debates, the issue here is that integrativists
have highlighted the desirability of a plu-
rality of voices in a manner that makes the
Taliban’s repression of such voices difficult
to accept.
What is Islamic about a beard?
Perhaps the issue that has drawn the most
outrage from integrative Islamists concerns
the Taliban’s demand that men grow their
beards. In a decree issued in December
1996, the Taliban declared that men are not
only forbidden to shave their beards, but
that their beards must be at least a fist in
length. To further enforce this regulation,
any man who shaves and/or cuts his beard
within less than a one-and-a-half-month in-
terval should be arrested and imprisoned
until his beard becomes bushy.3
For integrativist Islamists, many of whom
are clean shaven and/or wear Western-style
suits, the beard mandate is patently absurd.
Muhammad Zabara, an integrativist Islamist
member of Yemen’s Islah Party (who sports
’Growing a beard is the tradition of
Islam’s Prophet Muhammad that must
be followed by Muslims. Men without
a beard [at least a fist in length] will not
b e considered for jobs or services.’
Mullah Mohammad Omar,
Leader of the Taliban2
a trim moustache and no beard), expressed
bewilderment with respect to the decree:
I don’t understand it. What is Islamic about
a beard? Yes, the Prophet Muhammad wore a
beard, but what are non-Arab Muslims to do?
Does this mean that the Muslims of Indonesia
are infidels? It must mean that I am not a
good Muslim.4
One might have concluded that because
these policies of the Taliban clearly conflict
with the central integrativist norms, the de-
bate among integrativists within transna-
tional Islamist public spheres would have
quickly moved to condemn the Taliban.
However puzzling it may be, they did not.
Over the course of several years, a consen-
sus did emerge over the idea that many Tal-
iban practices violated the tolerant spirit of
Islam, particularly through the contribu-
tions of prominent thinkers to the debate.
The voice of Rashid Ghounoushi, for exam-
ple, has been central to debates around the
issue of reconciling the norms of an Islamic
frame with the norms of liberal democracy.
Within transnational debates condemning
Taliban practices, his voice has been among
the most prominent. Yet early responses to
the Taliban were indecisive precisely be-
cause the integrativist frame had no clearly
articulated position on what policies of a
ruling Muslim regime were too extreme for
its Muslim citizenry.
As an Islamist group struggling to realize
an Islamic society in Afghanistan, the Tal-
iban was welcomed by the broader transna-
tional Islamic community. Only when its
policies towards its own Muslim citizenry
seemed to violate the central norms of inte-
grativist Islamists did criticism of the Taliban
emerge. Personal ties have exacerbated
these tensions, as many Islamist groups
have members who were trained in
Afghanistan in the 1980s (though those
connections do not necessarily remain
strong). There may also be issues of iconog-
raphy at work, in that integrativists initially
found it difficult to condemn any group that
was struggling for Islam in the face of for-
eign domination, secularism, and general
adversity. Yet as the Taliban received con-
siderable attention within international
public spheres of debate, integrativists rec-
ognized that they faced the challenge of
distinguishing themselves from the Taliban
in their ultimate social objectives. By 1997,
just two years after transnational Islamist
debates about the Taliban emerged, inte-
grativists seemed to have agreed that Tal-
iban policies did not reflect, in their view,
the true spirit of Islam. ◆
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Mi ddl e Ea st
F AR H AD  K H O S R OK H A VA R
The 1979 Iranian revolution ended up in a theocratic
regime that mobilized an important part of urban
youth for both the war against Iraq and the realiza-
tion of a utopian Islam. Two decades later, a new
type of cultural-political movement, with democrat-
ic tendencies, is emerging and is founded mainly on
three groups: intellectuals, university students, and
w o m e n .
New Social
Movements in Iran
Throughout the 1990s, a post-Islamist intel-
lectual movement has been developing in
Iran that challenges the foundations of the
Islamic Republic as conceived by Imam
Khomeini in his theory of velayat-e faqih ( T h e
Guardianship of the doctor of the law) which
legitimizes an Islamic theocracy within a
closed political system, despite the exis-
tence of universal voting rights recognized
by the Constitution.
The intellectuals
Islamist intellectuals, such as Shari’ati and
Khomeini, advocated a closed system in
which politics and religion are directly
linked, whereas the post-Islamist intellectu-
als try to dissociate religion from politics.
These new intellectuals are by and large in
their fifties. At the time of the Revolution,
most of them were strong advocates of revo-
lutionary Islam and some had extreme leftist
tendencies. For example, Abdolkarim
Soroush was a revolutionary who participat-
ed, at least initially, in the ‘Cultural Revolu-
tion’ which resulted in the closure of univer-
sities. The same holds for Mohsen Makhmal-
baf, the filmmaker who had fought against
the Shah and who, after the revolution, was
a radical Islamist. These two, like many oth-
ers, have now changed sides and advocate a
tolerant vision of Islam in contrast to the
closed political field imposed by radical Is-
lamists. They contest the strongly advocated
notion held by Islamist thinkers, above all by
Shari’ati, of the close association between
politics and religion that gave birth to the Is-
lamic Revolution. In the 1990s, numerous Is-
lamist intellectuals began to gradually
change perspectives and to renounce the
revolutionary Islamist ideology.
Lay or clerical intellectuals, such as Soroush,
Mojtahed-Shabestari, Ayatollah Montazeri,
Mohsen Kadivar, and Eshkavari challenged
the Islamic theocracy in the name of Islam it-
self. These intellectuals split into many
groups: the first one consists of advocates of
a purely spiritual Islam, who challenge the
velayat-e faqih in the name of Islam. Accord-
ing to this group, the politicization of Islam
only discredits the faith. The second group
leans toward a limited, purely legislative, in-
tervention of Islam in society. According to
Kadivar and Montazeri, society must orga-
nize itself, without the intervention of the
faqih. The latter has only the right of supervi-
sion (n e z a r a t), and not of political domina-
tion (v e l a y a t) over society. The third group
comprises secular intellectuals who reason
in terms of modernity with no reference (or
simply a purely instrumental one) to Islam.
All three groups agree that the existing
regime is breaking the Constitution (1979-
80), and that the law should be respected by
the state and all other groups. Despite their
diversity, the post-Islamist intellectuals are
also united in their implicit rejection of the
velayat-e faqih, in the approval of ‘civil soci-
ety’ (or what some of them call ‘religious civil
society’), and the will to assert the rule of
law. This movement has access to journals
and publications, most of which have been
banned or attacked by violent pressure
groups, and the judiciary.
These intellectuals have a deep influence
on the young generation of university stu-
dents, who read their writings and attend
their debates at universities, despite all re-
pressive attempts at intimidation, including
imprisonment and, in some cases, execution.
The students’ movement
The students, who form the second social
movement in Iran, are largely inspired by the
post-Islamist intellectuals, but their de-
mands are not limited to those of the intel-
lectuals. The latter demand the freedom of
expression and the widening of social partic-
ipation in the political sphere, a demand also
shared by the young people. For example, a
student association like the Daftar-e Tahkim-
e Vahdat, which was a revolutionary and mil-
itant force representing the Islamist univer-
sity students until the first half of the 1990s,
has changed sides, defending Khatami and
his reforms against the pressure groups and
the conservatives.
The young generation comprises the nu-
meric majority, more than 60% of the popu-
lation being below 24 years of age. Most of
the youth did not experience the Shah’s
reign. One of the fundamental demands of
this movement is that of freedom in daily life
– freedom of dress, freedom to meet those
of the opposite sex in public space, and the
freedom to participate in the modern world,
especially in its diverse consumerist aspects
– without being harassed by the special Is-
lamic police who guard against overstep-
ping the forbidden boundaries of proper Is-
lamic conduct (such as the Bassij, Komite,
Monkerat, etc.).
Before Khatami, young people were con-
stantly pursued and harassed everywhere, in
universities, classrooms, streets, and in their
own cars by these repressive bodies and
they suffered continuous humiliation at
their hands. Since Khatami’s election, there
is some relaxation of this state of surveil-
lance, but many feel that this is a precarious
freedom as the vigilantes can harass them
on certain days, while on other days they are
left alone. And while there is still no guaran-
tee of security, the most humiliating mea-
sures against them have been lifted.
The Islamic regime, which used to be the
basis of the collective identity of the young
revolutionary generation of the 1980s, has
been transformed over time into a power
opposed to the youth. It is now feared and
despised for the violence and repressive
rigour it imposes on the new generation. 
The women’s movement
Finally, there is also a new women’s move-
ment, which can be best understood by refer-
ring back to the Revolution, when for the first
time in Iranian history, women’s presence was
crucial in street demonstrations. (In the most
massive of these, a third of the participants
were women.) Nevertheless, at the time, the
vast majority of these women had no specific
demands based on their gender. Women in-
tellectuals were mostly influenced by Marx-
ism and maintained the corresponding no-
tion that once the proletariat would come to
rule, women’s issues would be automatically
resolved. As for Islamist women, they be-
lieved that Islam would adequately solve
women’s problems by re-establishing the
communitarian harmony destroyed by the
monarchy. Consequently, there were no
specifically gender-based demands among
the vast majority of women demonstrators in
the 1978-1979 Revolution.
However, the onset of the Islamic regime
brought with it serious restrictions on
women. Primarily, they were forbidden to oc-
cupy certain administrative positions, and
those who worked for the state under a con-
tract were laid off or did not have their con-
tracts renewed. With the establishment of Is-
lamic laws, numerous other obstacles were
imposed on women, diminishing their equal -
ity of status: exclusion from certain jobs (such
as being a judge); inequality of divorce (the
man can divorce his wife, but not vice versa);
inequality of guardianship of children after di-
vorce (the man can keep male children after
the age of 2, and female children after the age
of 9); unequal laws of inheritance (women re-
ceive one-half of a man’s share); and the in-
equality in the face of justice (a woman’s tes-
timony counts as half of a man’s).
The women’s movement in the 1990s
began on the precept that the installation of
the Islamic regime had led to the regression
of women’s rights on many levels. At the
same time, in fields such as education and
health, women’s presence has improved. Lit-
eracy has increased among both sexes, and
women’s access to modernity, at least in the
field of education, is approaching that of
men. Much more than in the past, girls in rural
areas have access to schools. There is thus an
increasing equalization of access to moderni-
ty for women in schools and universities.
However, once they enter the labour market,
they find themselves excluded by social
mores, by men, but also by Islamic legislation.
Increasing modernization brings them intel-
lectually and psychologically ever closer to
men, making the legal denial of access to
equality incomprehensible, even scandalous
in their view. As long as women’s social and
cultural lives were different from those of
men, this inequality was perceived as ema-
nating from ‘natural’ differences. But now, the
intellectual status and living conditions of
women have changed, especially among the
urban middle and lower middle classes,
where many women work so as to maintain a
decent standard of living in their household.
The legal inequality becomes all the more in-
tolerable with the increase in economic hard-
ship faced by those in the urban areas, but
also by the vast majority. Despite the difficul-
ty in obtaining equal pay for equal work,
women’s incomes are vital and sometimes
even necessary to pay for children’s basic ed-
ucation.
Women’s political rights of citizenship are
theoretically almost equal to those of the
men. On the one hand, a woman’s vote in
elections, or any other exercise in citizenship,
counts the same as that of a man. In the par-
liament, their rights and voices count the
same as any male deputy. However, when it
comes to family law, the inequality becomes
flagrant: a woman cannot travel without the
explicit permission of her husband, she can
be divorced without any convincing reason
and can be denied the right of keeping her
children after divorce. Nonetheless, some of
these measures have changed recently due to
women’s intervention in the public sphere
and in the Parliament.
Before the revolution, secular and Islamist
women were opposed to one another, but
now, facing similar disillusionment with legal
inequalities, they are moving closer together.
Towards a new civil society
These intellectuals’, university students’
and women’s movements, while being dis-
tinct, do have several things in common.
They renounce revolutionary violence and
are willing to construct a society based on di-
alogue and compromise. On the one hand,
since Khatami’s election in 1997, the ab-
solute majority of the people support the de-
mocratic turn. On the other hand, a signifi-
cant degree of political power remains in the
hands of anti-democratic conservatives, in-
cluding: the juridical branch and the impor-
tant office of the Supreme Leader of the Rev-
olution, which is in the hands of Ayatollah
Khamenei; the Revolutionary Foundations,
which have access to significant sums of cap-
ital lying outside government control; the
Counsel of the Guardians, who can veto all
the laws that seem un-Islamic to them; and
the Office of the Superior Interests of the Is-
lamic Regime, which arbitrates between the
Parliament and the Counsel of the Guardians
in case of disagreement between them.
Thus, we are faced with a post-Islamist soci-
ety, with a divided power structure whose es-
sential instruments nevertheless continue to
be in the hands of the conservatives, while all
the groups fighting for the opening of Iranian
society are losing patience as the promised
reforms run into institutional obstacles. ◆
Regional Issues1 8 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  7 / 0 1
Mid dl e Ea st
AH ME D S E DK Y
The historical city centres in the Middle East are very
well endowed with artefacts and significant architec-
ture. The urban fabric found within these rich con-
texts can be said to be the binding force of cultural
heritage, along with the social qualities and values
that are integrated into these urban environments.
Yet modernity, globalization, and many other vehi-
cles of radical change have severely affected the tra-
ditional urban phenomena of the Middle East. Urban
conservation has therefore become imperative, sur-
passing the typical limited concerns of the restora-
tion and preservation of historical buildings in the
r e g i o n .
R e g i o n a l
Cooperation of
Urban Conservation
in the Middle East
Conservation in the Middle East today is
generally meant for complete quarters. Sev-
eral projects have been conducted in the re-
gion to confront the swift deterioration of
certain areas. The crucial questions now
being posed relate to how urban conserva-
tion should be carried out and even how to
define it within the specific Middle Eastern
context: Is it a kind of wide restoration that
covers entire buildings and streets? Is its ef-
fectiveness determined by whether a syn-
chronic approach to preserving the past is
employed? And if not, if we involve people,
namely the occupants, in the area of the
conservation process, thus inciting urban
regeneration, to what extent can we inter-
vene? Another valid question concerns the
criteria to be used in evaluating such pro-
j e c t s .
An exploratory approach was taken in car-
rying out the present research, the aim of
which was to compile contextual considera-
tions of urban conservation that can
emerge from a deep understanding of the
studied phenomena, their potentials, prob-
lems, and possible answers. Therefore, sur-
veying the conservation conceptions and
built-environment problems of different
cases proved to be the best tool for explor-
ing the meaning and the actual problems of
urban conservation in the Middle East.
It is vital to find a common base for vari-
ous urban conservation considerations or
guidelines. The latter term can tend towards
rigidity, whereas the very nature of the con-
servation process implies variety, including
regional variety. This often leads planners
and professionals to function in a very spec-
ulative mode when responding to problems
or suggesting intervention during both the
design and implementation phases of urban
conservation projects.
In order to avoid presuppositions and to
maintain a contextual base for all potential
considerations, a naturalistic paradigm of
research has been followed, while the ex-
ploratory approach allowed for the prob-
lems to be defined and answers to be sug-
gested with respect to the given data.
An initial expedition to Istanbul and An-
talya, Turkey, was followed by another to
the Fertile Crescent Region (financed by the
Barakat Trust, UK). These were accompanied
by a pilot study of the ongoing ‘Revitaliza-
tion of the Fatimid’ project in Cairo. The
study covered the projects that have been
carried out in the following cities: Amman
and Umm Qais (Jordan); Damascus and
Aleppo (Syria); Beirut and Tripoli (Lebanon);
and Cairo (Egypt).
All of these countries share several simi-
larities, both culturally and in terms of the
development process. They were the first to
be exposed to European influences before
and after colonialism. Moreover, religious
and political bonds have played a substan-
tial role in creating strong interaction
among different cities of this entire zone of
the Middle East even since before the Mam-
luk Period (1250-1517 AD). It is for this rea-
son that these countries were chosen for
the initial phase of the present inquiry – a
choice which offered maximum consistency
in terms of the urban environments of these
countries’ historical quarters – almost all of
which are experiencing threats to and dete-
rioration of their traditional urban fabric.
Such an undertaking requires deep aware-
n e s s of the potential and requirements of
the given contexts, and the relevant ecolog-
ical and demographic systems. It is neces-
sary to develop a framework proper to
urban conservation, which can only emerge
from such awareness. This, however, neces-
sitates the accumulation and integration of
knowledge and experiences gained from
the various ongoing and completed urban
conservation projects in different parts in
the Middle East.
What is needed is regional cooperation
among the many professionals involved in
the urban conservation processes of the
Middle East. A forum could contribute to
such cooperation by encouraging discus-
sion and presenting the experiences and
plans of those involved. Initially, the mean-
ings of the historical quarters, their present
function, and what they mean within their
contemporary context would have to be
clearly defined. Urban conservation as such
should also be defined. Furthermore, ques-
tions about the type of intervention neces-
sary for sustainable and effective conserva-
tion should be raised.
Such an undertaking responds to the
strong call for establishing a regional com-
mittee on urban conservation, composed of
coordinators as well as research members
representing each of the concerned Middle
Eastern countries. All coordinators with
their associated teams would have the task
of maintaining contacts and cooperation
with the local institutions and NGOs. There
are several real attempts already underway
to realize this goal. Regional events can also
secure the exchange of information as a
step towards synthesizing a regional charter
on urban conservation.
A practical step has been taken to organize
the First Regional Conference of Urban Con-
servation in the Middle East, under the aus-
pices of the Jordanian University of Science
and Technology (JUST) to be held in the fall
of 2001. The main objective of this event is
to establish a regional link among the pro-
fessionals and activists in the field and to
pave the way for the much-needed accumu-
lation of experiences in the field.  ◆
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1 . Died in 911 CE, the first Zaydi imam in Yemen.
2 . This encounter took place in 1994 during the
author’s fieldwork.
Bernard Haykel is assistant professor of Middle
Eastern Studies and History at New York University.
E-mail: Bernard.haykel@nyu.edu
Mi ddl e Ea st
B E R N AR D  H A Y K E L
One of the salient features of religious life in Yemen
in the modern period has been the fading of histori-
cally rooted Yemeni forms of Islam. Zaydi scholars,
for example, have been reduced to a minority group
within the body of the u l a m a and have little say in the
running of the country’s affairs. The Shafici Sufis of
the Hadramaut have faired even worse. The most vis-
ible form of Islam, and the one actively promoted by
the state, claims to be above the sectarian identities
of the Yemenis and ultimately adheres to the Salafi
school. This requires explanation since Salafism is
not usually associated with Yemen’s religious and in-
tellectual history.
The Entrenchment of
’ N o n - S e c t a r i a n ’
Sunnism in Yemen
The most commonly invoked name in offi-
cial government discourse on religion and
law in contemporary Yemen is by far that of
Muhammad b. cA l i al-Shawkani (d. 1834).
Shawkani was the chief judge of the Qasimi
imamate in the late 18t h and early 19t h c e n-
turies who had, through his writings and
political activities, attempted to mould
Yemen’s legal and political environment in a
Sunni fashion. Shawkani was a Traditionist
Sunni, or Salafi, who claimed that his legal
and religious opinions were derived from a
direct interface with the primary sources of
revelation (Q u r ' a n and Hadith), and not
from the derivative works of the established
schools of law. In so doing, he negates the
multiple legal and sectarian divisions of lat-
ter-day Muslims. For him, most of the juridi-
cal textual legacy from the time of revela-
tion could be ignored in favour of the teach-
ings of m u j t a h i d scholars like himself. Em-
bedded in Shawkani’s teachings was a call
for reform and an overhaul of Islamic legal
thought, elements which would later appeal
to Muslim states as well as modernist intel-
lectuals, who saw in his ideas a means of re-
forming their own societies.
Shawkani’s vision of social and political
order involved establishing a bureaucratic
state, the centre of which would be a top-
ranking jurist, a chief judge like himself. This
jurist would have to have an independent
intellect and be the ‘renewer’ of collective
truth; in short, the source to which scholars
and rulers alike should properly resort. The
shift from Zaydism to Sunnism, which
Shawkani had a central hand in effecting,
was part of larger transformations in Qasimi
state structures. The Qasimi imams, who
ruled Yemen from the 17t h to the 19t h c e n-
turies, were interested in establishing a dy-
nastic state in the 18t h century. Shawkani’s
vision accommodated their needs; hence an
alliance was struck whereby Traditionist
scholars legitimized the rule of the Qasimi
imams and in return, the imams provided
patronage in the form of appointments and
p r o t e c t i o n .
In the Yemeni context, a clear and distinct
chain of Shawkani students has perpetuat-
ed his legacy to the present day. Shawkani’s
status as the symbol of both Yemeni nation-
alism and pan-Islamic reformist thought in a
Sunni Traditionist mode has risen consider-
ably since the Yemeni republican revolution
in 1962. In addition to major avenues,
schools and university halls being named
after him, the republic promotes the editing
of his works, and officially subscribes to his
Traditionist interpretation of Islam. Appeal
to his ideas and symbolic status as a much-
recognized pan-Islamic reformer has proven
to be an effective tool in silencing the more
traditional Zaydi opponents of the republi-
can regime. Briefly stated, the argument
against the traditional Zaydis runs as fol-
lows: Zaydism’s intrinsic moderation and
acceptance of m u j t a h i d s allowed a figure
like Shawkani to emerge from within the
school and be patronized by the Qasimi
imams. Therefore, Shawkani’s understand-
ing of Islam is in fact consistent with the t r u e
teachings of Zaydism. The not so negligible
affirmation that Shawkani systematically at-
tempted to demolish the teachings of the
Zaydi school in a number of his works is in-
variably passed over in silence.
Another reason for the allure of Salafi
Islam in Yemen is the fact that elements in
Shawkani’s teachings resonate with specifi-
cally modern Muslim concerns about Islam’s
decline and the necessity for renewal and
rejuvenation. By monopolizing his dis-
course, the Yemeni state has garnered for it-
self an efficient means to instituting a more
standard, or what can be termed ‘generic
Sunni’, interpretation of Islam. And because
Shawkani’s Salafism has a considerable fol-
lowing across the Muslim world, all provin-
cial and historically rooted conceptions and
practices of Islam can be attacked for being
a t a v i s t i c .
The extent to which this ‘generic Sunnism’
has become dominant in Yemen can be
gleaned semiotically by looking at the way
most Yemenis pray in mosques nowadays in
the regions considered to be Zaydi. Like Ma-
likis – but unlike S h a f ici s, Hanafis and Han-
balis – Zaydis practise the i r s a l while praying
(i.e. they do not place the right hand over
the left, a practice referred to as d a m m, but
keep their hands lowered to their sides).
Very few Yemenis practise the i r s a l n o w a-
days, and some even make a point of pray-
ing in a non-Zaydi fashion. Though anecdo-
tal, these and other bodily practices are im-
portant markers of religious identity and re-
veal a shift to a more Salafi practice of Islam.
Encounter with a tribesman2
In S acd a, the traditional Zaydi bastion in
the country, was a 22-year-old tribesman
from cU s a y m a t, historically a Zaydi tribe of
Hashid. He had been recently recruited by
al-Amn al-Siyasi (political security service).
When asked about the local Zaydis’ com-
plaints that their tombs were being dese-
crated and destroyed by the students of the
scientific institute (where the tribesman had
been educated) and other ‘Wahhabi’ sym-
pathizers, his answer was categorical: ‘The
Hadawis are practising reprehensible inno-
vations [sing. b i dca] when they visit their
tombs and erect grave stones and domes
over them. This is contrary to Islam and
must be stopped.’ 
He insisted on referring to the local Zaydis
as Hadawis, revealing that he had accepted
a feature in the propaganda war that is
waged against them by Sunni Islamists. This
consists in asserting that Zayd b. cA l i ( t h e
eponym of the Zaydis) did not establish a
school or sect – thus no one has the right to
use his name – and that it was the ardent
followers of al-Hadi Yahya b. a l - H u s a y n1 w h o
had established a wayward sect, thereby
placing themselves beyond the pale of or-
thodoxy. Furthermore, his statement about
visiting tombs clearly indicates that this
young man had imbibed and accepted the
Traditionist/Wahhabi discourse on graves –
an important leitmotif in their literature. The
proof offered for his assertions was a recita-
tion of a number of Sunni prophetic tradi-
tions about the reprehensibility of erecting
and visiting graves. Perhaps the most re-
markable feature of this encounter is that
this man no longer identified with the his-
torical school to which his forefathers had
belonged, and he had the intellectual and
scriptural wherewithal to vilify it. In compar-
ison with his tribal ancestors, his knowledge
of Islam was more considerable, but the
content and the forms it took bore closer
affinity with that of a contemporary Islamist
in Riyadh.
The way Zaydis have coped
Republican state policies have effectively
marginalized traditional Zaydi scholars from
the political arena. With few notable excep-
tions, such scholars have not benefited in
terms of administrative or political appoint-
ments. Zaydis often speak of a combined
onslaught by the state and by the Wah-
habis, whose influence has been especially
significant in the S acd a province. The only
organized effort by Zaydis to reclaim influ-
ence has come belatedly with the establish-
ment of Hizb al-Haqq (The Party of Truth) in
1990 after the unification of the two
Yemens. Al-Haqq’s general secretary, Sayyid
Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Shami, does not
mince words in explaining why the party
was established:
It is implicit here that the republican gov-
ernment has allowed this to take place and
is therefore guilty by association. Politically,
al-Haqq has proved ineffectual. It won only
two seats in the 1993 parliamentary elec-
tions and none in 1997. In part, this is due to
the ambiguous nature of a Zaydi political
party operating in a republican context
where it is all too easy to identify it with a
call for reviving the imamate. In an unsuc-
cessful attempt to clarify matters, al-Shami
and other eminent Zaydi scholars issued a
statement in which they declare their aban-
donment of the institution of the imamate.
The imamate, they assert, is a historical con-
struct that is no longer valid. The most im-
portant matter for the present age is to at-
tend to the welfare (s a l a h) and the better-
ment (i s l a h) of the Muslim community. The
latter, alone, has the right to appoint a
leader, who is not an imam in the strict
sense, but rather a hired servant (a j i r). Final-
ly, this Muslim leader may be descended
from any lineage and belong to any race as
long as the affairs of the u m m a are safe and
sound. The institution which once defined
Zaydism was thus done away with in a few
p a g e s .
A number of Zaydi scholars do not agree
with the positions taken by al-Haqq’s lead-
ership, whether it is on the issue the ima-
mate or regarding participation in the polit-
ical processes in Sana’a. They remain for-
mally outside the party, preferring to lead a
Look, Saudi Arabia is pouring lots and
lots of money into Yemen to promote its
own version of Wahhabi Islam. This is ac-
tually an irrational and uncompromising
version of our religion, which we can do
without. So, we need to counter those ef-
forts… and to fight intellectual advances
by Wahhabism into Yemen.
life on the geographical and political mar-
gins of Yemen. When unable to change an
unjust regime, Zaydism advocates the prac-
tice of ‘emigration’ (h i j r a) from the abode of
injustice to a more secure area where a life
devoted to righteous living can be pursued.
A number of leading Zaydis, such as Majd al-
Din a l - Mu ca y y a d i and Badr al-Din al-Huthi,
live in rural areas where they teach. Thus far,
no one has claimed the imamate. Instead,
the more senior scholars have encouraged a
younger generation of Zaydi activists to
pursue activities in the fields of education,
religious exhortation, and the editing and
publication of Zaydi manuscripts. The two
most prominent men of this younger gener-
ation are al-Murtada al-Mahatwari and
Muhammad cI z z a n.
By and large, the efforts of traditional Zay-
dis to resuscitate their vision of religious
and political order have been limited and
mainly defensive, reacting to policies un-
dertaken by the state or their Salafi oppo-
nents. Both in ideological and political
terms, the response of the Zaydis has been
meagre, being confined to the publication
of texts and the establishment of a small
number of schools and institutes. The story
of the Zaydis and their detractors continues
to unfold, but the outcome appears to have
been determined in the mid-18t h c e n t u r y
when the state chose to support Traditionist
scholars such as Shawkani, whose intellec-
tual heirs continue to dominate the juridical
and political scene in Yemen. ◆
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Recent press coverage of what has been coined as
‘curfi marriage’ seems to bear witness to evolving sex-
ual norms in Egyptian society today. More than to the
phenomenon itself, for which no serious statistics are
available, our attention should be drawn to the la-
belling procedures indulged by the press and ‘popu-
lar literature’. Perceptions of sexuality and curfi m a r-
riage, and the way in which society is portrayed, re-
flect an attempt to incorporate the changing norms
within a revived Islamic code. Reading the press, one
discovers with astonishment an unleashed resent-
ment of and blame on the youth and women.
Perceptions of
cU r f i M a r r i a g e
in the Egyptian Press
Religious men, prominent sociologists and
psychologists are recurrently invited to give
not so much a scientific account, but a
moral sermon about the deep-seated illness
in our morally decadent society. On the
other hand, however, issues of youth and
sexuality are now publicly discussed and in-
terestingly touchy, though often unac-
countable, information is circulated.
A customary Islamic matrimonial institu-
tion, which has resisted the centralized reg-
istration policies of the modern nation-state
by surviving alongside the Personal Status
Law, cu r f i marriage requires two witnesses
and a third party to oversee the contracting
of marriage. cU r f i marriages can generate so-
cial and legal problems the minute conflicts
appear, since neither spouse can file a law-
suit to prove the marriage if the other denies
the relationship. Other problems arise when
women file for divorce or alimony, or claim
any of their marital rights. In Egypt, mar-
riage, divorce and inheritance are not gov-
erned by the Civil Code but by the s h a r ica, a s
progressively ‘codified’ in the 1920 and 1929
Laws of Personal Status. Most, if not all, of
the marriages covered in the press today are
not registered under this law.
That the curfi marriage has always existed
but was much less widespread before,
seems to have been forgotten in the public
discourse. For instance, an curfi contract has
been a practical way for widows to remarry
while maintaining the state pension of the
deceased husband. It was also a way of
matchmaking across classes. In Egyptian
films of the 1950s, curfi stereotypes portray
bosses secretly marrying their lower-class
secretaries while maintaining an hon-
ourable public face and life with their first
wives and children, or engaging in secret li-
aisons with women with a dubious past.
Movies thus conveyed the idea that cu r f i
marriage was a halfway solution for all par-
ties, for in the end, it was indeed permissible
though not public.
Whether the revival of this customary
marriage in a context of great economic
pressure is a strategy of youthful social ac-
tors eager to avoid moral and religious cen-
sorship of ‘illicit’ relationships, or a plain
transgression of socially accepted behav-
iour, remains to be seen. Indeed, the press
in general has placed under the heading of
curfi marriage, not only all sorts of imported
(illegal) marriage contracts presumably
flourishing in Egypt as of late, but also new
forms of curfi marriage. The confusion is
such that it becomes unclear whether what
is at stake is a problematic acknowledge-
ment of changing sexual norms or a wilful
campaign designed to oppose an ill-judged
custom. Two such confusing novelties are
the misyar, an ‘ambulant’ marriage import-
ed from Saudi Arabia whereby no economic
obligations from the man are requested;
and the m u tca marriage, which is a contract
limited in time, practised among the Shiites,
and perceived as being an import from Iran.
Parallel to that, Egyptians have acknowl-
edged that they are facing a serious crisis
concerning the institution of marriage.
Their sexual customs are changing and they
seem to face a deadlock in dealing with the
growing number of professional, divorced
and single women – at least this is what is
echoed in the Egyptian press. The spread of
what are often mere partnerships, abusively
called curfi marriages, among young stu-
dents at the preparatory, high school, and
university levels, has become the main tar-
get of tabloid and national papers. Because
the curfi marriage is part of Islamic law, cu l a-
mā ' increasingly express their views on the
state of matrimonial affairs. This has led to
diverging views within their ranks. Scores of
often contradictory fatwas have been is-
sued on whether one should validate the
new forms of curfi or refute them altogether,
along with misyar and m u tca.
The following story is drawn from cAbd a l -
Wahhab M u t a w w ic’ s popular al-Ahram Fri-
day column, ‘Barid a l - J u mca’ (Friday’s Let-
ters). A far cry from traditional ‘Letters to the
Editor’, these letters often take on the form
of biographical narratives seeking solutions
to personal dramas and possess all the in-
gredients and melodramatic overtone of
potential Arabic soap opera films.
Deviant youth
The story entitled ‘The Unexpected Visit’,
is told by a 50-year-old woman1 who says by
way of introduction that she has been quite
content with her life – a modest and honest
one. As a recent widow, she states her pride
in having raised her three children who be-
came successful in their professional and
personal lives, with the exception of her
youngest daughter, who did not obtain the
degrees necessary to enter any of the uni-
versities in Cairo. The daughter thus decid-
ed to complete her undergraduate studies
at a provincial university. The mother con-
sented to her daughter’s travelling to the
province and sharing a flat with other fe-
male students. Problems, it seems, began
during her second year there, when the
mother noticed her daughter dressing up in
tight trousers, leggings and short skirts.
Doubting her daughter’s conduct, she de-
cided to pay her an unexpected visit, only to
discover that her daughter no longer lived
with her female colleagues. To her dismay,
she learned from a letter found in the flat
that her daughter had contracted an cu r f i
marriage. In a desperate tone, the mother,
who has hidden the humiliating story from
the rest of her family, writes to M u t a w w ic,
imploring him to provide a solution.
In his answer, M u t a w w ic argues that if the
conditions of an curfi marriage are fulfilled, it
is then valid. He adds, however, that in this
particular case, and as more widely prac-
tised today among students, such unions
are immoral and invalid, because they are
carried out without the acceptance of the
family. Moreover, they are not made public.
The mother’s duty is to inform the rest of
the family of the situation so that they may
investigate the intentions of the young
man. Should he be serious and well inten-
tioned, the marriage should be public and
turned into a legally registered contract.
Should he not be serious, her daughter
should be put under surveillance by return-
ing to her mother’s house. According to M u-
t a w w ic, the daughter deviated because she
had been separated from her family and af-
firmed that it would be reparable if the
daughter be placed again under the family’s
g u i d a n c e .
In one possible reading, the story can be
said to convey two simultaneous messages:
although there is a moral condemnation of
youth and women, there is equally a chance
to repair the situation. Youths, if left on their
own, are bound by definition to immoral be-
haviour. But it is also possible to see how
through this column and other such press
releases, society is imposing a new label
upon youth and university campuses. The
message conveyed here by the press insists
on condemning deviant and ‘perverse’ sex-
uality as allowed in curfi marriage, implying
as it were that ‘loose’ sexual morals are be-
coming a prerogative of youth in Egypt.2
The fact that curfi marriage (and the recent
k h u lc or divorce law) became part of public
debates in Egypt has brought the ‘deviant
youth’ issue to the forefront. The k h u lc l a w
was passed in parliament in January 2000.
For the first time in the modern history of
Egypt, it is considered that this law will pro-
vide a significant freedom of choice to
women. The law allows wives to obtain di-
vorces in family courts within three months
if they return their dowry and give up their
rights to alimony. A clause also provides for
divorce in curfi c a s e s .
R e s p o n s e s
’cU r f i marriage equals legal prostitution’ is
the title of one of the many al-Ahram arti-
cles on marriage in Egypt.3 While the press
constantly associates lustful, mostly Euro-
pean-looking, ‘loose’ women with magni-
fied and/or invented stories about curfi l i-
aisons, thus attracting a promising reader-
ship, statistics about such liaisons are seri-
ously lacking. In a recent speech, the Minis-
ter of Social Affairs, Amina al-Guindi, stated
that curfi marriage concerns 17.2% of Egypt-
ian university students.4 One has to take
these official statistics with great precaution
since no serious survey was undertaken, nor
was there any explanation given on how
this conclusion was reached. While the a l -
W a f d newspaper mentions that these li-
aisons concern 67-70% of the total number
of university students,5 one might wonder
whether these exaggerated statistics are
Faten Hamama
and Omar Sharif 
in La Dame du
C h a t e a u .
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part and parcel of the diffuse ideology con-
demning the youth.
The general acknowledgement of chang-
ing sexual norms has prompted the sheikh
of al-Azhar to pronounce a fatwa on the cu r f i
issue. The fatwa allows cu r f i-wed women to
divorce – a way of reckoning this reality in
an attempt to rescue those trapped in it and
wishing to remarry legally, without being
otherwise liable to charges of bigamy. Earli-
er, M a j m ac al-Buhuth al-Islamiyya, al-Azhar’s
Islamic Research Academy, demanded the
inhibition of curfi practices in an attempt to
quell a phenomenon otherwise permissible
from the Islamic standpoint, but which is
growing out of control.6 Sheikh al-Azhar
(Sheikh Tantawi), in an interview, ques-
tioned the validity of curfi marriage since it
contradicted the order of the state. He
pleaded for the punishment of those who
practise it.7 His statements, however, raised
so much controversy that he was obliged to
back down. The mufti of Egypt, Nasr Farad
Wasil, recently stated again that curfi as prac-
tised in Egyptian universities, is fasid a n d
batil, invalid and illegitimate, and that the
restoration of the hymen is only valid in the
case of rape.8
Changing norms
In a society where 65% of the population is
under 30 years of age, the youth becomes
more visible, and is seen mixing in the re-
shaped public spaces such as popular cafés,
clubs, shopping centres, cinemas, and fast
food restaurants, all of which have multi-
plied in the last decade. Parallel to the grow-
ing Islamization of public space, the youth
has been equally experiencing a certain ‘re-
laxation of norms’, exemplified by the grow-
ing cross-class intermingling in Cairo. Young
girls wear Islamic attire and move freely, not
hiding their flirting with their boyfriends.
Sexuality for the middle classes is still very
much bound by the notion of chastity, at
least officially, as discourses continue about
virginity and preservation of the hymen. Fur-
thermore, no marriage is possible without
substantial financial assets and a flat: In a
country suffering an acute housing crisis, it is
no wonder that sociologists have observed
in the last decades that the average mar-
riage age is increasing. If it is true that cu r f i-
like marriages have become widespread on
Egyptian campuses – as the press likes to
make us believe – one may argue that this
generation has been smart in solving the
growing sexual tensions in a society that
idolizes marriage and is rigid in conventions
regarding the financial requirements of the
institution. One may even speculate over the
spread of curfi marriages as a hidden protest
of second-generation post-Islamist youths.
Some may be inspired by the example of the
radical activists of the 1980s and early 1990s,
when certain Islamist groups, through con-
demning contemporary society as j a h i l i y y a
(literally, ignorant; contextually, pagan or
pre-Islamic), isolated themselves in ‘Islamic’
communes that allegedly took to match-
making and exchanging women within the
group. In a recent incident, a group of m u-
tatarrifun (extremists) was found to be mar-
rying without contracts. The g a m aca c o n s i s t-
ing of ten members, among whom four were
women, justified theft by referring to corrup-
tion in society, and thus raided apartments,
stealing Q u r ' a n s and watches from mosques
to redistribute them within the group.9
These new Muslim Robin Hoods redefined
accessibility of women within the confines
of the group and invented their own sexual
c o n d u c t .
A quick glance at Cairene bookshops re-
veals that the theme of the ‘Woman’ has
come to occupy a large part of contempo-
rary male Egyptian fantasies. The covers of
popular books convey images of women as
sex bombs, over-eroticized and devilish
creatures. In his Permissible Prostitution: T h e
Modern Institution of Marriage in Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Iran (Cairo: Dar al-Khayal,
1997), cA b d a l l a h Kamal aims at exposing the
various institutions of what he calls ‘legal-
ized’ prostitution which, according to him,
are the m u tca, misyar and curfi contracts. He
places the major blame on the Saudis,
whom he holds responsible for the spread
among Egyptians of what he calls the ‘con-
tracts of adultery’ (cuqud al-zina').
Apart from so-called curfi contracts, m u tca
and misyar, Egyptian tabloids have made a
veritable sport of providing long lists of im-
ported, revived or even invented contracts.
The much talked about m i s y a r, whereby co-
habitation is not required and the wife is not
endowed with a residence, was authorized
by the late Saudi mufti, Sheikh bin Baz.
Many Egyptians saw no reason not to follow
this example. Whereas the former rector of
al-Azhar, Sheikh Sayyid M a scu d, considered
misyar improper since housing and alimony
were dispensed with, the mufti of Egypt,
Nasr Farid Wasil, has authorized it, arguing
that there are practical reasons for allowing
it. One of his justifications was the scarcity
of men, resulting from immigration to the
Gulf countries.1 0
Others attribute the success of misyar i n
Egypt to its legitimization by Sheikh Yusuf
al-Qaradawi, Egyptian Muslim Brother and
Azharite, in his now famous television decla-
ration in Qatar, in which he emphasized the
halal aspect of misyar which lies in the fact
that women themselves desire such
u n i o n s .1 1 He justified the misyar contract by
arguing that if a woman is rich and a profes-
sional, she does not need financial support.
It is a way for rich women to separate sexu-
ality from obligations. Nevertheless, al-
Qaradawi’s position stirred strong contro-
versies among other Azahrites, who argued
that misyar was invalid.
It may well be that television programmes
broadcasting pornography are contributing
to the evolution of Egyptian sexual norms,
but is pornography one of the main reasons
why cu r f i-like contracts have spread in
Egypt? Egyptians, we are told, are forgetting
their religious duties. While the government
is busy cracking down on Islamists, the press
is openly bringing about the issue of chang-
ing sexual behaviour as if it were a national
threat. The feminists and some of the cu l a-
m a' for once are united by their common
stance on current forms of cu r f i, treating
them as disguised prostitution. What may
really be at stake is the process of circum-
venting a most powerful institution in
Egypt: the eternal and omnipotent family.
Yet in the absence of the subversive ideolo-
gies that dominated in the late 1960s and
1970s, this generation is far from rebelling
against conventions. It might well be that
the official religious discourse, while being
state supported or at least silently encour-
aged to cut the ground of the Islamists, is
determining strategies of resistance among
the youth. By means of cu r f i and similar
types of contracts, they seek halfway solu-
tions that at least ease sexual tensions.
These are found in re-inventing an elastic
code of conduct that still remains within the
confines of what is thought to be ‘Islamic’
and therefore permissible. ◆
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A B E  W .  A T A
The indignity of American Christians who conve-
niently drop from their memory tales of oppression
experienced by their Palestinian Christian compatri-
ots is striking. The term ‘conveniently’ may be ex-
plained by the following unforgettable experience: I
once engaged in a conversation with an Anglo-Chris-
tian missionary on a bus trip from Bethlehem to
Jerusalem prior to the 1967 War. As a Christian born
in Bethlehem, I expressed how privileged I felt to
proclaim the honour of my birth place. Gasping with
a subdued expression, the missionary muttered:
‘And when exactly did you convert to Christianity?’
F o r g o t t e n
Christians 
in the Holy Land
It was virtually a ‘mission impossible’ to con-
vince my interlocutor that our ‘native’ Christ-
ian beliefs were not due to missionary work,
nor were they due conversions from Muslim
beliefs at the times of the Crusades. Palestin-
ian Christian churches and their communities
have dotted the Holy Land since the time of
Christ. During the last three weeks of January
2001, American (and Australian) public and
religious papers alike have failed to acknowl-
edge the presence of Palestinian Christian
Arabs, preferring instead the resurrection of
cultural, historical and religious divides be-
tween Muslims and Jews. A total of 400,000
Palestinian Christians worldwide (approxi-
mately 7% of the total Palestinian popula-
tion) have received no mention: neither in
the electronic media, nor in popular or acad-
emic discourse. The sense of betrayal has
been no less than that perpetuated by Judas.
Again I refer to the term ‘conveniently’ in
the sense that the politics of omission has
served its architects in making their subjects
endure historical stereotypes and religious
misnomers which the Anglo media and
churches forced upon them, and made
them pay the price for their guilt feelings
beginning with WWII atrocities.
As the Christian Palestinian community is
destroyed through desperation, forced emi-
gration and spiritual dissolution, their
churches have become the ‘authentic’ care-
takers for the tourist museums without wor-
shippers. For example, before l967, the Sun-
day service at my Lutheran church in Bethle-
hem attracted 800 worshippers – today only
25 maintain the tradition.
As the remaining Palestinian Christians
manage to halt emigration and strengthen
themselves through consolidation with
Muslim Palestinians under a nationalist um-
brella, unsympathetic and unavailing West-
ern missionaries will find themselves with
no pastoral role to play.
The holy sites and monuments cluttering
about them like limpets no doubt give the
land salience to (Western) Christian pil-
grims. For us ‘native’ Christians, the contin-
ued presence of fellow worshippers living in
the land, whether or not in association with
these sites, is our last breath of life.
We still find it hard to forgive the failure of
Christian pilgrims to resist the Western war
of propaganda war against the ‘native’
Christian population. Just like our Muslim
neighbours, we see the collusion of Christ-
ian pilgrims as a long-standing continuation
of the march of the Crusaders. After all, it
was largely the churches in the West, partic-
ularly Australian, which fought for the liber-
ation of the oppressed Christian population
in East Timor, Ireland and South Africa.
Perhaps it is more ‘convenient’ to remain
silent with respect to the injustices perpe-
trated against Palestinian Christians. We
ought not forget though that reconciliation
demands repair, that peace requires speak-
ing out against injustice. Now is the time for
American Christians to reach out for their
Christian brothers and sisters in the Holy
L a n d . ◆
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MA M O U N  F AN DY
Instead of focusing on the details of the current crisis
in Palestine, it is important to think broadly about the
global implications of this problem. The main obser-
vation made in the following is that the Palestinian
crisis exposes the deficiencies of the modern interna-
tional order and the limits of modernity at large. The
implications of such an observation reach far beyond
Palestine to include almost all the communities that
do not neatly meet modernity’s requisites.
Modernity’s Victims
The dilemma of
P a l e s t i n e
Modernity implies the expansion of the do-
main of the written word at the expense of
orality and oral tradition. Stripping moder-
nity from all its complexity and reducing it
to a matter of writing is limiting. However,
language is at the heart of the problem: at
the level of communication; at the level of
linkages between writing and legality; and
between writing and economic and political
empowerment. The modern nation-state is
the main instrument of this expansion of
modernity and the realm of the written
w o r d .
The domination of the written word and
the discourse of the modern nation-state
and of modernity have brought about a new
consensus and cosmology that must be
questioned if we are to become sensitive to
the plight of fragile communities. The con-
sequences of this worldview and the expan-
sion of modernity are fatal for those who are
the objects of such transformations.
Modern politics and modern intellectual
trends are about eliminating or suppressing
everything that defies the language of the
state and does not lend itself to categoriza-
tion. The sovereignty of the nation-state lies
in its power to determine anew who is legit-
imate, to distinguish between who is inside
and who is outside, and to make these defi-
nitions stick. The latter depend on a specific
language and a specific mode of represen-
tation. The lucky ones fall within this lan-
guage definition and are thus represented
as legal persons with political and economic
rights; the unfortunate ones fall outside the
language of modernity and consequently
outside legality and property rights. Every-
thing that self-defines or eludes modernity’s
categorical grasp or the language of the
modern nation-state is a challenge.
The Palestinian situation
At the heart of the Palestinian problem is
the fact that Palestinians are part of a linguis-
tic community that is inaccessible to the
West. For some in the West, Arabic is a ‘con-
troversial language’. It is the language of
emotionalism, or at least has been represent-
ed as such. In the current hierarchy of lan-
guages, Arabic, unlike English, is not one that
that defines the world today. A language’s
ranking is not unrelated to the language of
contracts, naming places and possessing and
dispossessing land. This hierarchy exists even
within a single language. Those forms that
fall outside of a particular mapping of the
world are marginal and unwritten – this mar-
ginality eliminates other forms of claims to
land and sometimes to existence.
Since the current international system is a
function of modernity, the Palestinians be-
come the victims of three layers of an op-
pressive structure: modernity, the modern in-
ternational system, and the Israeli occupa-
tion. Thus, the Palestinian situation is un-
veiled as a triple tragedy and its full complex-
ity must be addressed.
One dimension of the problem is in Israeli
hands. The other dimensions of the tragedy
lie within the larger contradictions of moder-
nity and the current international system,
which caters to sovereign states at the ex-
pense of various unfortunate yet distinct
c o m m u n i t i e s .
If we are to adopt such a perspective, the
limitations of the current rhetoric of leaving
the two parties to arrive at a bilateral solu-
tion on their own become salient and the in-
tentions behind it become obvious. It is mis-
leading to present the problem as a ‘Pales-
tinian-Israeli’ or even an ‘Arab-Israeli’ prob-
lem and absolve the dominant powers in the
current international system (as well as that
of yesteryears) from their responsibilities to-
wards a problem that resulted from the ex-
pansions and contractions of empires. The
modern post-colonial state was certainly
written in such a way that it obscured a local
history. For instance, present-day Guatemala
basically promotes a new history of the state
and its boundaries, trampling upon the his-
tory of the Mayan Indians that exist both in-
side and outside the country’s borders.
Native inhabitants are victims of displace-
ment, either at the level of time and history
or at the level of space and place. Modern
occupiers or settlers who are written in the
language of modernity have more rights
than indigenous or aboriginal people. If one
takes the issues of Palestinian refugees, or
what Oslo calls ‘displaced persons’, as an ex-
ample, and contrasts it with Israeli settlers,
the contradictions become more glaring.
Most Palestinians who live in refugee camps
and want to return to their homes in Pales-
tine may not have the written papers to
prove ownership of their own homes. A
home that has perhaps been in the family
for hundreds of years might not satisfy the
requirements of the modern nation-state
and its criteria for property rights. Palestini-
ans could offer many witnesses to testify
that indeed a particular family resided in a
certain home for years, but modern nation
states listen only to papers and legal docu-
ments they can understand.
The Israeli government was aware of this.
Following the June 1967 war, the Israeli mil-
itary government controlling the West Bank
almost immediately terminated a land regis-
tration campaign in progress. At the time of
the suspension of the programme, approxi-
mately 60% of the West Bank was left with-
out a standard form of titled ownership. The
systematic demolition of Palestinian homes
is also an element of this policy of eradica-
tion – an attempt to allow one history to
overwrite another. Since the inception of
the state of Israel, Palestinian lands were
considered terrus nullus. It is this notion of
emptiness that gave the settlers and the Is-
raeli state the power to take over Palestinian
land and homes with very little accountabil-
ity. Even Palestinian homes that are under
the control of the Palestinians are often
dead assets.
As Hernando De Soto has shown, this is a
larger problem that runs throughout what
used to be called the third world. Since the
homes are not incorporated into legality, it
would be extremely difficult for a Palestin-
ian to sell his home or get a loan against it to
better his lot. Hence, the exclusion of the
Palestinians from the written world has ex-
cluded them from the world of legality. It
has also excluded them from the world of
transactions (economic or other). Thus, it
becomes obvious that the Palestinian home
is only recognized within the testimonials of
the oral tradition. Its illegibility to modernity
and to the language of the nation-state ren-
ders it terrus nullus or nonexistent. Israeli
settlers, on the other hand, have become
the written people of modernity, both with-
in and outside of Israel. They have access to
all the paraphernalia of modernity that offer
them legal, economic and political rights.
The dilemma of the Palestinians is that they
aspire to be part of a legal system that does
not recognize their existence. The Palestini-
ans call for settlement on the basis of the Se-
curity Council Resolution 242, which was the
result of interstate wars. This resolution rele-
gated Palestinians to the status of a refugee
problem; even the current discussion con-
cerning the Madrid Conference and the sub-
sequent Oslo Agreement has been reduced
to a conversation over ‘land for peace’, with
little mention of the people.
As we adopt this state gaze and state-cen-
tred language, we become unaware that we
are trampling upon various fragile commu-
nities who were pushed into unfair arrange-
ments. Albanians, Kurds, and Chechens, na-
tive peoples of Australia and Canada, are
but a few examples. Across the globe, there
are many communities within states that
are tightly bound by the words of dominant
idioms. Their distinct rights are hidden from
v i e w .
For any Palestinian story to be heard,
Palestinians have first to be written. Only
when a Palestinian refugee is written, can
he or she gain access to modernity, become
a legal personality and consequently ac-
quire economic and political rights. Thus
the issue at hand not only concerns the in-
dependence of the Palestinian state, but
also, and perhaps even more so, the im-
provement of the economic conditions of
the Palestinians.
Because of its exclusive type of national-
ism, Israel does not accept the incorpora-
tion of the Palestinians into a bi-national
modern state with similar legal and eco-
nomic rights. Modernity is limited by the na-
ture of the Israeli state and the state of Israel
is limited by modernity’s parameters. The
only recourse for a Palestinian family is to
appeal to international law, but internation-
al law deals only with sovereign states and
the Palestinians have not yet acquired this
s o v e r e i g n t y .
By no means is Israel the only modern state
in the region that uses violence as a means of
domination. The rest of the states in the re-
gion, such as Turkey or the Arab states, resort
to violence as a way of dominating their own
unwritten societies. However, none of these
states use helicopter gun ships against stone
throwing youngsters. States speak a common
language, no matter how many translators
they employ to write their treaties. And it is
only in moving away from the agreed-upon
ignorance of this master tongue, this meeting
ground where words are supposed to meet as
equals, that we might begin to notice how lit-
tle our ears can serve us in this case. To really
listen implies, not some tricky rejection of
these shared ways of forming words and set-
ting them down, but a different way of con-
sidering what is real for political actors. How
can they hear and how much can their words
of state keep them from understanding?
Finally, the politics of reconciliation is
about forgetting past atrocities and injuries,
but the birth of a modern state is about reg-
istering and writing a history and a national
narrative through schools and various other
institutions. The Palestinians are required to
build institutions of remembering the birth
of a state and are simultaneously asked to
adopt a politics of forgetting for purposes of
reconciliation. These are the limits of
m o d e r n i t y .
As stated above, the Palestinians are vic-
tims of a triple-tiered oppressive structure of
modernity, the current international system,
and occupation. It is therefore incumbent
upon all of us to reflect, not only upon those
who are included in the world of modernity,
but also upon modernity’s victims. ◆
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S A M U L I  S C H I E L K E
M a w l i d s, traditional festivals in honour of saints, are
among the most popular, but also the most contro-
versial Islamic traditions in Egypt. Millions of people
– even half of all the Egyptians, according to an unof-
ficial estimate1 – participate in these festivals. In the
public sphere, however, Islamists and conservative
men of religion often find themselves side to side
with many secularists, both vehemently opposing
what they consider a shameful deviation from proper
Islamic and/or modern culture.
M a w l i d s are celebrated annually at saints’
shrines. People often travel to these festi-
vals from long distances in order to pay re-
spect to the saint, find a solution to a prob-
lem or a cure for an illness, meditate, meet
friends and relatives, and just have fun. Is-
lamic m a w l i d s – a number of Christian and
Jewish m a w l i d s exist as well – are closely
connected to Sufism: Sufi d h i k r ( m e d i t a t i o n )
and visits to the shrine of the respective
saint, often a Sufi shaykh, are central to the
festivities. Yet it is insufficient to describe
m a w l i d s entirely in terms of mysticism and
religious practice. These religious aspects
are mixed with more profane ones: a m a w l i d
is also an important social occasion that of-
fers a great variety of commercial entertain-
ment. On the ‘great night’, the final evening
of a m a w l i d, people crowd the area sur-
rounding the shrine, visiting tents with Sufi
d h i k r and merchants offering snacks and
sweets, target shooting and circus perfor-
m a n c e s .
The sacred and profane elements of the
festival are mixed in a seemingly unorga-
nized fashion. This impression is shared by
the participants: mūl i d (colloquial for
m a w l i d) is a common metaphor for chaos.
This mixture of apparently incompatible el-
ements is an essential feature of the
m a w l i d s and one of the main reasons why
many people find these festivals highly irri-
t a t i n g .
Antidote for modernity
Since the late 19t h and early 20t h c e n t u r i e s ,
the veneration of saints has been a main tar-
get of modernist and reformist criticism
concerned with traditional Islamic practices.
The reformists, in their response to Euro-
pean claims of cultural superiority as op-
posed to the alleged backwardness, fatalism
and superstitions of the Muslims, chose to
dissociate true, authentic Islam from the
popular religious traditions of the Muslims,
the latter being held responsible for the ret-
rogression of contemporary Muslim soci-
e t i e s .
M a w l i d s , perhaps the most visible ex-
pressions of saint veneration, became a
central issue of this kind of criticism. They
were regarded as both unauthentic, thus
un-Islamic, and irrational, thus anti-mod-
ern: a mere expression of ignorance (j a h l ),
an antidote for the reformist and mod-
ernist discourse.2
These arguments – equally popular among
Islamists and secularists – are fairly well
known to students of modern Islam. Howev-
er, they fail to give a complete picture of
what exactly makes m a w l i d s so offensive to
some people. There is a third, seldom out-
spoken, but nevertheless very central crite-
rion for the perception of the m a w l i d f e s t i-
vals; namely, the question concerning the
aesthetic quality of modern Islamic culture.
The importance of this question is revealed
in the following.
The m a w l i d of al-Shacrāw ı̄
After the death, in June 1998, of the enor-
mously popular television preacher
Mu .ha m m a d M u t a w a l lı̄ a l - S h acrāwı̄, a cult
similar to the traditional cult of saints began
to develop around him. His picture could be
seen almost everywhere. Prayers related to
him and books written by or about him
flooded the newspaper stands, and reruns
of his sermons were shown on television.
The funeral of a l - S h acrāwı̄ was a mass event,
and soon a popular cult developed around
his tomb in his native town D a qādūs in the
Nile Delta. Consequently, the Shaykh’s sec-
ond son cAbd a l - Ra .hı̄m organized a m a w l i d
to commemorate the first anniversary of his
father’s death.
This m a w l i d took place in mid-June 1999
and the final evening was celebrated on the
1 7t h of that month. The festivities centred on
the Shaykh’s shrine – at that time still under
construction – located next to the Islamic
Centre of a l - S h acrāwı̄, which is now presided
by the Shaykh’s son. A continuous stream of
visitors passed by the shrine, paying their
respects to the Shaykh and seeking his
blessing (b a r a k a). At the Centre, an official
ceremony took place which was set to satis-
fy reformist standards: addresses were read,
a l - S h acrāwı̄’s religious heritage was dis-
cussed, local poets recited panegyrics on
the Shaykh, and awards were granted for
young authors from the region. The official
programme was followed by the recitation
of the Q u r ’ān.
On the street in front of the Centre, the
more informal and significantly bigger part
of the festival took place. In a large tent,
d h i k r was conducted. Along the street,
chickpeas, snacks, sweets, amulets, funny
hats and other inexpensive souvenirs were
being sold. Steps away, target shooting
stands, swing boats and merry-go-rounds
had been set up next to a stage where a
m u n s h i d, accompanied by a band, was
chanting religious hymns.
Belly-dancing as well as the consumption
of alcohol and hashish, which are among
the more controversial practices of m a w l i d s,
were absent from the festival in Daqādūs.
The atmosphere was one of a communal
gathering with neighbours, families, Sufis
and followers of the Shaykh coming togeth-
er. Especially for youths, the m a w l i d s e r v e d
not only for consolidating existing commu-
nal ties but also for creating new ones: facil-
itated by the relaxation of gender segrega-
tion during the festivities, young men and
women used the occasion to see and be
s e e n .
’Who will stop this mockery?’3
The m a w l i d of a l - S h acrāwı̄ caused a storm
of protest in the religious media. Although
the sacralization of a l - S h acrāwı̄ was greatly
encouraged by the pro-government conser-
vative religious current, most of its repre-
sentatives were certainly not willing to ac-
cept the m a w l i d.
They pointed out that the Shaykh would
never have accepted such an occasion (in
fact, a l - S h acrāwı̄’s comments on m a w l i d s
had been quite ambivalent) and that
m a w l i d s were un-Islamic and immoral. What
was presented as particularly offensive in
the headlines and commentaries was the
turning of a legitimate pious celebration
into a popular festival with all its entertain-
ment and commerce. In this sense, the
weekly religious newspaper cA qı̄ d a tı̄ c o m-
mented disapprovingly: ‘The m a w l i d of a l -
S h acrāwı̄ turned into an amusement centre
of dervishes and a festival of chickpeas,
sweets and children’s play.’4
Any other m a w l i d would have received
only a routine condemnation, if any at all.
But a l - S h acrāwı̄’s importance as an icon of
the conservative religious current caused a
serious clash between the ideal of Islamic
culture and living Islamic tradition. Accord-
ing to these critics, a l - S h acrāwı̄’s memory
should be celebrated, but not in such a
shameful, un-Islamic way.5
Islam and chickpeas
Now what is so shameful and un-Islamic
about chickpeas? In fact, chickpeas are a
central symbol when describing a m a w l i d.
‘Leaving the m a w l i d without chickpeas’ is a
common expression for doing something
while missing the actual point or use of it.
Chickpeas – just as sweets and games –
stand as an archetype for the commercial
and entertaining aspects of a m a w l i d.
This by itself would not be offensive. But
in a m a w l i d, chickpeas are part of a religious
event. Sacred aspects are so closely con-
nected to profane ones that one cannot
meaningfully distinguish between the two.
For the visitors to a m a w l i d, the festival is
both: entertaining religion and pious fun. It
is this synthesis of religion and entertain-
ment that makes a m a w l i d so attractive to
some and so offensive to others.
Condemning the m a w l i d s is, to a great ex-
tent, an aesthetic judgement; the festivities
fail to fulfil a modernist ideal of rational,
constrained, pious, cultivated, well-orga-
nized and well-controlled culture. Based on
this criterion of dignity, the modernist/re-
formist discourse insists that occasions of
higher importance – not only religious, but
also social, political and private – must be
characterized by purity, dignity and educa-
tional value. Everyday popular culture may
be tolerated, but should definitely not be al-
lowed to enter the sphere of ideal modern
Islamic culture.
This modernist aesthetics of culture can
be found in a variety of other issues. Com-
mercial mass culture is opposed to the sub-
lime ideal of educational and politically con-
structive high culture.6
Or, to give another example, the discus-
sion on the ‘modern city’ is preoccupied
with issues such as cleanliness, order and or-
ganization, representing itself in the di-
chotomy between educated, civilized citi-
zens walking along wide prospects on one
side, and a chaotic m a w l i d in the narrow al-
leys of a slum on the other.7
In a similar way, the apologetic discourse
on female circumcision centres around the
concepts of beauty and purity and the prob-
lem of control.8
At this point, more questions arise than
can currently be answered. However, two
general remarks can be made. Firstly, in con-
temporary cultural criticism in Egypt, argu-
ments based on aesthetic quality are com-
mon and apparently share some identical
premises. Secondly, this theoretical ideal of
beauty, purity, dignity and order often finds
itself in grave contradiction to reality – a re-
ality which is not as similar to modernist
clarity as it is to the proverbial meaning of
m a w l i d as cheerful chaos. ◆
Girl in 
a swing-boat
i n the m a w l i d
o f Shaykh 
a l - S h acr -awı̄
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TH O MA S  E I C H
Abu l-Huda was born in a small village on the mar-
gins of the northern Syrian desert in 1850 into a fam-
ily of humble origins. In his early childhood, he was
initiated into the Rifaciyya order, which is still widely
spread today in the rural areas of Syria and Iraq. He
was quick to develop substantial contacts with Rifaci
sheiks in Aleppo, who dominated certain important
posts in the city. In 1874, he became the naqib al-
a s h r a f (scion of the descendants of the prophets)
there at a strikingly young age. In the following
years, he managed to overcome several severe set-
backs to his career and finally established himself in
the entourage of the new Sultan Abdülhamid II,
whose accession to the throne marked the end of the
t a n z i m a t, a period of wide-ranging administrative re-
forms in Ottoman history.*
Quest for a Phantom
Investigating Abu
l-Huda al-Sayyadi
Abu l-Huda was allegedly one of the most
powerful men in the Ottoman Empire for
several years. From 1881 onwards, he com-
menced vast publishing activities. It is
claimed that he wrote up to 200 books, of
which approximately 60 can still be found
today. In 1909, he died in Istanbul on the
Bosphorus island of Prinkipo where he had
been exiled by the Young Turks after their
coup d’état. Apart from this, little is known
with certainty about Abu l-Huda.
In existing literature, he has been charac-
terized as a reactionary and obscurantist,
who tried to oppose the reformist circles of
his time. He is usually juxtaposed with one
of the two fore-thinkers of Arab nationalism:
cAbd ar-Rahman al-Kawakibi or Butrus al-
Bustani. By this, he is interpreted as a mere
tool in the hands of Abdülhamid II for
spreading his pan-Islamic propaganda. Un-
fortunately this interpretation rests on only
one small booklet of Abu l-Huda which,
even at a short glance over his publication
list, is clearly an exception. No thorough at-
tempts have been made to question how
this astonishing career was possible, what
happened after Abu l-Huda had permanent-
ly settled in Istanbul and what comprised
the contents of his writings. It might even
be said that, over time, analysis gave way to
the development of an ‘Abu l-Huda topos’,
which is generally applied when something
negative has to be said or explained away
about the political and intellectual develop-
ments of the Ottoman Empire and especial-
ly its Arab provinces under Abdülhamid II.
The sources
When endeavouring to investigate Abu l-
Huda, the reason for these fascinating lacu-
nae in our knowledge of this important peri-
od in Middle Eastern history soon comes to
light: the sources. To begin with, there is no
autobiography and the biographies of some
of his followers – once they are discovered –
offer little information due to their laudato-
ry genre. Painstaking research is necessary
to find a substantial number of his books,
and acquiring trustworthy and dated infor-
mation through interviews poses difficul-
ties. The archives of European consulates in
Istanbul consulted thus far contain only ma-
terial about two or three isolated episodes.
Even classic strategies employed by histori-
ans of the Middle East, such as consulting
w a q f documents in Aleppo, provide scant
results. Investigating Abu l-Huda is indeed a
quest for a phantom.
What can be secured from these sources is
information about people who had contact
with Abu l-Huda. A certain pattern of recur-
ring names reveals itself and many of these
men can easily be identified. By such means,
the common depictions of Abu l-Huda as an
obscurantist and reactionary are severely
contested: he obviously had early contacts
with outstanding scholars in Damascus who
were later to gain fame as the forefathers of
the Syrian Salafi movement. After his rise to
influence in Istanbul, he supported such fa-
mous reform-minded theologians as Mah-
mud Shukri a l -cA l u s i in Baghdad by provid-
ing him with a teaching post at the Sultan
Ali mosque, which had been recently reno-
vated and re-established due to Abu l-
Huda’s intervention. This being said, the
similarities between the contents of espe-
cially Abu l-Huda’s later writings to reform-
ers such as Muhammad Abduh come as no
s u r p r i s e .
The common interpretation of the intel-
lectual history of the Middle East in the late
1 9t h century rests on an assumed rupture be-
tween reform-minded u l a m a a d v o c a t i n g
their vision of an Islam purified of popular
practices and superstitious beliefs, on the
one hand, and reactionary traditionalists re-
sisting any change, on the other. Abu l-
Huda is usually interpreted within this frame
as the outstanding representative of the lat-
ter. This picture is erroneous.
Since Abu l-Huda was the leader of the R i-
f aci y y a order in his time, which was popular
especially among the lower strata of society,
he undoubtedly represented the more tra-
ditionalist camp in this dichotomy. But
analysis of his social networks as well as of
the development of his writings over time
shows that the so-called ‘traditionalists’ had
a permanent exchange of ideas with the re-
formers, thus developing a new interpreta-
tion of Islam. For example, a discussion of
findings from the field of European astrono-
my concerning the distance between the
sun and the Earth can be found in R i f aci y y a
writings from the late 1880s. In this sense,
the traditional sector of society appears less
as resisting the changes of its time and per-
haps more as actively contributing to these
c h a n g e s .
Lineage as a tool in
t h e p o w e r - s t r u g g l e
Abu l-Huda built up a network of contacts
and followers in the entire fertile crescent.
He even tried to take over the mighty R i-
f aci y y a in British-controlled Egypt, a move
successfully opposed by the Khedive. Usual-
ly persons from less influential families,
some of whom had experienced a recent
loss of influence, were integrated into Abu l-
Huda’s following. At the same time, a wide-
ranging scheme of construction and
restoration of shrines took place. Most of
the important R i f aci y y a tombs are situated
in Iraq, some of them in Baghdad. On the
other hand, the famous shrine of cA b d a l -
Qadir al-Jilani, founder of the Qadiriyya
order, had served as an intellectual and po-
litical focus in that city over decades, if not
centuries. It apparently lost much of its im-
portance during the 1880s and 1890s due to
the competition of the new and well-en-
dowed R i f aci y y a shrines, since some of the
most renowned scholars of Baghdad taught
at the schools attached to these new
shrines. The Qadiriyya’s answer to these de-
velopments was simple: they claimed that
one tomb was fake, that the man buried in
the second (the Sultan Ali Mosque) was not
the father of Ahmad a r - R i f aci, who founded
the R i f aci y y a, and that R i f aci himself and con-
sequently all of his offspring were not de-
scendants of the prophet (a s h r a f, sing.
s h a r i f). Therefore, in the 1880s and 1890s a
multitude of publications treating these
subjects can be observed. This phenome-
non comprised several aspects. Firstly,
a s h r a f were exempted from military service
and taxes. Secondly, these books were part
of a major power-struggle going on in the
Middle East at the close of the 19t h c e n t u r y .
On the one hand, there was the competition
of several shrines for pupils and pilgrims at
the local level. On the other hand, these
books constituted the attempt of an over-
throw of Abu l-Huda, himself the initiator of
this sudden competition. As already men-
tioned, he was the naqib al-ashraf in Aleppo.
He maintained this post until his death in
1909, although he stayed most of the time
in Istanbul. The easiest way to get rid of Abu
l-Huda was to negate his noble lineage lead-
ing back to the prophet via Ahmad a r - R i f aci.
This was done by reactivating very old de-
bates about the noble lineage of the R i f aci
that traced back to the prophet. If this un-
dertaking had succeeded, it would not only
have meant that Abu l-Huda would have
been unemployed in the strict sense of the
word. Since the notion of a holy man in
Islam is usually connected with the assump-
tion that he is a s h a r i f, it would most proba-
bly have meant that the recently construct-
ed and renovated shrines of the R i f aci a l l
over the fertile crescent would have lost pil-
grims, income and importance. Therefore,
other competing Sufi orders would have ex-
perienced a steep rise in the number of their
followers and influence. This means that the
debate about lineage in the 1880s and
1890s was not a sign that nothing had
changed in the Middle East over the last 500
years when these discussions were conduct-
ed for the first time. Even more so, it was a
very particular power struggle, which owed
much of its force to the socio-economic
changes taking place in the Middle East in
the late 19t h c e n t u r y .
Changing research methods
A network analysis was developed in the
late 1950s, originally by anthropologists, as
a means for analysing smaller residential
groups. It rests on the premise that individ-
uals construct a network of personal rela-
tionships and use that network to reach
their personal aims. It also rests on the
premise that there are certain patterns un-
derlying these networks. Network analysis
challenges the structuralist view that indi-
viduals are completely determined by soci-
ety’s norms and categories, while trying to
avoid the opposite extreme of formalist re-
ductionism, which defines norms as mere
by-products of social change. Only recently
have the first attempts been made to apply
the methodical instruments, developed for
network analysis by anthropologists, to the
sources of historians of the Middle East.
Common pitfalls of historiography, like pro-
jecting modern nationalist paradigms such
as borders or ethnic community back into
the past, can thus be avoided. ◆
N o t e
* In older literature, Abdülhamid’s reign was totally
juxtaposed to the t a n z i m a t-period, while in more
recent studies greater emphasis is placed on the
continuities between the two periods.
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Mi ddl e Ea st
B I R G I T  S C H A E B L E R
Last November, the Syrian province of al-Suwaida
was again in the news – Arab and European news,
that is. The Syrian media remained silent on the mat-
ter. The province, better known as ‘Druze Mountain’,
is also called ‘Hawran Mountain’ and ‘Arab Moun-
tain’, the name confusion already hinting at the com-
plicated identity of its inhabitants. It was, once again,
surrounded by army troops. What had happened?
Identity, Power
and Piety
The Druzes in Syria
The Druze Mountain has historically been a
frontier region, a major contact zone be-
tween steppe and agricultural lands. In No-
vember, in incidents reminiscent of a centu-
ry ago, local Bedouins, hard pressed by
three years of drought, had led their herds
of sheep and goats into the small-scale fruit
plantations (b u s t a ns) for which the province
of al-Suwaida, primary wine producing re-
gion of Syria, is known. The Druze inhabi-
tants, outraged by the imminent destruc-
tion of their plantations, drove out the
flocks and attacked the Bedouins. The ensu-
ing skirmishes cost the lives of 5 to 10 peo-
ple, all Druzes, and injured 150 to 200 per-
sons, mostly Druzes. The fatalities and in-
juries can be ascribed to the great number
of illegal firearms in the hands of the
Bedouins. As always, when conflict arose in
the area, the main road linking al-Suwaida,
capital of the province, with Damascus was
closed. The province sent a petition to
Bashar al-Asad, the young president of
Syria, ensuring him of their support and ask-
ing for protection. Druze university students
demonstrated in Damascus, demanding
government support for their people. Presi-
dent Bashar al-Asad personally called
s h a y k ha l-ca q l (highest Druze religious office
holder), Husain a l - J a r b uca, on the phone.
Discourse on the Druzes
This is the gist of the incident, as reported
in a number of news articles and by word of
mouth in Syria, an obvious conflict between
‘desert and sown’. The stories woven into
the incident are of major interest. The first
articles, for example, reported that Be-
douins had seized Druze land and tried to
build a mosque there; other stories purport-
ed that it all began with Christians, who had
been living for a long time in the mountain.
The latter stories held that that the Druzes
only came to defend the Christians against
the Bedouins. Virtually all observers were
awaiting a new ‘Druze revolt’ against the
Syrian government (only six months after
the death of Hafiz al-Asad). One news report
stated that the governor’s office was burnt
down (the fact is that it was invaded by
Druze youths and some windows were bro-
k e n ) .
These stories hint at the discourse on the
Druzes, both by others and by the Druzes
themselves. First, virtually any event involv-
ing the province is automatically given a
touch of sectarianism, hence the story of a
mosque amidst a conflict over land use.
Then, on the part of the Druzes, an apolo-
getic discourse evolved early on, which rep-
resented them as protectors of the Christian
minority in their territory. Sultan al-Atrash,
the Druze leader of the anti-colonial ‘Great
Revolt’ against the French in the 1920s, for
example, chose as his constant companion
and signer of international petitions a Chris-
tian from his territory – a political strategy
to defuse European sectarian suspicion.
Governments, starting with the Ottomans,
and including the French Mandate and Syri-
an president Shishakli in the 1950s, had to
deal with Druze revolts, all of which consti-
tute a ‘history of rebellion’ from which the
Druzes continue to derive political capital
and which they evoke whenever a crisis
erupts. In particular, the revolt against the
French under Druze hero Sultan al-Atrash
has been skilfully utilized by the Druzes to
construct an image of selfless patriotism for
t h e m s e l v e s .1
The difference of the Druzes translates it-
self into the many names of their territory.
Jabal Druze is the oldest designation. Yet,
the sectarian content of the name is an issue
in present-day Syria, where t aci f i y y a ( s e c t a r i-
anism) is one of the greatest taboos, and so
the more geographical term ‘Mountain of
the Hawran’ is preferred. The politically cor-
rect term is ‘province of al-Suwaida’, and the
term Jabal a l -cA r a b (i.e. mountain of the
Arabs, stressing the Arabism of the Druzes)
was bestowed upon the area by urban na-
tionalists for Druze achievements against
French colonialism. The Druzes have clout
in Syria. Not all provinces receive personal
phone calls from the president in times of
c r i s i s .
The role of Sultan al-Atrash
The Syrian Druzes can be seen as the most
‘secular’ of the Druze groupings in the Mid-
dle East. Unlike Lebanon, where sectarian-
ism is built into the political system and
where the Druzes are a party-turned-militia-
turned-party, and Israel, where the state put
them into the position of a special and non-
Arab minority, in Syria the Druzes are repre-
sented in the political system as a m u h a f a z a,
a province. As such, al-Suwaida sends six
deputies to parliament, and provides one
minister and one member of the Ba't h
party’s Regional Command. The long peri-
ods of virtual autonomy that the Druzes en-
joyed in Syria, the powerful role as a nation-
alist symbol assumed by Druze hero Sultan
al-Atrash, and the secular political discourse
of the present state with its taboo on sectar-
ianism, have encouraged the traditional
separation of religious and secular spheres
within Druzedom.
Yet it was their religious leader, the s h a y k h
a l-ca q l, with whom Bashar al-Asad reported-
ly spoke, not the (non-Druze) governor of
the province, nor the local secretary of the
Ba't h party. Until the death of Sultan al-
Atrash in 1982, the president’s phone call, to
be understood as a symbol for who is repre-
senting the Druze community, would
doubtlessly have been to the latter, a world-
ly leader. Underneath the official represen-
tation as a province lurks the unofficial rep-
resentation as a religious/ethnic communi-
ty. This raises the question of power sharing
within the Druze community itself, and the
relation between religious and secular
spheres within Druzedom.
The separation of the spheres
The separation of the religious and the
secular has traditionally been expressed in
the terms denoting elites. The worldly
sheikh was called s h a y k h j u d h m a n i ( c o r p o-
real sheikh), the religious sheikh was being
called s h a y k hr u h i (spiritual sheikh). While all
older men (traditionally above the age of
40) are expected to ‘enter the religion’ by
shaving their heads, donning religious garb
and attending prayers, only a select group
of religious sheikhs maintain a reputation
within the community. A religious sheikh,
also called j u w w a y y i d (noble, high-minded)
establishes himself either by the path of
piety and holiness, without this requiring
him to know much about the mysteries of
the religion, or through expert knowledge
of the holy scriptures. The highest rank is
held by those able to combine both holiness
and knowledge. They lead an ascetic life,
nourishing themselves exclusively from the
pure products of nature, which they culti-
vate themselves. Their task is to channel di-
vine blessings to the community through
their rituals and meditation, undertaken in
the k h a l w a, a sacred place of congregation
outside the village and thus removed from
the political factionalism of the secular
sphere. The spiritual sheikhs are absolutely
forbidden to become involved in politics.
The office of the shaykh
a l-c a q l
In view of the rejection of worldly power
in the sphere of spirituality, the nature of
the office of s h a y k h a l-ca q l is somewhat am-
biguous. The s h a y k h a l-ca q ls among the Syr-
ian Druzes have historically been derived
from three families: the Hajari, the J a r b uca,
and the Hannawi. The candidates have been
chosen from among these families ‘follow-
ing Druze traditions and religious rites’, a
privilege they defended vigorously against
critics from within and the state from with-
out. In Syria, the s h a y k h a l-ca q ls have been
much less dependent on powerful families
than in Lebanon, where the families of the
Junblat and the Arslan nominate their own
candidates. The office of the s h a y k h a l-ca q l
was in all probability invented by the state,
i.e. the Ottomans, who wanted a religious
spokesman for the Druze community. The
first recorded incident of a Syrian s h a y k h a l-
ca q l, al-Hajari, representing the community
v i s - à - v i s the state occurred in the sectarian
crisis of 1860.
Today’s s h a y k h a l-ca q l, Husain J a r b uca,
was flown back from Venezuela, which is
home to a large Druze emigrant communi-
ty, when the previous office holder in his
family died. Since he had been out of the
country for years, the family’s choice creat-
ed a stir in the community and gave rise to
rumours about his moral and spiritual qual-
ities. He turned out to be politically savvy,
profiting from the power vacuum left by
the death of Sultan al-Atrash and monopo-
lizing power within the community. This he
achieved by reviving and expanding an old
Druze ‘convent’, Ain al-Zaman, into a reli-
gious centre.
When in 1991 the Egyptian paper a l -
Ahram a l - M a sa'i published a fatwa that de-
nied the Druze faith its place within Islam,
the confident s h a y k h a l-ca q l J a r b uca d i s-
patched a letter to Egyptian president Husni
Mubarak, expressing his hope that ‘the
mufti of Egypt did not know what he was
doing by issuing this fatwa. For, if he knew
what he was doing, it would be a catastro-
phe for Islam.’ The president’s and the
mufti’s offices looked into the matter.
Egypt’s president wrote back to the Druzes,
stating that the mufti, Dr Tantawi, denied
ever having issued such a fatwa. The news-
paper printed the explanation that the
fatwa in question stemmed from 1936, and
that the current mufti of Egypt had nothing
to do with it.
O u t l o o k
Since the separation of spheres has been
upheld longer in Syria than in the other
Druze communities, arguably until the
death of Sultan al-Atrash in 1982, the arcane
discipline has been strong and reform
movements within the religious sphere
have been weak. In conversations, a handful
of young men are sometimes mentioned
who reportedly ‘wanted to write’, but were
discouraged in the end. The Syrian Druzes
learned about Lebanese Abdallah Najjar’s
controversial revelations of the faith largely
through Sami Makarim’s more moderate
‘counter-book’, and through his lecture vis-
i t s .2
There are signs, however, of a new debate
on the Druze faith in Syria. One book in five
volumes about the Unitarians, a term the
Druzes prefer, has already been published.
Another Syrian book project, treating the
Unitarians as Gnostics, was presented at a
recent meeting of the American Druze Soci-
ety. The Syrian Druzes are beginning to de-
bate their faith, further breaking down the
separation of the spheres which, for better
or worse, likens them to the other Druze
communities in the Middle East. ◆
Sultan al-Atrash,
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AN J A P E L E I K I S
’By going through this wonderful website, I saw my-
self walking the street of my village long time ago
with my cousins. That was the best time of my life.’ ‘It
gives me a big pleasure to belong to the big family of
Joun. I will always have the wonderful days in my
memory and my heart that I spent in this dear village.
These memories I will pass on to my children and
grandchildren.’ ‘Proud to be a Jouni. It is a wonderful
page that reminds me of my village.’ These are a few
comments found in the visitors book of the home-
page of a Lebanese village called Joun (http://joun.
l e b . n e t ) .
Locality in Lebanon
Between Home
a n d H o m e p a g e
The above-mentioned comments were
made by people who presently live in the
United States, in Europe, Australia or the
Arab Gulf States, but feel in some way or
other linked to their village of origin. Some
of them spent their childhood in this multi-
confessional (Maronite, Greek-Catholic, Shi-
ite) Jouni community, which is situated in
the southern part of Mount Lebanon, while
others grew up in the capital city of Beirut
and only spent their weekends in the village
before emigrating. For other people, their
village came to life only through family
tales, always having lived far away.
At present, ten years after the end of the
civil war, an increasing number of Lebanese
– who once left the country because of the
war or due to economic, family or profes-
sional reasons as well as those who were
born abroad and those who were displaced
inside Lebanon – are in the process of redis-
covering their villages and redefining their
(trans-)local identities. Many travel ‘home’
for their summer holidays, while some re-
turn for good. Others are returning to places
that they were forced to leave due to con-
fessional cleavages or wars. How have their
images of their home locality changed over
time and from a distance and how do these
images influence the remaking of their local
identities? Why do the Lebanese actually
cling to their local identity, re-approaching
and redefining it in a globalized world
which offers an immense variety of different
opportunities for identification?
The emergence of trans-local
v i l l a g e s
’I enjoy visiting Joun’s homepage and
learning more about my village while living
in Canada’, says a 35-year-old man standing
in front of a dilapidated house in the village
which he hopes to renovate one day. The
old building belonged to his grandfather
and fell into ruin when the he died. Other
members of the family fled to Beirut during
the war in 1985, when the Christian popula-
tion was expelled from the village. Since
the end of the war, the grandson, who has
spent most of his life in Canada and has
family all over the world, comes to Lebanon
regularly for his summer holidays, together
with his wife and two small children. They
stay in Beirut, but sometimes travel to the
village for a short visit. They walk up the old
stairs of their house of memories, remem-
ber the grandfather taking care of his roses
and yelling at the neighbour’s children. The
village of this Lebanese-Canadian man has
turned into an emotional landscape, a place
of happy childhood memories, of continu-
ity and rootedness in an ever-changing
world. While continuously moving from
place to place in the ‘real’ world due to pro-
fessional and family reasons, the place from
which he and his family originate becomes
an important fixed point of reference, pro-
viding an imaginary stability in a world of
increasing mobility and change. The village
becomes a metaphor for social relations, in
general, and family and kin relations, in par-
t i c u l a r .
Large family and kinship groups have al-
ways fought over local politics and econom-
ics, over influence and power in the differ-
ent neighbourhoods of the village – and
they still do. However, nowadays members
of the same family, of the same neighbour-
hood and the same village, no longer share
their everyday life. They live in Joun, as well
as in Beirut, in Paris, Berlin, Detroit, Abu
Dhabi or Sydney. Nevertheless, family and
local identity remain important and kin
groups form social networks beyond local,
regional and national boundaries.
As a matter of fact, the Lebanese personal
status laws reinforce the strong ties to the
paternal village of origin, since all personal
affairs are registered there and the
Lebanese rarely change their place of regis-
tration. Documents necessary for the regis-
tration of births, marriages and deaths as
well as polling cards can only be obtained
from the local mayor. The same applies to
people who no longer reside in the village
or who have never lived there, but whose
patrilineage has always been registered
there. In the event that migrants in Beirut or
abroad need certificates of any kind, they
have to go to their village of registration or
engage a family relative to carry out the
task. Thus, national registration and elec-
tion practices encourage the establishment
of trans-local connections. Elections are ac-
tually a typical example of the mobilization
of trans-local links: People move from
Beirut to their villages of registration or are
even flown in from abroad, sometimes at
the expense of local political representa-
t i v e s .
In many cases, family members are contin-
uously in touch and interacting, which is
made possible by new forms of communica-
tion. For more and more people, and espe-
cially for the younger generation, using the
internet has become exceedingly attractive.
They exchange e-mails and voice-mails with
friends and family, and they also send pho-
tos or make direct calls via the internet.
Many have computers in their homes, and in
every Lebanese city and in many villages
one can find internet cafés. ‘Joun online’, a
local internet café, is the place where the
young people of the village send and re-
ceive their mail, where they chat with their
friends online, exchange the latest local
news and also feel close to their peers and
kin far away.
One can sense the emergence of ‘pluri-
local’ or ‘trans-local’ villages where the so-
cial sphere no longer coincides with the ge-
ographical sphere. Everyday experiences
that were once necessarily derived from a
close face-to-face relationship are currently
being extended. One could argue that peo-
ple whose life-worlds are closely linked
share ‘habitats of meaning’1 and form a
‘community of sentiment’;2 they begin to
share thoughts and feelings despite the fact
that they live hundreds or thousands of kilo-
metres apart. Primarily, these groups can be
defined as overlapping, de-territorialized
social – often close-knit family – networks of
people who strengthen their unity with
their discourses on and fantasies about their
village of origin. Despite the fact that peo-
ple are dispersed all over the world, moving
between places of residence, places of reg-
istration and imaginary places, they are in-
volved in ongoing negotiations and strug-
gles to define and ‘produce’ the meaning of
their village, thereby directly or indirectly
influencing local political and social devel-
o p m e n t s .
The struggle over locality
’Got a burning desire to explore the
peaceful hill and valleys of Joun and a green
nature well preserved? Or wander among
the tales of history and its events? Then
you’ve landed at the right place.’
(http://joun.leb.net/jmain.htm) ‘Joun offers
a unique view of the sunset. Hospitality has
always been a great tradition. Joun is well
known for its virgin olive oil production.’
(http://joun.leb.net/jmain1.htm) With these
village descriptions on the Joun website, set
up by members of the municipality, local
politicians assume a certain position in the
struggle over locality. Most of the15 mem-
bers of the district council – doctors, engi-
neers and lawyers – have had migration ex-
periences. Some of them have returned only
recently, such as the mayor, a 45-year-old
doctor, who grew up in Beirut and spent
eight years in France. Presently, he and most
of the other district councillors live and
work in Beirut and only spend their week-
ends in Joun. The images of the village con-
veyed by them have been strongly influ-
enced by their lives in the city and abroad.
By pursuing a discourse of nostalgia, prais-
ing old traditions and the famous history of
the village, they contribute to the formation
of emotional landscapes, trying to encour-
age more people to visit and support their
home village. Their local development pro-
jects are strongly influenced by this image
of the village as a holiday and weekend re-
sort. While restoring old village walls, plant-
ing trees and laying out small parks and an
impressive sports stadium, the main interest
is to transform the village into a beautiful,
clean weekend resort full of tourist attrac-
tions, with historical sites, an impressive cul-
tural history and a relaxed environment. It is
quite clear they are acting in the interest of
the other Jounis who, like themselves, live in
Beirut or abroad and share their image of lo-
cality. Most of the people who actually live
in the village have a different image of their
locality. It is their place of everyday life,
where they have to make their living. They
often complain that the municipality does
not contribute to economic development or
local education. ‘They have no time, no ex-
perience and are only here at the weekend’
is the opinion of many people who live in
J o u n .
New and conflicting images of locality –
resulting from people’s movements – can
be traced back to the beginning of the 20t h
century when the first people migrated
overseas, and also to rural-urban migration
in the 1950s and 1960s. Although these
movements were mainly initiated by the
Christian population in the village, later all
confessions and families participated in
these movements. Thus, changing and con-
flicting views of locality have largely devel-
oped trans-confessionally. The situation
changed during the civil war when the
Christians were expelled and the Shiites re-
mained in the village. To this day, they con-
stitute the majority of the Joun population,
while most of the Christians settled in Beirut
or elsewhere and presently do not want to
fully return to the village. They only come
for the weekend and for their holidays, for
religious celebrations and elections, and
they try to influence local politics from out-
side. Given this fact, the struggle over local-
ity is at present becoming increasingly con-
fessionalized and the conflicts between
confessional groups – built up during long
war years – are reinforced, rather than over-
come. Here the struggle over the nature of
locality in a globalized, de-territorialized
world still continues. ◆
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No r th Afr i ca
R A B I A  B E K K AR Women in the City
in Algeria
Change and Resistance
The current social and identity crisis in Alge-
ria is unfolding against the background of
spectacular urban growth, which is occur-
ring at the expense of villages, the old city
and its hierarchies. The modification of erst-
while alliances and past forms of social in-
teraction, the constitution of new family
and generational ties are fuelling societal vi-
olence. Confronted with this situation, the
political establishment is promoting a social
homogeneity that is in contradiction with
the diversity and complexity of Algerian so-
c i e t y .
One result is that a segment of the popu-
lation is seeking refuge in the safety of tradi-
tional cultural models, which are reassuring
and admissible in the city; another is that
women – considered competitors on the
job market – have been attacked and stig-
matized, and are all the more easily relegat-
ed to the home insofar as this is in keeping
with tradition.
Space and gender
Gender marks out space with a specific set
of firmly established rules and rites of pas-
sage from one place to another. The main
territorial division accepted by Algerian so-
ciety attributes the house to women and
the public space to men. The former is the
place of procreation and everything that is
implicit (the sacred and the sexual). The lat-
ter is the realm of trade, business, manage-
ment, and power. This gender-based divi-
sion of space has become part of both the
symbolic order of things and the mentality
of men and women, thus providing the
structure for a territorial system.
When women leave the domestic space,
they must always face the ordeal of becom-
ing visible in the public space. Moving
through the streets, they must submit to a
code of conduct imposed by the group
dominating the urban space. They them-
selves – still raised according to models of
gender separation and the fundamental
rules of family honour – have largely inter-
nalized these territorial arrangements.
But a gender-based definition of space
cannot occur without transgression. When
crossing the borders between inside and
out, all the senses – vision, speech, smell,
touch and hearing – may come into play
and thus justify the concern of Muslim soci-
ety for continually creating material or sym-
bolic separations. The home, with its doors
and shutters, articles of clothing, and in par-
ticular the veil, are all so many screens es-
tablished to preserve (or transgress) this
strict separation of the sexes. Paradoxically,
the h i j a b – like the haïk (veil), which was
widely worn during the colonial period –
provides women with new possibilities for
gaining access to the public space. It be-
comes a means of identification for women
moving through the city, a sort of pass al-
lowing them to make use of male territory.
Integrated into the complex relationship
between the garment and the place where
it is worn, the h i j a b expresses an identity.
First, it offers confirmation of the fact that
the m o u t a h a j i b â t e s – women who wear the
hijab – accept the body’s invisibility in the
public space. Yet this new way of concealing
the body also highlights the difference be-
tween these women, those who wear the
h a ï k and those who wear neither one nor
the other. The hijab thus appears to be
marking a break with tradition. That is one
of its most important meanings. It quite
probably represents the emergence of a
new female identity. More than a means of
movement from the inside to the outside,
qualifying the women as ‘being from the in-
s i d e ’ ,2 as the h a ï k was in the colonial vil-
lages, the h i j a b is becoming the sign of a
new urbanism, a new way of being a woman
in the city.
Within the basic division attributing the
house to women and the public space to
men, we see the introduction of a new hier-
archy based essentially on age, marital sta-
tus and job status. It is confounding the tra-
ditional limits in cases where women as-
sume a habitually male role, for example,
that of principle breadwinner.
Changing from the inside
Women have periodically swept onto the
public stage in the course of Algeria’s recent
history. In such circumstances, the presence
of women in the city is recodified by events
(the War of Liberation, demonstrations,
etc.). It is then associated with the social val-
ues that justify such an intrusion into the
public space. These exceptional situations
of conflict revolving around the occupation
of public space and the public debate in Al-
geria shake up the limits imposed on
women. They momentarily acquire the sta-
tus of protagonists, even as extremist vio-
lence reminds them they are not in their
p l a c e .
Added to the old customs are more recent
ones arising from the new demands of daily
life: school, work, travel, political expres-
sion, etc., all of which require going out into
the public space. The use of the city by
women is thus opening a more lasting
breach in the repartition and domination of
territory. Women’s access to education and
consequently to economic activity is bring-
ing about a change in their territory. But al-
though women have access to school and
paid work, the space still does not belong to
them: Crossing the street can be a torment
in the face of the many remarks or even at-
tacks to which they are subjected. Profes-
sional women certainly have a justified right
to the public space, but they can neither
linger nor stroll through the city. Offenders
are subject to social sanctions. These are
sometimes justified by religious and social
reasons, and sometimes by the differences
between the socialization and education of
the two sexes. Women can only evolve with-
in their own group, as their presence out-
side the home disturbs the social order.
They therefore have a strong incentive not
to linger in public places. For them, the city
is solely a place of transit.
On the basis of these restrictions, the Is-
lamist agenda has turned separate develop-
m e n t into a system governing daily life and
social relations.3 The radical break with a
popular, tolerant Islam rooted in society has
led Islamists in Algeria, like the Taliban in
Afghanistan, to declare war on women who
are visible in the public space. Similar spatial
separations have appeared and are defend-
ed by Islamist associations in certain Moroc-
can cities (segregated beaches, for exam-
ple). One of the consequences of this segre-
gation is the emergence of an image of the
city as a place of perversion.
Thus, the expression of women’s develop-
ment as individuals, the source of their fulfil-
ment, is encountering major resistance in
Algerian society where the lauded homo-
geneity of behaviour takes precedence over
personal impulses. Faced with this difficulty,
the strategies of women in daily life are
often implicit, in view of the weight and in-
ertia of society. The practice of making
roundabout uses of traditional or modern
institutions (the veil, h i j a b, h a m m a m, beau-
ty salon, work, etc.) requires various levels of
mediation and multiple schemes, given that
justifying one’s actions assumes particular
i m p o r t a n c e .
The radicalization of conflicts in Algeria
over the past decade has crystallized over
such issues as the mixed-gender use of pub-
lic spaces. Yet as in Iran, women’s claim to
the public sphere is a trend that will endure.
The modernization of society has had the ef-
fect of expanding opportunities for ex-
changes with the outside, with increasingly
frequent access to urban space. Of course,
that process is not always accompanied by
significant advances. It can remain mimetic,
superficial, and even contribute to limiting
women’s movements, as has been true in
some cases with cars, bathrooms, television
and now the internet, technological devel-
opments that can actually discourage
women from going out. Men will fight
against the intrusion of women into their
space (the workplace, marketplace, leisure
space) as long as there is not enough work
for everybody and they consider that the
authority is vested solely in them.
Nevertheless, society’s ability to recom-
pose, renegotiate and even invent new rela-
tionships should not be dismissed. Contem-
porary Algerian history has shown that
women remain at the heart of change.
Today the conflict is exacerbated because of
the economic crisis, demographic burdens,
power plays, opposition from crime net-
works, the deterioration of living conditions
and the inability of governments to meet
citizens’ basic needs.
Algerian society will not escape the
process of renegotiating the identities of
men and women who have broken with pa-
triarchy, Muslim communitarianism and the
hegemony instituted by colonialism and
prolonged by the State. The reclusion of
women, defended by some as the symbol of
a past frozen by the closed nature of the Is-
lamic debate that is holding the Muslim
world prisoner, and bolstered by an Orien-
t a l i s t4 vision, will not be able to withstand
this development, which is changing soci-
ety from the inside. ◆
Two generations
in the same space:
Separate …
…and mixed.
In the cities of the Arab world, the relationship be-
tween public and private is governed by a world of
glances. It varies by situation – individual or collec-
tive, ritual or random, sacred or profane – and ac-
cording to specific locations and events. The negoti-
ation of boundaries is subject to those contingen-
cies. Indeed, there is not a strict, systematic separa-
tion between the private sphere, a place where
women can express themselves, and the public
sphere, dominated by the words of men. Urban stud-
ies have shown that the relationship between home
and outside is surprisingly complex and flexible.
Nevertheless, the declension of space into thresh-
olds and gradations1 in Arab cities is characterized
by a social identification of men and women with
spaces that are specific to them.
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B E R N H AR D  VE N E M A
The political institutions of Moroccan tribes are
closely intertwined with the central state. By allying
with state officials, tribe members actively con-
tribute to state authoritarianism. The state has seen
to it that neither the rural council nor the customary
village council offers positions for representation of
the tribal population. However, the recent g o u v e r n e-
ment d’alternance of Prime Minister Youssoufi and
King Mohammed VI have both declared the introduc-
tion of a local government intended to serve the pop-
ulation, instead of controlling it through this non-
representation. Nonetheless, in view of Morocco’s




I n s t i t u t i o n s
Since the independence, the political sys-
tem of Morocco can be described as based
on patronage relations. For example, in No-
vember 1988, King Hassan II visited Azrou,
the most important market place of the Beni
Mguild pastoralists in the Middle Atlas, on
his way to his palace in Ifrane. On that occa-
sion, the main roads were paved with car-
pets collected from the Beni Mguild by the
c a i d s (district officers) and their assistants.
Once the King had arrived, the reception
ceremony commenced – his donation of a
mosque to the town being central. Before
leaving, the King allowed men to hand him
letters in which they had worded their
preoccupations, such as lack of work.
Some days later, several herdsmen were
dissatisfied because the hunting expediti-
ons of the King near Ifrane had closed off
certain forests. Enraged, the herders set fire
to parts of the forests. As recounted by lo-
cals, the police responded by rounding up
several people in randomly selected vil-
lages, putting them into jail for several days.
In exchange for submission – in this case
the obligation to lend carpets and the clo-
sure of some forests – the population was
left with a gift and a certain degree of hope.
The belief that having the right contacts
with influential people is a precondition for
success in life is greatly cherished in Moroc-
co. Indeed, the notion of p i s t o n n e r i e ( p u l l i n g
strings) is essential in Beni Mguild culture
(and Morocco in general) and this becomes
clearly manifest in Morocco’s political cul-
t u r e .
Key role of the Ministry
o f t h e I n t e r i o r
Recent research shows that Morocco’s
state power remains very hierarchical. The
Ministry of the Interior at the provincial
level, represented by the governor, oper-
ates in an authoritarian fashion. The gover-
nor is the guardian of law and order and
therefore has a tutelle sur les collectivités lo-
cales (tutelage of local collectivities). On 9
November 1999, the dictatorial Minister of
the Interior was suspended from his office
by King Mohammed VI, but the governor
still maintains control over his territory.
Thus, he supervises the activities of the re-
gional headquarters of the line ministries
and it is at the provincial level that the
information is gathered on local conflicts.
This information is collected by the c a i d s,
themselves being informed by their assis-
tants, the sheikhs and m o q a d d e m s. By intro-
ducing a less inhibiting territorial adminis-
tration, the new King did away with almost
all governors on 31 December 1999 and ap-
pointed new officials that were more open
to communication with the population.
However, the general secretary, a crucial fig-
ure at the provincial headquarters, handles
affairs just as he used to do. His influence is
unsurpassed in the province. Each time he
passes through the provincial headquarters,
people hurriedly bow on their knees. When
he has a meeting with a c a i d, all notables
pay their respects by prostration and hand
kissing, a dramatized representation of the
obedience to authoritarian power.*
The province’s tutelle sur les collectivités lo-
c a l e s continues to strike at the heart of the
local economy. The Beni Mguild’s main
source of livelihood is sheep farming on the
collectively owned pastures. It is the gover-
nor, following the instructions of the Min-
istry of the Interior, who ultimately decides
on the criteria of access. According to the
governor, people having recently settled in
the area may herd on these pastures as well
– a move deeply resented by several au-
tochthonous sheep farmers.
At the province hall, one can meet the im-
portant men. It is here that the develop-
ment plans of the province and how they
can fit into the national plan are decided
upon. Informally, the general secretary has
meetings with the chairmen of the district
councils, informing them on how to make
their local plans coincide with those of the
province. Once these men agree, the plan is
elaborated. The population is well aware of
the decision-making power of the province.
The sheep farmers connive with the gover-
nor by regularly sending him letters, asking
him to redress certain decisions taken by
lower authorities which they resent; secret
information about countrymen who were
their adversaries in disputes often accompa-
ny these letters, enforcing the key position
of the province in conflict resolution.
What is happening at the level of the
province is replicated at the district level.
The main function of the c a i d is to maintain
law and order in his district. However, many
disputes about access to the pastures and
other conflicts are directly put forward to
him. Especially on market days, his office is
crowded with people. Most c a i d s find great
difficulties in the straightforward handling
of affairs as they are confronted with people
who opt for other avenues to solve their
p r o b l e m s .
The sheikh and m o q a d d e m are the media-
tors between the c a i d and the population.
The former represents a clan, while the lat-
ter represents a lineage. Both are recruited
from among the local population. Despite
not receiving any compensation, many
compete for these positions because they
offer ample opportunities for self-enrich-
ment. Some may even go so far as to tattle
on other candidates in order to get into of-
fice. Because of the lack of consensus, the
village council is not able to nominate a can-
didate, leaving the appointment to be de-
cided upon at the level of the province. It is
for this reason that the population sees the
positions of sheikh and m o q a d d e m as being
equivalent to those of state representatives,
although it does not prevent them from
making deals with those in office.
Encapsulation of the elected
c o u n c i l
The district council (conseil rural) is com-
posed of elected members. Among the Beni
Mguild, most members adhere to the Mou-
vement Populaire, a conservative Berber
party. Party ideology, however, is not much
taken into consideration. The most impor-
tant factor is what a candidate can do for
the voters; therefore entire lineages act as
voting banks. 
The council has its own funds, including
the 30% added value tax it receives and in-
come from forest exploitation. By means of
a meeting, the councillors vote on the de-
velopment plan, already elaborated for
them by the province. At such a gathering,
the c a i d and technical staff of the province
are present. Should the councillors, for ex-
ample, wish to change budget allocations in
the plan, the governor has the right to veto.
But because the minutes of the meeting are
sent to the province, councillors are reluc-
tant to suggest major changes.
Part of the budget is allocated to inter-dis-
trict projects, such as a sports stadium in the
1980s and a more recent tourist complex in
Ifrane. These projects, however, were not
priorities for the local population. Part of the
budget is used to pay the staff of the district
office, with few funds remaining for small
projects, such as street cleaning. For these
reasons, the population is very dissatisfied
with the council. In addition, there is a gen-
eral belief that councillors take money from
the budget for personal use – a belief that
has caused great distrust.
Autochthonous institutions:
an alternative?
The Beni Mguild society is segmentary,
the minimal lineage being the smallest unit.
Formerly, this unit constituted the group
that would trek to summer camps. The max-
imal lineage often coincides with a village at
winter sites. Several lineages comprise a
clan, the members of which defend their in-
terests in larger pastures. Clans make up a
tribe, coinciding with still larger tribal areas.
Actually, now that the Beni Mguild have
sedentarized, the j e m a a (village council) has
become the most influential local power
centre. 
Within the j e m a a are the influential elders
who have the reputation of being wise.
Those known as religious men will be invit-
ed as members too. The j e m a a still runs in-
ternal village affairs such as mosque mainte-
nance and the payment of local irrigation
watchmen, and helps in organizing mar-
riages and funerals. One very important task
of the council is to elect n a i b s. The task of
each n a i b is to control access to collective
pastures and to maintain the resting period
(a g d a l) .
At a higher level, there were tribal coun-
cils composed of representatives from the
maximal lineages, which would elect a
leader by rotating among the lineages. No
longer operative, this council had the func-
tion of distributing land and water amongst
the lineages. Now sheikhs and c a i d s, ap-
pointed by the government, decide on most
m a t t e r s .
Although the j e m a a is still operative, sev-
eral factors have undermined its functions.
In the first place, there is the introduction of
party politics. Because a lineage generally
acts as a voter’s bloc, a village cannot nomi-
nate one candidate if it consists of different
lineages. In such cases, the affair generally
ends with one part of the village feeling
underrepresented and acting accordingly.
Second, people tend to go to the c a i d if they
feel the village council has not done justice.
Members of the j e m a a frequently go to the
c a i d to look for help with a dispute.
The Berber brotherhood of the hunters
(r m a a) is still important among the Beni
Mguild. R m a a members organize the annual
visits to Berber and Arab saints’ shrines and
the tribal offerings in spring and in autumn.
Only men considered religious and honest
are asked to become members. Because the
r m a a members are highly respected, they
are important men in the j e m a a. But nowa-
days their importance is waning as they are
no longer respected by educated people.
The latter go directly to the c a i d or to the
court if they have a dispute.
Next to the j e m a a and the r m a a, the posi-
tion of the naib is weakening. People are
now very reluctant to accept a request of
the j e m a a to take up this post. They know
that they will be frequently invoked by the
c a i d to help in sorting out access problems,
and while the latter ultimately decides, this
decision may be contested, the n a i b r e c e i v-
ing his share of resentment. In addition,
they receive no compensation for their trou-
bles. It is thus that the Beni Mguild no
longer have an a g d a l, and the conse-
quences have, among other things, grave
ecological implications. ◆
N o t e
* Hammoudi, A. (1997), Master and Disciple:
T h e Cultural Foundations of Moroccan Authoritaria-
n i s m, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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C entr al  As i a
VL AD M I R  B O B R O V N I K O V
The vision of Islam as it is practised in the post-so-
cialist context is very confused at the moment. It is
associated either with ‘the revival of local pre-mod-
ern traditions’ and thus with the localization of post-
socialist Muslim space, or with ‘the spread of Is-
lamism absolutely alien to local Muslim traditions’,
introduced to countries of the former socialist bloc
from abroad and fraught with their Islamist global-
ization. Post-socialist forms of Islam are often
thought of as an ‘Islamic threat’ opposing all non-
Muslim cultures.
P o s t - S o c i a l i s t
Forms of Islam
Caucasian Wahhabis
The so-called ‘Wahhabi’ movement in the
North Caucasus offers particular insight into
what Islam has come to mean in this post-
socialist era. Its relevance becomes even
more clear when discussing the main prob-
lems of post-socialist Muslim societies, in-
cluding the impact of the socialist and pre-
socialist legacies on modern forms of Islam,
new divisions of the contemporary Muslim
space, and the politicization and radicaliza-
tion of the Islamist movement.The Wah-
habis are dissident Muslim congregations
that emerged in the Northern Caucasus in
the late socialist period. Their i m a m s a p p e a l
to the ‘purification of Islam’ from ‘non-per-
mitted innovations’ (b i d ac), including d h i k r,
pilgrimages to saint shrines (z i y a r a t) ,
m a w l i d celebrations, recitations of the
Qur’an in cemeteries (t a l q i n), and the use of
protective charms (s a b a b). They regard the
Qur’an and the Sunna as the only sources of
faith (d i n). Sufi s h a y k h s are particularly tar-
geted by the Wahhabis’ assaults. Criticizing
them for their cooperation with post-social-
ist authorities, the Wahhabis accuse these
‘tariqatists’ of selling their religion to the ‘in-
fidel’ (k u f f a r) government.
The Wahhabis have even challenged the
other North Caucasian Muslims by their
dress. Their men have beards without mous-
taches and wear short trousers. Some Wah-
habi women are veiled by a k h i m a r or a h i j a b
and sometimes by a n i q a b. The followers of
the movement call themselves ‘Muslims’ or
‘brothers’ (i k h w a n) and consider their con-
gregations as the only communities of the
faithful (j a m aca t). They are also known as
s a l a f s, making reference to the first follow-
ers of Prophet Mohammed whose way of
life they claim to imitate. The movement
was named ‘Wahhabi’ by its opponents
amongst the followers of local Sufi s h a y k h s.
This term was invented after the name of
Mohammed b. cA b d al-Wahhab, a reformer
of Islam in the 18t h century. In the Northern
Caucasus, it has a derogatory and negative
c o n n o t a t i o n .
Soviet roots of the Wahhabis
The foundation of Wahhabi congrega-
tions in the Northern Caucasus is usually as-
sociated with the fall of the socialist regime
in 1991. In reality, they date back to the mid-
1970s, when proselytizing Muslim groups
arose in dozens of Dagestani and Chechen
villages situated in the Terek-Sulak low-
lands. Their members secretly gathered in
houses of local Muslim scholars (cu l a ma')
while attending their Arabic and Qur’anic
classes. Such unlicensed schools also carried
out missionary work (dacw a) among the vil-
lage youth. Fearing the spread of Islamism
from Iran and Afghanistan, the Soviet au-
thorities closed down all unauthorized Is-
lamic schools by the beginning of the 1980s.
However, in the 1990s some of the teachers,
such as Bagauddin Kebedov (b. in 1945),
from the village of Pervomayskoe, and
Ahmad-qadi Akhtaev (1942-1998), from the
village of Kudali, became renowned Wah-
habi a m i r s. Initially, they sided with Naqsh-
bandi s h a y k h s who had instructed them in
Arabic and usul al-din.
It should also be mentioned that the
North Caucasian Wahhabis emerged in a
context of, though in reaction to, anti-Islam-
ic socialist reforms. Their movement arose
in lowland districts of Dagestan and Chech-
nya where collectivization, resettlement
and ‘cultural revolution’ campaigns were
successfully carried out from the 1930s-
1970s. About two-thirds of highlanders had
resettled there. For instance, Bagauddin
Kebedov’s parents had moved from their
native Dagestani village of Sasitli to Vedeno
in Chechnya following the deportation of
the Chechens in 1944, and in 1957 resettled
in the village of Pervomayskoe in Dagestan.
Closed Muslim communities had been
formed within collective and state farms in
the lowlands and these became the cradle
of the ‘Islamic revival’ movement that arose
in the latter years of perestroika.
Under socialist rule, many pre-revolution-
ary cu l a m a ' were persecuted and most of the
Sufi intellectual practices faded away. Both
Wahhabis and followers of Dagestani and
Chechen Sufi s h a y k h s shared a secular so-
cialist mentality. The impact of the Soviet
ideology can be observed down to the very
title of the Wahhabi programme, passed in
January 1998, called the ‘Manifesto of J a-
m aca t of Dagestan’ after the famous Com-
munist Manifesto.
Redividing Muslim space
The wave of Islamic enthusiasm, which
seized Dagestan and other Muslim republics
of the Northern Caucasus at the end of the
1980s, divided the region’s Muslim society
into ‘Wahhabis’ and ‘Traditionalists’. This
schism replaced a traditional cleavage of
Muslim space into S h ici t e s (Azerbaijan and
Southern Dagestan) and Sunnites (Northern
Caucasus). Under socialist rule, confronta-
tions which had taken place between Cau-
casian S h ici t e s and Sunnites from the Safaw-
id expansion of the 16t h- 1 8t h centuries to the
early 20t h century died out. At present, the
former S h ici t e places of worship, such as Fri-
day j u m a-mosques in the Dagestani towns
of Derbent and Kizlyar, are attended by
S h ici t e s and Sunnites alike. At the same time,
another pre-modern division of the Sunnite
Muslims into followers of the S h a f ici t e l e g a l
school, which had traditionally dominated
in Dagestan and Checheno-Ingushetia, and
the Hanifite m a d h h a b prevailing in the
North-Western Caucasus, disappeared.
A new fundamental division of the North
Caucasian Muslims has an important politi-
cal dimension associated with the disinte-
gration of the central power as it occurred in
post-socialist Russia. Following the fall of
the socialist regime, the Spiritual Board of
the Muslims of the Northern Caucasus, dat-
ing back to 1943, broke up into several inde-
pendent republican branches. In turn, some
of them split into small ethnic branches.
Though legalized by the North Caucasian
republican authorities and incorporated
into the post-socialist political system, these
m u f t i y a t s have failed to gain the support of
all the restored Muslim congregations. The
number of unauthorized Friday mosques
grew rapidly, as did the new congregations
independent from the officially recognized
Muslim clergy: only 212 of 1585 restored
Dagestani mosques sided with the republi-
can m u f t i y a t by May 2000.
Dagestan and Chechnya witnessed the
appearance of the Islamist counterparts of
the official Muslim clergy – the Wahhabis.
From the lowlands, their influence first
spread to the highland villages of both re-
publics. By the mid-1990s, their congrega-
tions, although small in size, emerged in In-
gushetia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Kabardi-
no-Balkaria, Stavropol’e and even in the
Dagestani migrant community in Astrahan.
Before the beginning of the first Russian-
Chechen war (1994-1996), the Wahhabis
concentrated on their missionary work
(d acw a) by imparting Qur’anic education
and literature on basic Islamic practices
such as Bagauddin’s book, N a m a z ( P r a y e r ) .
This work had been reprinted in hundreds
of thousands of copies in 1993, 1994 and
1999. Until 1998, the centre of the move-
ment was located in the Dagestani town of
Kizilyurt, where the largest Wahhabi
m a d r a s a, al-Hikma, comprising more than
700 pupils, had been set up by Bagauddin
Kebedov in December 1991. By the mid-
1990s, some Wahhabi congregations estab-
lished close contacts with the missionary
centres and foundations from abroad in-
cluding Tayba, al-Haramain, and al-Igasa al-
Islamiyya, which began to sponsor their ed-
ucational and publishing activities.
Radicalization of Islam
From 1994-1998, a number of armed con-
flicts occurred between Wahhabi and Sufi
factions in the towns and villages of Dages-
tan and Chechnya. Since the mid-1990s, the
Wahhabis have been subjected to systemat-
ic repression by the local official Muslim
clergy. Gradually, outbreaks of fighting
within village and town communities were
reproduced at the level of the republic and
subsequently expanded to the regional
level. Thus from 1997-1999 the Wahhabi j a-
m aca t of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, Kadar
and Durangi villages expelled representa-
tives of the Dagestani authorities and pro-
claimed ‘a separate Islamic territory gov-
erned by the S h a r ica’ (or the so-called Kadar
zone). By 1998, the initiative in this struggle
was captured by ‘Traditionalists’. The official
Muslim clergy lobbied for a new federal reli-
gion bill and a Dagestani version was
passed in Moscow and Makhachkala in Sep-
tember-December 1997. Wahhabi congre-
gations and other ‘non-traditional confes-
sions’ were to be officially registered.
In December 1997, Bagauddin Kebedov
had to leave Kizilyurt for Urus-Martan in
Chechnya. This exile and the ensuing death
of Ahmad-qadi Akhtaev in March 1998, re-
sulted in a rapid politicization and radical-
ization of the movement. There had always
been a political dimension, but its form and
programmes now changed. While Khasbu-
lat Khasbulatov’s ‘J a m aca t a l - M u s l i m i n ’ ,
Kebedov and Akhtaev’s Islamic Revival Party
and Akhtaev’s ‘al-Islamiyya’ movement had
been founded in the period from 1989-1996
to represent the North Caucasian Muslims
to the Russian state authorities and to
spread Islamic knowledge among the North
Caucasian highlanders, ‘Islamic J a m aca t’, es-
tablished by Bagauddin Kebedov in 1998,
announced a holy war (al-jihad al-asgar) .
This war was to be waged against the ‘unbe-
lieving secular government’ of Dagestan
and for the establishment of an ‘Islamic
caliphate in the Caucasus’. Supported by
Chechen field commanders, the Wahhabi
leaders organized ‘Islamic peace-making
troops’. Some famous terrorists such as cA b d
al-Rahman ibn al-Hattab, originating from
the Chechen diaspora in Jordan, and Shamil
Basaev entered the movement. The former
Chechen m u f t i Kadyrov, siding with the ‘Tra-
ditionalists’, formed a ‘tariqatist’ regiment
that actively fought with the Wahhabis.
From 1999-2001, the Wahhabis based in
Chechnya and Dagestan were involved in
the second Russian-Chechen war, which
started with a raid by military Wahhabi
groups in northern Dagestan. Federal forces
rapidly defeated their troops and destroyed
villages of the Kadar zone, but failed to abol-
ish the movement whose leaders escaped
to Chechnyan territory. They are still active
in the underground, functioning simultane-
ously ‘everywhere and nowhere’ (cf. M.
Gilsenan). Paradoxically, the militant Is-
lamist ideas and practices are shared by
both Wahhabis and their religious and secu-
lar adversaries. Such enigmatic and destruc-
tive tendencies in modern North Caucasian
forms of Islam deserve greater attention in
research on the process of re-Islamization in
the post-socialist context. ◆
Portrait of the
former Chechen
m u f t i A. Kadyrov.
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T u r k e y
C A T H A R I N A  R A U D VE R E
When the resurgence of Islam in Turkey is debated,
Islamistic women’s appearance and visibility in pub-
lic life often forms one of the core topics on the agen-
da. Discussions all too often end with a fixed asser-
tion about the presence of ‘covered’ women. But how
are place and space claimed in women’s religious ac-
t i v i s m ?
Space, Place and
V i s i b i l i t y
Islamistic Women
in Turkey
The platforms established during the last
decade have had a considerable impact on
social practice as well as on theology and
ritual performance.1 In most cases, women’s
interest groups established in the post-1983
period function as non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) and it is these that have
had such an impact on social practice in
T u r k e y .
The veritable explosion of NGO activism
over the last ten years has caused some con-
fusion in public discourse as regards
women’s interest groups’ relations with the
state. This became apparent during the
preparations for the UN Habitat conference
held in Istanbul in June 1996, when groups
representing very different concerns and
strategies in policy making cooperated and
discovered – what sociologists had pointed
at before – the similar conditions under
which they were acting. The legislation for
foundations with non-commercial cultural
or social activities and the consequences of
the liberal changes in economic policies
have left extensive amounts of private
money available to the NGOs. Through their
mere presence in civil life, these groups,
with their various agendas, have been an
open political challenge outside the tradi-
tional party system.2 Thousands of groups
are registered as active and have played a
determining role in the formulation of polit-
ical arguments. The changes during the
Özal regime and thereafter brought about
spheres of social autonomies and initiatives
of a kind that had never been seen before in
the Turkish republic.3
Compared to the situation for female reli-
gious activists in Turkey some 10 or 15 years
ago, the activities are not only larger in scale
but also considerably more visible and pub-
lic. They are also undoubtedly part of global
events. The situation reveals more than one
paradox. On one hand, in contemporary
Turkey there are more possible choices of
religious life than ever: an apparent individ-
ualization with emphasis on personal pref-
erences exists at least in the major cities. In
poor areas too, though often viewed with a
biased gaze as culturally homogeneous,
there are options for variety in religious life.
Different Muslim associations compete with
various theological and ideological pro-
grammes for attention and support. On the
other hand, not everything that comes after
high modernity is pluralism: what the highly
visible religious groups teach today is often
quite authoritarian, more or less radical, Is-
lamistic universalism. Women within the Is-
lamistic movement are empowered – from
the perspective of their local community –
but they seldom claim formal power at any
institutional level.
’Covered NGOs’
Most religious NGOs in contemporary
Turkey are constructed as pious founda-
tions, v a k ı f l a r. A distinct feature in the new
situation is comprised by the many women
in charge of foundation activities. The in-
creasing number of ‘covered NGOs’, ç a rş a f l ı
N G O, as one Turkish journalist has named
t h e m ,4 run by Islamistic women, concen-
trate their activities on small-scale commu-
nity work, often far away from the eyes of
the general public. The women offer basic
religious education programmes and ele-
mentary social welfare such as food sup-
plies, clothing, school grants, legal advice,
etc. They execute voluntary work at all lev-
els of society and if not in direct political
power, they seek to influence local society.
An apparent process of formalization of reli-
gious activism has taken place, i.e. a trans-
formation from private to public. For cov-
ered women, the establishment of a v a k ı f i s
often the only way of taking part in local po-
litical discussions. Few of the active w o m e n
go public, and those who do often attain an
iconic status as well-known authors, jour-
nalists or television personalities on the reli-
gious stations. The women must stand firm
when in the focus of debates, such as the
situation was for Merve K a v a c ı when she en-
tered the assembly hall of the Parliament in
Ankara wearing her headscarf.
Women’s NGOs and access
t o public space
Women’s grassroots activities and volun-
tary work are too often explained as deter-
mined by their sex and their poverty rather
than as the result of conscious choices. The
activities are neither informal nor occasional
and the importance of the organization as
such can not be overestimated. The
strength comes from the members’ ability
to establish long-lasting loyalties outside
the family in combination with the specific
legal status of a foundation. The fact that
the v a k ı f’ s legal and economic status is reg-
ulated cannot solely be interpreted in terms
of control since the legislation also protects
the activities from local criticism.
Through the v a k ı f l a r, the less well-known
women gain not only stability and structure
to their activities, but also local public
recognition and opportunities to address
wider audiences. This change has meant a
shift from meetings in family houses or
apartments according to very traditional
patterns to conquests of spaces such as uni-
versity campuses and modern media.
Nilüfer Göle has noted the Islamistic groups’
‘attempts to reappropriate control over the
orientation of the cultural model problema-
tizing the relations of domination in spheres
of lifestyle and knowledge.’5 For women’s
forms of assembly, these changes are appar-
ent and have raised questions about access
to urban space. Increasingly larger parts of
the city have become accessible to covered
women, and women have begun to move
over great distances to be able to reach the
groups of their choices. More significantly, a
v a k ı f, as a relatively stable economic organi-
zation, provides opportunities for women to
establish rooms of their own. Mono-gen-
dered space is an indisputable condition for
prayer meetings as well as social welfare
work. With rooms that protect moral values
such as decency and purity, the leading
women can present the message of their
groups without fear of criticism from male
family members of their prospective sup-
porters. They can speak with authority and
claim legitimacy when invited to activities
and balance their urge to contribute to local
society while manifesting absolute recogni-
tion of the rules of proper behaviour.
Combating master narratives
A shift in focus of interest can be noted in
the academic discussions about Islam in
contemporary Turkey. Elite Muslim women
have been interested, since long ago, in
local discourse and practice – an interest
now taken up by academicians. The
women’s groups are not easily defined in
conventional socio-political categories as
they mobilize over and above class bound-
aries; they are far from being hailed by the
Islamist party; and their agenda embraces
both radical and traditionalistic issues.
The small independent Muslim groups
represent, in general, a heterogeneous
counter discourse between the combating
master narratives in Turkey: state Kemalism
and the conventional interpretation of Islam
as formulated by the Directorate for Reli-
gious Affairs. Both of these hegemonic dis-
courses seem to have difficulties in offering
relevant images of history and in depicting
recognizable visions of life. In the wake of
this failure, new arenas and platforms have
opened for interpretation of theology and
faith. Consequently, women’s religious ac-
tivism at a local level is provocative – even if
it is not intended to be – since it challenges
the establishment, be it the representatives
of the secular state or local religious author-
i t i e s . ◆
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E - m a i l : c a t h a r i n a . r a u d v e r e @ t e o l . l u . s e
On page 35 of the ISIM Newsletter 6,
a book presentation by Elisabeth Özdalga
was published. The full title of the
publication was not mentioned in the
main text. The following is the title as it
should have been published:
Elisabeth Özdalga (ed.) (1999),
Naqshbandis in Western and Central Asia:
Change and Continuity, Istanbul:
S w e d i s h Research Institute in Istanbul.
Distributed by: Curzon Press
15 The Quadrant
Richmond Surrey, TW9 1BP
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 8948 4660
Fax: +44 20 8332 6735
E-mail: publish@curzonpress.co.uk
URL: www.curzonpress.co.uk
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* The term ‘Ethnic English’ was coined by Fatima
Hussain and Margaret O’Brien, and is useful
because it signifies that ‘white’ British people have
an ethnicity; and it also avoids the notion of racial
origin as a determinant of cultural identity. See
their valuable report (1999), Muslim Families in
Europe: Social Existence and Social Care, University
of London Press. In their glossary of terms they
state: ‘(this term) is used to emphasise that every
individual has an ethnicity and that the ethnic
majority should not be labelled “white”.’ The term
has been adapted here as ‘ethnic UK’, in order to
include women from Wales, Scotland and Ireland
who would most often be classified ‘white’.
Sonia N û r î n Shah-Kazemi is a barrister and senior
lecturer in law. Her field of interest is alternative
dispute resolution systems in particular family
mediation, and legal training. She is also a member
of the equal treatment advisory board of the Judicial
Studies Board responsible for the training of the
judiciary in England and Wales.
We ste rn  Euro p e
S O N I A N Û R Î N S H A H - K A Z E M I
Severing the ties of marriage in any context is a try-
ing process, while in almost proportionate contrast,
obtaining marital status is nearly always relatively
easy. If Muslim women in the UK are unable to obtain
an Islamic divorce (t a l a q) from their husbands, they
are obliged to go through a complex set of proce-
dures in order to dissolve their Islamic marriage con-
tracts (faskh o f n i k a h). If the women are recognized
as legally married according to UK civil law, they
must take steps to change that status as well by un-
dergoing the civil divorce process.
Untying the Knot
Divorce and Muslim
law in the UK
’Surely there is some part of Muslim law to
look after women’s rights and general and
personal needs.’ (Case 715) The results of a
two year investigation into what Muslim
women experience whilst trying to divorce
their husbands reveal that although women
may be unaware of many facets of the Shari-
ah applicable to the dissolution of the n i k a h
contract, they are conscious that there must
be some way of terminating their Islamic
marriages, and are active in finding solu-
t i o n s :
The study focuses on applicants to the
Muslim Law (Shariah) Council (MLSC), an in-
dependent body established by the Muslim
community in the UK in 1985. The fieldwork
comprised two stages: the first stage in-
volved examining over 280 detailed case
files of women who approached the organi-
zation during the period from 1985-1996;
and the second was to conduct in-depth in-
terviews with over 20 women whose cases
were being processed during 1999 and
2000. Although men do apply to the organi-
zation, and many husbands communicate in
detail with the MLSC, the findings in this
summary focus on the women applicants.
The MLSC comprises i m a m s ( a u t h o r i t a t i v e
religious figures) and f u q a h a ' (jurists) from
all over the country representing the five
schools of law (Hanafi, Maliki, S h a f ici, Han-
bali, and J acf a r i). One central aspect of the
MLSC’s work is the ability to facilitate a di-
vorce according to the Shariah, and to act in
the capacity of an Islamic judge (q a d i) and
function as he would in an Islamic court of
law. The majority of applicants are women
who approach the MLSC with a view to se-
curing their intervention in marital disputes.
The women come from different areas of
the UK and many are from outside London.
There is also a considerable number of en-
quiries from elsewhere in Europe.
The case files demonstrate that the women
come from a variety of socio-economic
backgrounds, ranging from qualified pro-
fessional women to those with minimal for-
mal education. The ages of the women
range from the very young (16-18 years) to
women in their forties and fifties. Similarly,
the women’s cultural backgrounds are di-
verse, with applicants from South Asia, the
Middle East, Africa, migrant refugees from
the Balkans and ethnic UK* women who
The time has come that I have chosen to
marry again…My solicitor has advised I
can get a divorce from (X) on the basis of
English Law using the grounds of five-
year separation or grounds of indecent
behaviour. I have decided to file my di-
vorce on the grounds of five-year separa-
tion. However, I am a Muslim, and ac-
cording to Islam, only the man has the
right to divorce, but there must be a way
in which a woman can divorce herself
from the man under special circum-
stances (like the trouble I’ve been
t h r o u g h ) .
(Case 8145)
have converted to Islam. In addition, there is
also a number of ethnic UK* women who
marry Muslim men, but do not become Mus-
lim. They are aware that their Muslim mar-
riages may have no legal status in this coun-
try, but nonetheless feel personally com-
pelled to obtain Islamic divorces in order to
sever their marriage ties. This may be done
in addition to obtaining civil divorces in
those instances where these women were
also married according to civil law.
The vast majority of women who apply to
the MLSC are unable to obtain a t a l a q f r o m
their husbands. This can be for a variety of
reasons such as the husband’s desertion or
intransigence. In the latter case, the MLSC
seeks to facilitate negotiations between the
parties in order to resolve the conflict. The
women often approach the MLSC without
having taken other prior formal steps. They
seek the supportive intervention of the or-
ganization in order to help them negotiate a
divorce with their husbands and obtain the
support of their families. This role is compa-
rable to approaching the family solicitor
upon a breakdown of the marriage, but it is
also parallel to mediation facilitation inas-
much as the woman maintains a high de-
gree of participation in the process, thereby
differing from the act of ‘handing over’ mat-
ters to the solicitor. In all cases, the MLSC in-
sists on communicating directly with the
woman, even is she is not the one who first
approaches the organization. Although the
MLSC is keen to keep the door of reconcilia-
tion open, in almost all the cases where this
is not a possibility, they then seek to per-
suade the husband to divorce his wife. If this
is not so straightforward and the parties still
require the intervention of the MLSC, they
will continue to mediate in the dispute. In a
small minority of cases, the MLSC negotiates
what is called a k h u l l a agreement, whereby
the wife releases herself from her marriage
by paying an agreed sum of money (usually
returning the amount of money received as
dower, the m e h r). However, in the vast ma-
jority of cases, the MLSC acts to terminate
the nikah c o n t r a c t for the wife.
The MLSC’s intervention can result in the
man divorcing his wife, but should he
refuse, the MLSC acts to dissolve the n i k a h
contract by declaring a faskh o f nikah. T h e
MLSC considers the husband’s refusal to
pronounce a t a l a q a deliberate act intended
to harm the interests of the wife and is
therefore considered valid grounds for ter-
minating the n i k a h contract. In almost all
applicable cases, the MLSC also encourages
applicants to institute civil divorce proceed-
ings according to English law if they have
not already done so. However, this is irrele-
vant to a category of women who are not
Now we have been separated for three
years. I would like a divorce certificate is-
sued. I would now like to seek your guid-
ance and help on this matter and would
be grateful if you would issue a divorce
certificate in order to dissolve the mar-
r i a g e .
(Case 728)
married according to English civil law and
whose Muslim marriages are not valid in the
UK. These women have no option but to ap-
proach organizations like the MLSC. These
women, in addition, often seek supportive
counsel from the MLSC as well as its inter-
vention in facilitating divorce. The majority
of women perceive themselves, to varying
degrees, as practising Muslims; sometimes
it is a question of deep faith and a need to
comply with religious laws in every aspect
of their lives. The women consider their abil-
ity to approach the MLSC an empowerment
to which they are without question entitled:
From the case files, it became apparent
that in those cases where women had a
strong adherence to Islamic religious val-
ues, they confided in the MLSC by offering
many details about their marriage and their
own feelings. This was often in contrast to
the sparse and perfunctory information
given to the solicitor to set in motion civil
divorce proceedings. In interviews, the
women expressed a reluctance to divulge
information about immigration matters, or
about the breakdown of family customs as
they complained that those advisers who
were not Muslim would ‘not understand’.
While they were reluctant to make the effort
to challenge the prevailing stereotypes of
Muslim women’s lack of autonomy, many
considered themselves independent and
free of any burden of stigma attached to di-
v o r c e :
Where the women’s religious adherence
was not strong, but they nonetheless chose
to approach the MLSC because of a desire to
comply with cultural community norms,
they did not provide the MLSC with many
details about their emotions and the rea-
sons for marital breakdown. Often, con-
comitantly, their civil divorce documenta-
tion revealed a more intimate relationship
with their solicitors. These women often ap-
proached the MLSC after having ap-
proached civil lawyers, or at about the same
time, but rarely before doing so.
Parameters and
e m p o w e r m e n t
The MLSC is constrained both by a lack of
resources and to a certain extent by the self-
imposed parameters of its current role in
the Muslim community because it cannot
function as a fully equipped court of law. Its
Actually there is someone I would like to
marry, but I cannot until I am free from
this matter because I do not wish to do
anything against Islamic Law, which I
greatly respect and believe in with all my
h e a r t .
(Case 779)
Because of this help and my faith in Allah
(SW), I have now found the courage to
ask for a divorce as I believe this to be my
God-given right.
(Case 8173)
activities have been hindered by the exi-
gencies of operating within a different ‘host’
system. It is reluctant to become involved in
disputes pertaining to property or other fi-
nancial matters, other than writing letters
urging frankness and fairness on the part of
the disputants. Both the applicants and the
M L S C itself vest the organization with a
morally prescriptive role regarding the wel-
fare of the Muslim community. However, it
is apparent that the disputants attribute to
the organization a wider remit than it de-
fines for itself. Predicated on achieving a
moral consensus amongst the Muslim com-
munity members, the MLSC’s role has
evolved over the years, responding to the
ever-changing needs of its applicants. The
interaction between the MLSC and the larg-
er social matrix within which it is situated is
a dynamic process that continually refines
the nature and function of this organization.
It is evident from the range of ideas, emo-
tions and demands expressed by the
women in this study that such organizations
as the MLSC can serve to empower those
Muslim women who make their demands
within the framework of the Shariah. Obvi-
ously, the sample could not include women
who choose to ignore the precepts of the
Shariah and for whom a civil divorce suf-
fices. However, for those who approach the
MLSC and those women whose marriages
are only recognized by the Shariah, the
MLSC is the only recourse. ◆
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self-fulfilment through an alternative (Is-
lamic) morality. However, Islam also repre-
sents for them a way of overcoming what
they label as backward and traditional fea-
tures of their cultures. In certain cases, the
endorsement of a Muslim agenda and the
process of studying and learning become a
terrain whereby women negotiate their as-
pirations for autonomy and self-realization
in a sort of public sphere without challeng-
ing their husbands’ traditional supremacy in
the private sphere. Women who actively en-
gage themselves in Islam in Italy constantly
confront other Muslim women who, accord-
ing to them, remain in the realm of igno-
rance or tradition, or whom they see as los-
ing their identity by compromising with
Western values and behaviour. These narra-
tives, however, are highly contested by
other Muslim women who invoke a notion
of modernity that embraces secular ideas
and behaviour and who claim a diverse no-
tion of authenticity.
Whereas Islamist women in the mosque
are persuaded that different ways of being
Muslim cannot exist because the Qur’an
clearly states what being a good Muslim im-
plies, many Moroccan women consider
themselves Muslims and adhere to the gen-
eral principles of the Islamic religion but
show flexibility in practising them and
admit different behaviour. However, Muslim
women who display more secular behaviour
are not necessarily less embedded within
traditional practices. More importantly,
women who renegotiate Islam construct
their own versions of authenticity by refor-
mulating and accommodating diverse cul-
tural and religious practices.
The secular demeanour displayed by
these women does not represent a capitula-
tion to a Western hegemony to which they
become assimilated. Migration is certainly
part and parcel of women’s compulsion for
change, since it constitutes a major turning
point in their lives, where the confrontation
with a different model of living and inter-
preting religion amplifies their reflections
about themselves, their culture and their
roots. However, women’s renegotiation of
Islam also reflects the historical processes of
adaptation, negotiation and reformulation
of cultural and religious identities that have
occurred in postcolonial societies. Indeed,
processes of renegotiation of cultural and
religious practices are more historically
rooted than the more recent Islamist call for
a return to the religious texts as sources of
a u t h e n t i c i t y .
Muslim women’s striving to affirm their
own subjective positions discloses a power
struggle to interpret and define cultural as-
pects and performances, and highlights
contestation of dominant perceptions of
cultural authenticity.
Several women shared with me their anxi-
eties and reflections regarding two models
and dominant discourses, articulated as the
‘Western’ and the ‘Islamist’, both of which
they feel are ultimately alien to their identi-
ties. Indeed, several amongst the Muslim
women I have worked with define them-
selves as Muslims but refuse Islamism as the
only political and cultural frame leading to
self-determination without assimilation. For
them, authenticity is not a mere and strict
respect for some religious norms, but is
rather about positioning themselves
through genuinely recognizing negotia-
tions as inescapable outcomes of living in a
different society. ◆
N o t e
* Muslims in Italy are estimated at around 600,000
(Muslim organizations provide higher figures:
1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) .
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Inaugur a l  Lec ture
H A R AL D M O T ZK I
There are hardly any sources available for the histor-
ically most important period of Islam, its first 150
years of existence. We only have at our disposal tra-
ditions that can be found in later written collections.
The historical reliability of these traditions is doubt-
ful because religious and political developments
possibly – sometimes even demonstrably – have dis-
torted, embellished or even created such traditions.
Methods of Dating
Muslim Traditions
Four main types of dating methods are ap-
plied by Western scholars of early Islam to
ascertain the historical reliability of tradi-
tions, namely: those based on the texts
m u tūn of a tradition; texts based on the col-
lections in which the traditions can be
found; those that use the chains of transmit-
ters a sānı̄ d; and those that take stock of
texts as well as the chains of transmitters.
Dating based on the texts of traditions
have dominated .H a dı̄t h research ever since
Ignaz Goldziher’s Muhammedanische Studi-
e n. Several criteria are applied, such as com-
plexity of the text, level of development, in-
ternal coherence of the textual elements,
style and vocabulary. The result tends to be
a relative, sometimes absolute chronology
of the texts. However, research into the
plausibility of the premises and the conclu-
sions that are applied make it clear that re-
sults are often unconvincing and that there
is no real footing in the texts for the purpos-
es of absolute dating. This is a general prob-
lem with the methods that try to date tradi-
tions solely on the basis of the texts. The
method seems to be useful only when com-
bined with other dating criteria.
Dating based on the collections of tradi-
tions received a significant impulse by
Joseph Schacht, who applied this method in
his book The Origins of Muhammadan Ju-
r i s p r u d e n c e. The e silentio conclusion plays
an important role in this method – a danger-
ous one given that it provides little certainty
because of the few available sources on
early Islam.
Dating based on chains of transmitters is
applied mainly by Gautier H.A. Juynboll,
who developed the i s nād analysis to a high
level. Of crucial importance for this method
is the phenomenon of common links, i.e. the
same names of persons who come up at a
comparable level in the various chains of
transmitters of the same H a dı̄ t h. In general,
it is assumed that the oldest common link or
an immediately preceding common link is
the author of the tradition in question. This
interpretation of the common link is actual-
ly based on premises that can hardly with-
stand criticism.
Dating on the basis of chains of transmit-
ters as well as texts seems to be the most
successful method. In the i s nād-c u m- m a t n
analysis, interdependencies between the
chains of transmitters and their correspond-
ing texts that can be determined in many
traditions play an important role. These in-
terdependencies are seen as indications
that we are dealing here with a real process
of transmission and not with mere fiction.
Thanks to the combination of i s nād and text
analysis, it is possible to make more positive
pronouncements on the common links and
thus on the dating of a tradition, on the de-
velopment of the text, and on mistakes and
forgeries the variants may contain.
Only after plenty of traditions are dated
can scholars of Islam venture to make pro-
nouncements on the authenticity and his-
toricity of what has been transmitted in the
sources. Until now, however, things have
not developed to that extent. ◆
Vacancy: The Aga Khan University
Institute of Islamic Civilisations
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
The Aga Khan University, established in Karachi, Pakistan
in 1983 as the country’s first private international universi-
ty, comprises a Faculty of Health Sciences consisting of a
Medical College and a School of Nursing, a University Hos-
pital, and an Institute for Educational Development. The
University is offering programmes in Advanced Nursing in
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and planning has com-
menced for a College of Arts and Sciences in Karachi.
The Institute of Islamic Civilisations, a unit of the University,
is being established in London, UK. Its goal is to further the
study of civilisations of Muslim societies, through research
and instruction on the heritage, in all its historical diversity,
in moral and ethical thought, forms of governance and
public life, and also in artistic and creative expression in all
forms. The Institute will seek to create contexts for interac-
tion of academics, traditionally trained scholars, profes-
sionals and others in furthering the understanding of
pressing issues of public life. Since these issues are central
to the lives of societies generally, the Institute’s activities
shall foster understanding of other cultural and intellectual
traditions, with which Muslims live and interact.
Director of the Institute 
T h e Director should be a broadly experienced scholar of
distinction in fields of study related to Islamic civilisations
and committed to the development of new intellectual di-
rections. He/she should have significant experience in aca-
demic leadership and management at a senior level, as
well as the ability to work with colleagues from diverse
backgrounds and foster extensive academic connections
in Muslim societies.
Senior Faculty
A core group of senior faculty, preferably those having a
doctorate in related disciplines and teaching and research
experience, will be required to expedite development of
the initial programmes, including curricula, an index with
abstracts of published works and thematic multidiscipli-
nary research. The faculty will be selected in consultation
with the Director.
Please send your resume and contacts of at least three referees
w i t h i n four weeks of this publication to the following:
Personnel Director, The Aga Khan University
Stadium Road, Karachi 74800, Pakistan
Fax: + 92 21 4934294 , E-mail: recruitment@aku.edu
Further information is available at the website: www.aku.edu
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B oo k Pr esenta t io n
A B E  W .  A T A
Mixed Christian and Muslim marriages have an
impact which reaches beyond the lives of the
spouses, their children, and their parents. These
marriages affect the wider community in ways which
can be understood by identifying the enrichment
and complications of family dynamics in West Bank
households and by exploring the attitudes and
reactions of spouses, which have shaped their inter-
relationships even at the level of the community at
large. Their aspirations and fears about their
children’s futures, when placed within the context of
social, political and religious developments, offers
insight into the changing boundaries of the Christian
and Muslim communities in the West Bank.
I n t e r m a r r i a g e
in Palestine
Emerging as a unique phenomenon, cross-
religious marriages within the Palestinian
community may be seen as having escaped
the traditions of religious and cultural exclu-
siveness. But this by no means signifies a
smooth transition for those who decide to
take the step, nor does it mean a smooth in-
tegration of the differences or an easy ac-
commodation of religious and cultural com-
plexities between the Muslim and Christian
communities within the one household. In
order to explore these phenomena, a sam-
ple group of 120 people was chosen to form
the basis of analysis. They were selected
from East Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Ramal-
lah according to their concentration in
these three townships. Though perhaps
small for a comprehensive study, the sam-
ple group covers the majority of known
cases of Muslim-Christian intermarriages in
the West Bank.
Religious intermixing brings with it a cer-
tain degree of stress, despite a welcome so-
cietal change which allows a choice of part-
ner and associated lifestyle options. The
analysis allows us to monitor the extent to
which cross-religious intermixing is gradu-
ally emerging between Muslims and Chris-
tians, a trend which may signify the gradual
dissolution of the boundaries between the
two communities. Whether it will continue
at the same pace or gather momentum de-
pends largely on demographic, migratory
and socio-political developments. For ex-
ample, the level of education of this sample
was much higher than those shown in a pre-
vious study (Ata, l986). In this study, those
having obtained tertiary education amount-
ed to 72.3%; whereas in the previous study
it was 10.5%. One thing, however, remains
certain: the best answer lies in monitoring
the marriage patterns of second and third
g e n e r a t i o n s .
One must be careful when assessing de-
velopments in the field, if only for the over-
whelming religio-gender imbalance. In the
majority of cases, male spouses are Muslim
and females are Christian. Only in 4% of the
cases was the reverse found to be true. As
the latter type of marriage is not sanctioned
in a predominately Muslim society such as
the contemporary West Bank, the data will
not allow a symmetric comparison between
the two communities.
Pleasant and unpleasant
f e a t u r e s
Emotional strains and behavioural prob-
lems due to cultural and religious differ-
ences emerged as a cause of tension be-
tween the spouses. Most of these were
mentioned by at least one partner, particu-
larly as the person being interviewed per-
ceived the differences. A few of these were
serious and unresolved. They related to the
community’s negative reactions, and much
less so to incompatibility in personality, po-
larization of roles or absence of love at the
beginning of marriage. The ratio of those
who cited negative reactions by the com-
munity to those who cited incompatibility
of backgrounds was five to one; precisely
48.7 % and 12.95% respectively. The reac-
tions were perceived to come from relatives,
friends, the community at large and one’s
own religious group. They were also high-
lighted as the most unpleasant features
about the marriages. Depending on one’s
liberal leanings, responses towards Christ-
ian-Muslim marriages have been encourag-
ing. The decision that cross-religious mar-
riages are better than mono-religious ones
drew almost the same percentage (16.1%)
as those who believed in the contrary
(15.2%). The highest reaction (47.3%) was
drawn from those who indicated that it was
the same. Their reaction was a variation on a
theme; one interviewee summed it up with
the following: ‘it all depends on how much
one invests in it.’
Pleasant features were equally varied. The
highest proportion of responses (27.4%)
comprised reactions relating to cultural ex-
posure and tolerance between the two
communities. This was followed by 22.1%
who indicated love, understanding, and a
liberal life at home. A small percentage
(7.4%) held that pleasant features were ab-
s e n t .
Attitudes towards children
Concerns about children and the future
ranked as the second highest among ele-
ments that affect the relationships. Others
included lack of communal and professional
support from social and health groups, and
the absence of social and psychology-based
agencies to deal with feelings of marginali-
ty, disorientation and exclusion. The follow-
ing words of an interviewee encapsulate the
depth of this concern:
The depth of such disappointment must
be scrutinized side by side with the permis-
sion of mixed households to grant their chil-
dren the choice of their own religion. The re-
actions provided by Muslim and Christian
spouses differ significantly. The percentage
of Christian spouses giving such permission
is twice (58.0%) that of Muslim spouses
(33.9%); a larger percentage of Muslim
spouses (40.9%) do not grant this permis-
sion, compared with 16.0% Christians. The
remainder of the group did not answer or
simply did not know.
The combined responses of male and fe-
male spouses who allow such a choice com-
prised 45.5%. Only one-fifth (20.5%) indicat-
ed strongly that they wanted them to be
non-religious – something that is consid-
ered unthinkable anywhere in the Middle
E a s t .
Of particular interest are parental expecta-
tions of the children’s life in the future, which
ranged from 5.4% indicating ‘worse’ to 52.7%
indicating ‘better’. Those having been mar-
He [my son] doesn’t know what he really
is. He feels he belongs to both religions.
There is no support from anyone around
for their well-being and at school, it is like
a different place altogether. […] Our kids
already have mental insecurity. What
kinds of problems will they face when
they grow up? Right now they have been
to church, next time to the mosque. And
no one asks questions about them going
only to this place or that.
ried from one to ten years expressed a slight-
ly higher expectation for a ‘better’ life (at
56.9%) than those who have been married
more than ten years (at 46.8%). One explana-
tion for these slight differences has to do
with psychological and workable prece-
dence that has been set by couples in ‘older’
mixed marriages. Children who have already
transcended the brutal realities of cultural
differences are success stories.
Escaping from an unbearable situation of
spinsterhood may have affected a few
(Christian) wives, although that was not the
rule. Most of the wives had tertiary educa-
tion, as did their husbands. This may have
prompted them take a proactive role in the
choice of their partners.
Gender Roles and
R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
One measure of family style was the role
of the breadwinner. Almost two-thirds of
the spouses (62.5%) indicated that income
was shared equally between the two spous-
es. This finding is considered a marked im-
provement on the realities of the 1980s
where 12.5% out of total of 899 ‘non-mixed’
families share this responsibility. A relatively
modest access of the East Jerusalem fami-
lies to the Israeli labour market could have
also contributed to this result. This need not
overshadow the pressing economic hard-
ships becoming instrumental in softening
the patriarchal resistance to gender partici-
p a t i o n .
The trend noted above is reversed with re-
gards to house cleaning and other domestic
duties. The shared responsibility on this
item is reduced to 19.6%; whilst 79.5% of
the responses indicated that these chores
were reserved for the ‘wife mainly’.
Apirations for the future
Aspirations with respect to the future of
Palestine were diverse. This measure was
used primarily to distinguish ideas on reli-
gious or social changes, and the possible
impact on the dynamics of mixed marriages.
Preference for a ‘democratic’ society drew
the largest response (at 40.2%). The three
second largest groups comprised 16.1%
preferring an Islamic society; 16.1% a ‘multi-
religious’ society; and 15.2% a ‘non-reli-
gious’ one.
The two Christian and Muslim sub-sam-
ples differed strongly in that the latter
group ranked three times higher in prefer-
ring an ‘Islamic’ society; and also twice the
proportion of other Muslims who preferred
a ‘non-religious’ society.
When asked to choose between three de-
scriptors, namely ‘Arab’, ‘Palestinian’ and
‘Muslim/Christian’ as the most important
basis for their identity, the direction of both
the gender and religious responses were
the same and proportional. The combined
responses of Muslim husbands and wives
show that 50% chose ‘Palestinian’, 28%
‘Arab’, and 23% ‘Muslim’ as their main iden-
tity. The Christian male and female respons-
es combined tend to display an identical
p a t t e r n .
Despite the relative diversity of reactions,
a larger proportion of Muslim spouses still
cherish taking part in mixed marriage as
long as it is in a larger Islamic atmosphere.
The ratio of Muslim spouses (40.9%) to
Christians (16.0%) that opposed children
having the freedom to choose their religion
was three times as high.
These results may be viewed as the seeds
of change from the way previous genera-
tions used to identify themselves. It may be
that this group signals a departure from ac-
cepting that nationality and religious affilia-
tion are one and the same. The two ingredi-
ents may be viewed as synonymous only in
as far as couples of mixed marriages view
their sense of destiny as identical.
As the children attain their relative inde-
pendence against a centuries-old kinship
structure, they will have to learn how to ad-
just and combine cognitive maturity and
operating within the established communi-
ty. Mixed marriages on the West Bank have
brought with them a mixed outcome. At
one level, couples of this kind of marriage
are far from being fully integrated into
mainstream society. There is little indication
as to whether their children will make head-
way as times roll by and changes seep deep-
er into the layers of society. Clearly, unless
the community at large effectuates major
adjustments to this newly emerging para-
digm of partnership, Christian-Muslim mar-
riages are doomed to fail. ◆
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Bo o k P re senta ti o n
ZE H R A F .  A R AT
The women of Turkey are often characterized either
as a secluded and inert mass oppressed by harsh pa-
triarchal rules of Islam or as liberated citizens enjoy-
ing equal rights with men – thanks to Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk’s modernization reforms. The latter charac-
terization has been promoted by the state and sever-
al privileged women, including the former Prime
Minister Tansu Çiller, and reinforced by the cross-na-
tional data that ranked Turkey higher on many gen-




ing the debates on the ‘woman question’,
and their demands for education and
changes in family law had some resonance
in the reforms undertaken first by the
Young Turks and later by the Kemalists.
Two essays by I
.
r v i n Cemil Schick and Pelin
Baş c ı are concerned with the images creat-
ed through the Western gaze. In agreement
with the earlier critiques of orientalism,
Schick argues that erotic literature and its
claims to be the representation of reality
eroticized the East, facilitated gendering,
and forged a powerful colonial discourse.
Another crucial function of sexuality, he
adds, was allowing Europe to form a distinct
identity and define its place in the world.
Thus, attributing several conflicting images
to Ottoman women (e.g. disgustingly filthy
and obsessed with bathing) was not self-
contradictory but consistent with the alteri-
tist discourse, because each characteriza-
tion contributed to Europe’s self-definition
through ‘othering’. Baş c ı ’ s analysis of the
texts by American female missionaries
shows strong links between missionaries’
perceptions and the orientalist discourse.
Deconstructing Images of ‘The Turkish Wo-
m a n ’ is an effort to counter such oversimpli-
fications. It problematizes the collapsing of
multiples of people into a prototypical sin-
gular as a practice of domination (repeated
throughout the history) by focusing on the
negation of the diversity and individuality
of the women of Turkey. Locating various
images of uniformity, employed to define
the ‘ideal’ Turkish woman or to describe her
‘pitiful’ condition, Deconstructing Images
scrutinizes the cultural construct of ‘the
Turkish woman’ and the imperialistic, na-
tionalistic, religious and other currents be-
hind it. It also shows how opposing groups
have built upon and reinforced similar im-
ages and inquires into the role of women in
these processes.
In an effort to illustrate the revival and re-
production of the representations of women,
the volume attempts to contextualize dis-
courses chronologically by organizing the
essays into three politically distinct periods.
The first section explores the late Ottoman
era and begins with a chapter by Palmira
Brummett, who examines the cartoon im-
ages of women in the revolutionary press of
the Empire between 1908 and 1911. Depic-
tions, though numerous and diverse, all col-
lapse into an image of women as weak and
vulnerable and therefore needing to be pro-
tected and controlled. For example, the car-
toons that depict the country as a woman
flirting with European men may be a warn-
ing about European imperialism but also
point to the perils of women’s indepen-
dence or Westernization. Examining women’s
journals from the same era, Aynur Demirdi-
rek shows that some urban Ottoman
women were indeed demanding certain
rights. Despite their relatively small number,
these women had been influential in shap-
Commenting on how they related to the
‘other’ women, she argues that by present-
ing the ‘Ottoman woman’ as both the ulti-
mate victim and evidence of the country’s
backwardness and by assigning themselves
the role of her saviour, missionary women
were able to justify their own recent eman-
cipation and increasing public role.
The second section focuses on the gender
ideology of the early Republican era. K. E.
Fleming’s study of the Ottoman sociologist
Ziya Gökalp’s contribution to the nation-
building project of the Kemalists explicates
his interest in connecting the restoration of
gender equality, claimed to be prevalent in
pre-Islamic Turkish societies, to the revival
of authentic Turkish civilization. Reviewing
the roles assigned to the patriotic women of
the Republic, A yşe D u r a k b aşa argues that
while Kemalism encouraged women’s par-
ticipation in the public domain, it also re-
stricted them by imposing moral and be-
havioural codes that emphasized family ho-
nour. Zehra Arat analyses the educational
system as a device of socialization and dis-
cusses how the gendered curricula enabled
the regime to beget educated female citi-
zens who would contribute to the modern-
ization of the country without threatening
its gender hierarchy.
The last section explores the lives of
women since 1960. Iş ık Urla Z e y t i noğ l u
points to women’s low participation rate in
gainful employment and finds the explana-
tion both in popular cultural norms and
their reinforcement in discriminatory labour
laws. Emine Onaran I
.
n c i r l ioğ l u ’ s e t h n o-
graphic study of the gender division of
labour in two villages challenges the stereo-
typical notions of village women as igno-
rant, passive, and powerless. The profiles of
women who have climbed the corporate
ladder also challenge some common as-
sumptions. Hayat Kabasakal reports that the
chief women executives demonstrate a
strong desire and ability to maintain invisi-
bility and reject any association with femi-
nism. Focusing on another privileged group
of women, referred to as ‘the elite Islamist
women’, Aynur I
.
n c i r l ioğ l u argues that as-
suming an ‘Islamist identity’ and the ‘new
veiling’ allow a group of university-educat-
ed urban women to resist Kemalist moder-
nity, intercede Islamic patriarchy, and enter
public life; they reinterpret Islam to chal-
lenge the traditional norms held by Islamist
men and employ Kemalist women’s lan-
guage of ‘serving’ people to justify their
c l a i m s .
Carel Bertram’s review of short stories by
four contemporary women writers invokes
the Islamic concept of fitne-i â l e m. Taking
housework as a metaphor for chaos con-
tainment, she suggests that the female pro-
tagonists who defy their expected roles un-
leash f i t n e that could change the meaning
of the house and threaten the social order.
Thus, the house is presented as the domain
where women negotiate new roles and rela-
tionships. Arzu Öztürkmen studies the con-
tribution of a controversial women’s maga-
zine, K a d ı n c a, to the development of femi-
nist consciousness and gives it credit for en-
gaging non-politicized women. In her brief
historiography of the ‘Purple Roof of
Women’s Shelter’, Yeş i m Arat examines a
new wave of feminism and points to the dif-
ficulties of pursuing feminist ideals of sister-
hood, solidarity, and participant democracy
within an organization that has to operate
in a materialist, male-dominated, and essen-
tially undemocratic socio-political system.
Together the essays show that improving
women’s lot was treated as the focal point
of community interests by all competing
ideological groups: advocates of Western-
ization, Western missionaries, defenders of
Islam, Ottoman patriots, Turkish national-
ists, and socialist reformists and revolution-
aries. Moreover, they all manipulated the
same images and metaphors within the lan-
guage of their own ideology. Consequently,
women and their images have served as the
site of important political struggles for over
a century; but what was questioned by all
ideological groups was women’s backward-
ness, not male dominance. Nevertheless,
speaking of domestic life, family and house-
hold politics as public issues marked by
gender, they all effectively politicized the pri-
v a t e and thus contributed to the develop-
ment of a new paradigm of modernity.
While the male-led modernization projects
have treated women as targets rather than
participants, they have also created some
opportunities. Although most women have
demanded or embraced these opportuni-
ties to ‘serve the country’, increasingly more
women and women’s groups, however dif-
ferent (e.g. Islamist, Kemalist, Socialist, or
Radical), seek financial independence, de-
mand equality at home, and strive for an in-
dependent identity. ◆
Zehra F. Arat is professor of Political Science and
Women’s Studies at Purchase College of the State
University of New York. Her research and writings
focus on democracy, human rights and women’s
rights. She is author of, amongst others, D e m o c r a c y
and Human Rights in Developing Countries.
E-mail: zarat@purchase.edu
which aim at harmonizing the various tra-
ditions of both the East and West.
Prajna Vihara is published biannually by
the Graduate School of Philosophy and
Religion at Assumption University in
Bangkok, Thailand.
Editorial correspondence, including manuscripts
for submission (on diskette or by E-mail as file
attachments) and books for review should be
s e n tt o :
Dr Imtiyaz Yusuf, Editor, Prajna Vihara
Graduate School of Philosophy and Religion
Assumption University, Hua Mak
Bangkok, Thailand 10240
Tel.: +662 3004543-62, ext. 1325,1330
Fax: +662 7191521
E-mail: prsisy@au.ac.th
Prajna Vihara is a multicultural, pluralistic
journal of philosophy and religion dedi-
cated to the promotion of mutual under-
standing among the peoples of the
world. The Pali term prajna vihara m e a n s
‘temple of wisdom’, and indeed the edi-
tors encourage creative academic work
that shares the wisdom of the trained
academic mind with a readership of
scholars working throughout the world.
The editor and editorial board of P r a j n a
V i h a r a welcome specialized articles on
philosophy and religion that seek to shed
light upon pluralism and harmony be-
tween the various philosophical and reli-
gious traditions of peoples and races.
They especially welcome those articles
that exhibit the role and importance of
philosophical and religious thinking
C A L L  F O R  S U B M I S S I O N S
Prajna Vi hara
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C I R H S
B A H E Y  E L  DI N  H AS S A N Human Rights, 
Education and Dissemination
A 21 s t Century Agenda
Approximately 120 human rights experts
and advocates representing 40 human
rights organizations from 14 Arab countries,
as well as a number of experts from Africa,
Asia, Latin America and Europe, participated
in the conference, at the end of which ‘The
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights Educa-
tion and Dissemination’ was adopted. The
deliberations showed that during the first
five years of the UN Decade for Human Edu-
cation, only limited success was achieved in
bringing about more extensive partnerships
between governments and NGOs, on the
one hand, and amongst the NGOs on the
other. In the Arab world, the implementa-
tion programmes of the Decade were faced
with a number of challenges: political crises,
the discrepancy in economic and social con-
ditions in the Arab countries, and the lack of
cooperation between official government
institutions established for this purpose and
NGOs working in the field. A number of pa-
pers and interventions reflected on the ob-
stacles facing the NGOs in this regard. Most
significant among these were the practical
consequences of the imbalanced historical
emergence of the human rights culture and
thought, and hence the association of the
notion of human rights with Western cul-
ture. This is further exacerbated by the de-
clared position of the US, and the West in
general, on a number of the most vital is-
sues of Arab collective rights, such as in
Palestine and Iraq, which contribute to a
real barrier to human rights education in the
Arab World.
Discussions demonstrated that the most
important problem for human rights dis-
semination within the dominant culture is
‘elusive democracy’. Some regimes circum-
vent their international human rights com-
mitments by adopting an elusive rights dis-
course that keeps intact the essence of
tyranny and human rights violations and re-
duces human rights promotion by govern-
ments to mere propaganda. In addition,
there is the problem of the growth of funda-
mentalist currents with their conceptual
repertoire that is particularly hostile to the
freedoms of opinion, expression, and belief,
and the rights to equality, bodily integrity
and life. These currents also preach a con-
tradiction between cultural specificity and
the universality of human rights – the same
argument used by the governments to
derogate from their international commit-
ments and to make reservations on
women’s rights in particular.
Discussions further showed that cultural
diversity among the peoples of the world is
a fact to be acknowledged, tackled and for-
tified in order for it to become a factor that
enriches and supports the universality of
human rights. Also noted was the impor-
tance of having closer relations with advo-
cates of religious reform.
Furthermore, deliberations also dealt with
the effect the Eastern Church has had on
human rights culture through the teachings
of the Bible, the heritage and works of the
founding fathers of the Eastern Church, its
educational institutions, and the contribu-
tions of Christian Arabs to the Arab renais-
sance. The Christian Arab presence was af-
firmed as a supporting factor for human
rights culture, and was described as an em-
bodiment of democratic pluralism. It was
also affirmed that upsetting such presence
in any way would have a negative impact on
the image of Islam in the world. Finally, in
relation to the role of the arts in the dissem-
ination of human rights culture, five papers
were discussed that treated the issue exten-
sively, especially the role of theatre, plastic
arts, folk art and poetry. They affirmed that
human rights issues constitute rich material
for creativity in such domains. The interven-
tions noted the necessity of combining
work on human rights and creative works,
and called for lifting all forms of tutelage
and censorship on the arts, whether based
in the law or in the dominant political cul-
ture. They also argued for the necessity of
giving special attention to folk culture and
the arts in human rights education and dis-
semination, and for developing non-tradi-
tional educational materials such as films
and plays. It was stressed that a greater and
more flourishing role of the arts in shaping
the consciousness of the people requires
putting an end to the arbitrary marginaliza-
tion of artists and innovators in their own
countries. Discussing ways of developing in-
dependent Arab regional human rights
media, a number of detailed proposals on
issuing an Arabic newspaper and establish-
ing a radio station and a television channel
for human rights were reviewed. ◆
G e n d e r
Z AK I A  B E L H A C H MI
Women’s production of scientific feminist knowledge
in Arab-Islamic1 society is rarely systematically ad-
dressed. The available literature reflects preconcep-
tions and misconceptions about women’s feminist
scientific production of knowledge in the Arab world.
In response to this, it is necessary to provide a sys-
temic view of women’s scientific production of knowl-
edge in Arab-Islamic education and society.2 T h e
focus then shifts from the ‘woman question’ in Arab-
Islamic society to the more radical ‘science question’
in feminism, education and society in general.
The Science Question
in Arab-Islamic Feminist Knowledge
Women’s production of scientific feminist
knowledge in Arab-Islamic society is rarely
systematically addressed. The available lit-
erature reflects preconceptions and miscon-
ceptions about women’s feminist scientific
production of knowledge in the Arab world.
In response to this, it is necessary to provide
a systemic view of women’s scientific pro-
duction of knowledge in Arab-Islamic edu-
cation and society.1 The focus then shifts
from the ‘woman question’ in Arab-Islamic
society to the more radical ‘science ques-
tion’ in feminism, education and society. 
The question of women’s feminist produc-
tions of scientific knowledge in contempo-
rary Arab-Islamic society is complex and
raises two fundamental and interlapping is-
sues: the historical process of women’s in-
volvement in science, and feminism2 w i t h i n
Arab-Islamic society. To answer these two
questions adequately, investigating educa-
tion is central. 
Research conducted by the author is
based on the rationale that different world
systems of education have culturally specif-
ic socio-pedagogical practices that shape
both the process of knowledge production
within culture and regulate the relations be-
tween the individual/society and individu-
als/groups. It offers an epistemological
study of women’s scientific productions in
Arab-Islamic education and society. Further-
more, it presents a reflexive model that rec-
onciles particularism and universalism in
the cross-cultural analysis of feminist knowl-
edge; hence avoiding the traps of cultural
relativism and scientism.
The author’s thesis examines the process
involved in the production and construction
of al-Sa’dawi’s (Egypt) and Mernissi’s (Egypt)
scientific feminist knowledge in its systemic
relation to Arab-Islamic education and soci-
ety from 1970-1990. The aim is twofold: to
situate al-Sa’dawi’s and Mernissi’s scientific
feminine mode in its systematic relation to
the power structure of scientific practice in
education and society from 1970-1990; and
to examine and evaluate al-Sa’dawi’s and
Mernissi’s feminist research in view of the
power-structure that governed scientific
practice in education and society from
1970-1990. Theoretical and empirical works
of both authors from 1970 to 1990 were se-
lected in order to discover their respective
articulations of gender from their perspec-
tive as women. 
From a pro-active perspective that main-
tains the systemic link between scientific
knowledge and social action in a dialectic
relation to culture, the methodology com-
bines a theory-praxis approach for the epis-
temological analysis of al-Sa’dawi’s and
Mernissi’s feminist research and its related
contexts of scientific discovery. For the sys-
temic investigation and evaluation of al-Sa’-
dawi’s and Mernissi’s feminist scientific per-
spective, the study provides a reflexive
three-leveled model of analysis, drawing se-
lectively from Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology
(1992), Dorothy Smith’s feminist sociology
of knowledge (1990 a,b), and Stanley and
Wise’s feminist epistemology (1990). In this
manner, the study captures the tensions be-
tween determinism and agency contained
in al-Sa’dawi’s and Mernissi’s feminist dis-
courses, and delineates how communica-
tion and co-optation of information take
place in their feminine scientific mode.  
The findings indicate that al-Sa’dawi’s and
Mernissi’s feminist scientific perspective is
marked by an ambivalent feminist con-
sciousness, and is therefore inadequate to
represent the plural socio-political reality of
Arab-Muslim women, or the diverse reality
of women’s scientific practices. Also, on the
basis al-Sa’dawi’s and Mernissi’s appropria-
tions of the disciplines in the social sciences,
the thesis describes how the authors’ scien-
tific feminist paradigm is anachronistic with
respect to the Islamic post-modernist scien-
tific practices in higher education and main-
stream culture; hence lacking scientific va-
lidity and moral authority in women’s stud-
ies in the region. Moreover, the thesis dis-
cusses why the authors’ respective scientific
approaches and epistemologies fail to offer
sustainable egalitarian societal projects that
make realistic progress in the status and
rights of Arab-Muslim women, or contribute
to the advancement of Arab-Islamic
women’s studies in the region. 
The thesis concludes that these findings
show the need for a change of paradigm in
favour of a systemic scientific paradigm that
combines the particularism of the Arab-Is-
lamic identity with the universalism of femi-
nist egalitarian goals derived from women’s
concrete social experiences. Finally, the
study illustrates with the example of Moroc-
co how local feminist post-modernist pro-
jects, affiliated with the Islamic tradition of
political governance, and scientific practice
have yielded to both the scientific develop-
ment of women’s studies and to the ad-
vancement of women’s status and rights in
Arab-Islamic society since the 1980s. ◆
R E S E A R C H
N o t e s
1 . The author’s PhD thesis, Al-Sa’dawi’s and
Mernissi’s Feminist Knowledge With/in the History,
Education and Science of the Arab-Islamic Culture
(1999), deals specifically with this issue.
2 . Feminism is defined as ‘an international socio-
political movement with plural origins, multiple
cultural historical manifestations, and diverse
epistemologies that shape the discursive feminist
practices in the world community’.
Dr Zakia Belhachmi is presently a research associate
at the INRS Culture et Société, Montreal, Canada.
S h e is also a consultant in international/comparative
education and women’s studies to various inter-
national organizations.
E-mail: cisis@hotmail.com
The Second International Conference of the Human
Rights Movement in the Arab World was held in Cairo
from 13-16 October 2000, under the title of ‘Human
Rights, Education and Dissemination: A 21st Century
Agenda’. The conference was held at the invitation of
the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIRHS),
in coordination with the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network. It came in re-
sponse to the conclusions of the First International
Conference of the Human Rights Movement in the
Arab World, organized by the CIHRS (Casablanca,
April 1999), at which was stated that utmost priority
should be given to the tasks of human rights educa-
tion and dissemination. There was a shared belief
that citizens’ awareness of their rights is the first line
of defence of human rights.
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C E R A W
S T E F A N  ZI M M E R M A N N
Attended by many scholars and experts, the
conference provided an excellent opportu-
nity for professionals from research, indus-
try, academia and related government sec-
tors to discuss the latest developments in
Middle Eastern cinema. The conference par-
ticipants tried to focus on a very broad vari-
ety of topics related to the many aspects of
film production in countries of Northern
Africa and the Middle East. The questions
ranged from those concerning production
conditions and the cinematic depiction of
everyday life, to the analysis of economic
structures and socio-economic interconnec-
tions of the film industry in parts of the Mid-
dle East, Northern Africa and Asia.
Several panels concentrated on ‘National
Cinemas’ of the following countries: Syria,
Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Iran and India.
Within these panels, several papers were
presented. Randolph Galla (Amman) spoke
about ‘The M u aca s s a s a a l -cām m a l i - s - sı̄n a mā
fı̄ D i m as̆q i: Working Conditions for Cinema
Directors’. He highlighted the fact that Syri-
an authorities regard cinema today as a vis-
iting card to the world. Viola Shafik (Cairo)
presented a paper on ‘Prostitute for a Good
Reason: Stars and Morality in Egypt’, giving
a brief introduction of the history of the
Egyptian film industry, its current star sys-
tem and the general evaluation of stars on
the artistic as well as on the moral levels.
The Iranian filmmaker Abbas Kiarostami and
his film C l o s e - U p was the subject of Azadeh
Saljooghi’s (Salt Lake City) presentation in
which she demonstrated how Kiarostami
suggests new meanings of cinema, audi-
ence, and human imagination.
Using Ziad Doueiri’s film West Beirut as an
example, Ala Al-Harmaneh (Mainz) demon-
strated the use of historical elements in the
context of an autobiographical movie. Sven
Andressen (Frankfurt) introduced ‘The Leg-
end of A n â r k a l î’ and Indian historical film.
Claudia Preckel (Bochum) focused on some
ideas of the Indian film industry, usually re-
ferred to as ‘Bollywood’.
Several panels specifically dealt with the
construction of the so-called Orient, while
using different angles on the topic. The ‘his-
torical Orient’ was the central focus of one
of these panels. Diana Wenzel (Mainz) of-
fered a paper on ‘The Construction of
Cleopatra in Film: A Queen of Egypt as a
Symbol of Oriental Culture’. Regina Heil-
mann (Mainz) tried to approach the cine-
matic Orient from an archaeological point
of view, analysing ‘The Ancient Near East in
Film and Babylon’s Reception as a Paradigm
for the Other’. Wolfgang Zwickel, in his
paper on ‘The Arc of the Covenant – Cine-
matic Representation of a Biblical Object’,
dealt with the problematic use of biblical
texts, giving two examples of movies deal-
the London-born director for his cultural
heritage in Yemen. The panelists were high-
ly fascinated by the extraordinary photogra-
p h y .
The interdisciplinary network counts
more than 100 members from 21 different
countries. The conference greatly benefited
from the diversity of its participants, coming
from various fields of studies and industry.
This blend led to intriguing and fruitful dis-
cussions within the different panels. The
discussions and the personal engagement
of several researchers and filmmakers re-
confirmed the importance of this field of re-
s e a r c h .
The forthcoming meeting will be held
again at the Institute of Geography at the
University of Mainz, scheduled for 4-5 Sep-
tember 2001, and will concentrate exclu-
sively on film and mass media of the
M a g h r e b . ◆
Stefan Zimmermann is a doctoral student at the
Centre for Research on the Arab World (CERAW)
Institute of Geography, Johannes Gutenberg-
University of Mainz, Germany.
E-mail: S.Zimmermann@Geo.Uni-Mainz.de
C I E
H E R M A N  D E  L E Y
The conference was chaired by Mrs Meryem
Kanmaz, researcher at the CIE, and opened
with a welcome address by Prof. Johnny De-
vreker, Dean of the Faculty of Arts. He
stressed the innovation and uniqueness of
both courses in Flanders. They confirm, in
an exemplary fashion, the distinct social
profile of Ghent University as a pluralistic in-
stitution that ‘welcomes all students what-
ever their philosophical, political, cultural,
and social background’ (Charter of GU, Para-
graph 1). Prof. Blommaert, in his inaugural
lecture, spoke of ‘racism as a perspective: on
the ideological character of racism’. Racism
must not be reduced to an individual atti-
tude: the structuring and spreading of racist
ideas are closely interwoven with existing
social structures. As a consequence, racism
is related to power systems. At the same
time, it is not just a matter of ideas: there is a
close link with behaviour as well. Besides
being an ideology, though, racism should
also be viewed as a kind of e p i s t e m e: it is a
structured way of producing ‘facts’ and
‘knowledge’ on social phenomena.
Prof. Blommaert was joined by Dr Thijl
Sunier (head researcher at Erasmus Univer-
sity, Rotterdam), who had been invited as a
guest speaker. The subject of his lecture was
‘Muslims as a policy category and an object
of research: The role of Islam in policies of
integration in the Netherlands’. The lecture
gave a critical review of the consecutive
policies and debates in the Netherlands
since the 1960s. The intervention by publi-
cist Scheffers at the start of this year con-
firmed the definitive transition from the for-
mer tolerant policy of multiculturalism to-
wards that of an enforced civic integration
(i n b u r g e r i n g) of minorities.
The second course was inaugurated by
Prof. De Ley with a lecture entitled ‘Muslims
in the Belgian secular state: what secular
state?’ He introduced his lecture with a par-
ticular case, viz. the practical problems an
inhabitant of Ghent had recently been con-
fronted with in order to provide an Islamic
burial for an Iraqi refugee killed in a traffic
accident. Prof. De Ley stated that for too
long Muslims living in Europe have been
subjected to a debate on Islam and secular-
ism as a kind of precondition to be granted
the basic rights guaranteed by the Euro-
pean constitutions. When Muslims are re-
fused a dignified burial in the name of ‘secu-
larism’, European secularism itself has to be
critically examined and updated. Many Mus-
lim intellectuals, philosophers, and sociolo-
gists inside and outside the Western world
offer interesting contributions to this de-
bate that is vital to our democratic future.
The international guest speaker for this
second course was Prof. Tariq Ramadan
(Collège de Genève and Université de Fri-
bourg), one of today’s leading European
intellectuals. In his lecture, entitled ‘To be a
European Muslim’, he forcefully pleaded for
the right of Europe’s Muslims to be recog-
nized as fully qualified citizens, while pres-
erving their Muslim identities. ‘Not one po-
litical constitution in Europe requires Mus-
lims to be less Muslim in order to be accept-
ed as a citizen’, he stated. Muslims, for their
part, have to learn to differentiate between
their religion and the cultural traditions that
they brought to Europe as immigrants; at
the same time, they have to appropriate Eu-
rope’s cultural traditions. That way they will
be able to construct a ‘European Islam’
while respecting the universal fundamen-
tals of their faith.
The last speaker was Mr Youssef Souissi,
president of the VOEM. In a short speech, he
stressed the importance for Muslim citizens
in European countries to be not only ‘recog-
nized’ and ‘known’, but also to be ‘seen’.
This public visibility does not only apply to
some dress codes (such as the headscarf),
but also to religious practices such as the
a d h â n, and architectural contributions to
the urban environment – i.e. the building of
real mosques instead of the presently-used
old garages, supermarkets or factories.
The inaugural session was concluded with
a festive gathering including a Moroccan tea
ceremony, accompanied by a recital of orien-
tal music and an exhibition of calligraphy by
master Kakayi (living and working in Ghent).
The afternoon session was attended by
several hundred people, not only students
and academics, but also many Muslim and
non-Muslim field workers and activists from
all over Flanders, and from Brussels and the
Netherlands. There was a conspicuous pres-
ence of a large number of young Muslims.
Thanks to the dedication of everyone in-
volved, this inaugural conference earned
outstanding academic, social and intercul-
tural merit. ◆
Herman De Ley is professor at the Department of
Philosophy and Moral Science, Ghent University
(Belgium), and director of the CIE.
E-mail: herman.deley@rug.ac.be
URL: http://allserv.rug.ac.be/~hdeley/CIE.htm
ing with the Ark of the Covenant: Steven
Spielberg’s Indiana Jones and Bruce Beres-
ford’s King David.
A different approach was introduced by
Christopher L. Lukinbeal (New Haven). In his
presentation, he tried to show how land-
scapes function in popular American cine-
ma. The construction of cinematic land-
scapes and movie-generated geographies
were also presented by Stefan Zimmermann
(Mainz). He offered an inside glance of ‘Cin-
ema’s view of Marrakech’ by analysing Euro-
pean and American film productions using
Marrakech as their location.
The use of stereotypes in the depiction of
Arabs in popular European and American
cinema was demonstrated by Martin
Noweck (Munich), who showed that the use
of offensive stereotypes is usually based on
specific political intentions. Annelies Moors
(Amsterdam) looked into a different mass
media phenomenon. She chose (the cloth-
ing company) Benetton’s advertising cam-
paign which features photos of Jews and
Palestinians posing in friendship, to reflect
upon what sort of ‘imagined community’
was being produced.
Films were not only discussed, but also
shown. The first day ended with the presen-
tation of Parine Jaddo’s Aisha, an intricately
woven experimental film on Arab identity
and gender. The next day, the exceptionally
innovative feature documentary The English
Sheikh and the Yemeni Gentleman w a s
screened in the presence of its director,
Bader Ben Hirsi. The film traces the search of
International Conference on
Cinema and the Middle East
Islam and Racism in Europe
Media in general, and especially feature films, have
the power to create places. Mass media and the cine-
ma supply major parts of society with information on
current affairs and ideas about foreign places. It is
within this context that the interdisciplinary network
on ‘Cinema and the Middle East’ met from 11-12 Oc-
tober 2000 at the Institute of Geography at the Uni-
versity of Mainz. The conference was jointly orga-
nized by Prof. Dr Anton Escher and Prof. Dr Günter
Meyer, both of the Centre for Research on the Arab
World (CERAW).
The Centre for Islam in Europe (CIE) held its inaugur-
al conference on 25 October 2000 in Ghent. The con-
ference, held at Ghent University, was organized by
the CIE in close collaboration with the Flemish Mus-
lim association, VOEM (Association for the Education
and Emancipation of Muslims). At the occasion, two
new courses were jointly inaugurated: ‘Islam in Eu-
rope’s Secular States’ and ‘Racism and Representa-
tion’. They will be taught by two leading members of
the CIE: Prof. Herman de Ley and Prof. Jan Blom-
maert, respectively.
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The conference papers, edited by W.A. Shadid and
P.S. van Koningsveld, are to be published in the
summer of 2001.
Welmoet Boender is a PhD candidate at the ISIM.
E-mail: w.boender@rullet.leidenuniv.nl
C o ngr ess  Re po r t
W E L M O E T  B O E N D E R Religious Freedom and
t h e Neutrality of the State
The Position of Islam
in the European Union
Organized by Prof. Dr P.S. van Koningsveld
and Prof. Dr W.A. Shadid, this congress was
held under the auspices of the Leiden Insti-
tute for the Study of Religions (LISOR), the
Leiden Centre for Asian, African and Ame-
rindian Studies (CNWS), and the Forward
Studies Unit of the European Commission in
Brussels, which made the conference finan-
cially possible.
In their presentations, participants point-
ed to a bias which often exists in the atti-
tudes of states towards Islam. This is strong-
ly influenced by historical traditions be-
tween state and religion, which differ from
one country to another, as exposed by Mor-
eras (Spain), Soares Loja (Portugal), Musseli
(Italy), Ferrari (Italy, on the EU), Jonker (Ger-
many) and Akgönül (France, on Greece).
One the one hand, a general striving to-
wards equality, non-discrimination and un-
biased attitudes is clearly visible in the EU
countries. A gradual adjustment of the ‘new’
Islamic religion into the legislation of pre-
dominantly Christian states can be ob-
served and an increase in religious liberty
for foreign and other minority groups has
been apparent. Case studies as presented
by Maréchal (Belgium, on the EU) and Heine
(Austria) on the integration of Islam and Is-
lamic education in public schools served as
examples of recent developments in this
field. The contributions of Wiegers (The
Netherlands) and Dessing (The Netherlands)
analysed how life rituals such as circumci-
sion and Muslim standpoints on organ do-
nation are developing in a secular Dutch
context. Jensen (Denmark) endeavoured to
measure the attitudes of Muslim high
school students towards their religion.
On the other hand, this process has not
been without disturbances and setbacks, as
Alwall pointed out for Sweden and Foblets
and Overbeeke for Belgium. Perceptions of
Islam play an important role in public and
political discourses, as was shown in differ-
ent ways by Von Kemnitz (Portugal), Shadid
(The Netherlands), Zemni (Belgium) and
Beck (The Netherlands). Deep sentiments of
fear for Islam hinder an unbiased and impar-
tial attitude of the state. Moreover, in dis-
cussions on a separation of church and
state, secularism is often taken as neutral,
while Muslims are considered to be in oppo-
sition to it, as De Ley (Belgium) pointed out.
Baeck Simonsen (Denmark) critically ex-
pressed the urgent need for new legislation
in Denmark in order to empower the Muslim
minority to take advantage of the constitu-
tionally defined right to religious freedom in
Denmark. Processes of emancipation
among Muslims in the European Union
were analysed in a considerable part of the
contributions. Lewis (United Kingdom),
Schmidt di Friedberg (Italy) and Krois-
senbrunner (Austria) looked at the role and
influence of Muslim leadership. Van Kon-
ingsveld (The Netherlands) and Mohsen-
Finan (France) elaborated on the discourses
of Muslim intellectuals. Sander and Larsson
(Sweden) discussed new technologies such
as the internet and Allievi (Italy) elaborated
on the process of building transnational
Muslim communities through Islamic net-
works and the use of (mass) media.
Dassetto (Belgium, on EU) and Nielsen
(United Kingdom, on EU) presented a report
to the European Commission on Islam in Eu-
rope, entitled ‘La situation des musulmans
en Europe – rapport de recherches realisé
pour la Cellule de Prospective de la Commis-
sion Européenne’. This report consisted of
quantitative and qualitative data on infra-
structural provisions and Muslim daily life in
various countries of the EU. The study in-
cluded a list of 1200 recent publications on
Muslims in the EU.
The atmosphere of this congress was one
of critical concern. Many questions raised in
a specific national context appeared to be
similar in other countries, although debates
may focus on different institutions or insti-
tutional figures, as exemplified by Boender
and Kanmaz (The Netherlands and Belgium,
respectively) who compared i m a m s in the
Netherlands and Islamic teachers in Flan-
ders. The aim of this congress, the third of its
kind in a series of international congresses
on Islam in Europe organized by the Univer-
sity of Leiden (1991, 1995), was to bring to-
gether specialists for the exchange of
knowledge and expertise concerning the
latest developments in legislation, jurispru-
dence, administrative regulations and atti-
tudes of officials and politicians with re-
spect to Islam and the Muslim communities
residing in these countries (Van Kon-
ingsveld and Shadid). Obviously scholars on
Islam in Europe cannot act as neutral ob-
servers. However, the participants succeed-
ed in their task of closely observing these
developments and attitudes and alerting
policy makers, both at the national and Eu-
ropean levels. ◆
Johannes den Heijer is director of the Netherlands-
Flemish Institute in Cairo (NVIC).
E-mail: nvic@rite.com
Semi na r  Rep o r t
J O H A N N E S  D E N  H E I J E R
The Netherlands-Flemish Institute in Cairo (NVIC) held
a seminar entitled ‘A Pioneer of Islamic Studies in Hun-
gary: Ignaz Goldziher (1850-1921) and his Significance
for the 21st Century’ on 4 October 2000, in co-operation
with the Hungarian Embassy in Cairo. The work of
Ignaz Goldziher can still be regarded as seminal for nu-
merous fields within Arabic and Islamic Studies.
Ignaz Goldziher (1850-1921)
and his Significance for the 21s t C e n t u r y
Goldziher’s life and working
methods were highlighted
particularly in a presenta-
tion by Tamás Iványi (Bu-
dapest) entitled ‘Positivism
with a Personal Approach –
Goldziher at Work’, based
on Goldziher’s diaries and
annotated copies of Arabic
m a n u s c r i p t s .
Three speakers sought to
assess the value of Goldzi-
her’s studies for current
and future research. Sándor
Fodor (Budapest) stated
that whereas Goldziher’s
work on Islamic history, in-
cluding Qur’anic exegesis
and dogmatics, philosophy, and legal think-
ing, has retained much of its value, his stud-
ies on ‘popular’ religion now raise serious
methodological questions. According to
Fodor, Goldziher’s admiration for ‘high’ Is-
lamic culture – he regarded Islam as the
only religion able to satisfy inquisitive philo-
sophical minds – was counterbalanced by
an outright contempt of magical practices
in Islam (as well as in Judaism and Christian-
ity), which he often dismissed as ‘religious
swindle’. And even when he wrote in more
objective terms about such topics, he was
too heavily determined by the evolutionist
theories of his time to escape from explain-
ing the regional variety of ‘popular’ beliefs
in terms of local substrates dating from pre-
Islamic times.
In the same vein, Catherine Mayeur (Paris)
discussed Goldziher’s interpretation of the
famous m a w l i d of as-Sayyid Ahmad al-
Badawi in Tanta as a linear continuation of
the ancient Egyptian solar cult at Bubastis.
Modern anthropological work has shown
that this cult of a Muslim saint can be ex-
plained fully within an Islamic framework.
One important historical point made by
Mayeur is that, through the works of such
European scholars as Vollers and Littmann,
Goldziher’s interpretation came to confirm
Muslim reformists in their rejection of such
practices as belonging to polytheism (s h i r k) .
Turning to political history, Ferida Jawad
(Groningen/Cairo) drew attention to the
lack of progress made since Goldziher en-
deavoured to explain the s hucu b i y y a m o v e-
ment in the Abbasid period as a mainly pro-
Persian nationalist political party. In Jawad’s
view, 20t h-century scholars have failed to
offer satisfactory alternatives, especially due
to their use of terms they never properly de-
fined, such as ‘social cultural movement’
and ‘cultural identity’ (Gibb), the ‘position’
of the respective peoples in Islam (R. Motta-
hedeh), Persian vs. Arab ‘race’ (D. Agius),
and Arab ‘nationhood’ (B. Lewis).
Rachida Chih (Paris/Cairo), introduced her
paper on the ‘Nouvelles perspectives de
recherche sur le r ô l e des saints et soufis
dans la société égyptienne contemporaine’
with a reference to Goldziher’s work on
Muslim saints. However, she stressed the
need to pay more attention to living saints
and to emphasize their considerable impact
on Egyptian society. Chih illustrated this
with an outline of her own research on Sufis
of the Khalwatiyya brotherhood, particular-
ly in an Upper Egyptian rural setting, com-
bining textual analysis and historical an-
thropological fieldwork.
The presentation by Hassan Hanafi (Cairo)
was mostly consecrated to an Arabic anno-
tated translation of Goldziher’s R i c h t u n g e n
der islamischen Koranauslegung by cA b d a l -
Halim al-Naggar, published in 1955. This
translation influenced various other Egypt-
ian scholars, such as sheikh al-Dhahabi (as-
sassinated in 1976) and Hassan Hanafi him-
self. Rather than simply rendering Goldzi-
her’s text in Arabic, the translator produced
numerous marginal corrections on and addi-
tions to such issues as the Judaeo-Christian
background of the Qur’an, its codification
and punctuation, the alleged incompatibili-
ty between legalist Islam and mysticism, and
contradictions in al-Ghazali’s works.
Two speakers discussed topics more
loosely connected to Goldziher’s work,
which were nonetheless of much relevance
to the general theme of the workshop. Iffat
Al-Sharqawi (Cairo), in ‘Reason and Revela-
tion in the Thought of Fakhr ad-Din al-Razi’,
analysed al-Razi’s ideas on a very central
issue in Islamic dogmatics and philosophy,
and added comments on their importance
for present-day Muslim intellectual chal-
lenges. Gino Schallenbergh (Leuven/Cairo)
discussed the ‘Diseases of the Heart’ (A m r a d
a l - Q a l b) in the works of Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyya, who sought to refute what he
considered to be excesses in certain Sufi
practices and beliefs.
The seminar had the character of a work-
shop in that ample time was reserved for
discussion and exchange of information.
More particularly, in a panel discussion
chaired by Mustafa Kamel el-Sayyed (Cairo),
the participants were asked to reflect upon
the progress and prospects of Islamic Stud-
ies since Goldziher’s days. Some of the is-
sues debated were: the increased applica-
tion of tools taken from sociology, econom-
ics and political science to assess questions
about the compatibility of Islam and devel-
opment or democracy; the concept of ‘Is-
lamization of Knowledge’, which might be
understood as a reaction to what is con-
ceived as the myth of the objectivity of the
social sciences; and the problem of interac-
tion between Muslim societies and the
scholars who study them. ◆
A slightly more elaborate report on this seminar will
be published in the NVIC Newsletter 4 (2000); see also
w w w . l e i d e n u n i v . n l / i n t e r u n i v / n v i c
Ignaz Goldziher
i n1 8 8 0 .
The title of the international congress held in Leiden
from 14 to 16 December 2000, ‘Religious Freedom
and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam
in the European Union’, can be said to indicate a chal-
lenge. Although all member states of the European
Union state the principles of religious freedom and
non-discrimination in their constitutions, neutrality
appears to be a paradoxical concept. A group of 35
scholars from 11 countries of the European Union
discussed the recent developments regarding the
position of Islam within the current national legisla-
tions, political structures and public discourses in
the European Union.
T H E  N E T H E R L A N D S




T e l: + 31 15 285 0114
R e c e n t
• Arabesk: Contemporary art from Iran,
Iraq and Lebanon. Art from non-west-
ern countries as source of inspiration
for Dutch artists. Lectures, music,
workshops and for schoolchildren the
opportunity to work with mosaic.
Programme on request.
Den Haag 
G e m e e n t e m u s e u m
Stadhouderslaan 41,
2517 HV The Hague
T e l: +31 70 338 1111/ 365 8985
25 November 2000 – 
11 March 2001
• Glass from the Orient Islamic glass-
ware. 
C o n t i n u i n g
• Islamic crafts: The renewed exhibi-
tion from its own collection, in par-







T e l: +31 10 270 71 72
F a x: +31 10 270 71 82
E - m a i l: mediatheek@wereldmuse-
u m . r o t t e r d a m . n l
26 November 2000 – 
25 March 2001
• Buitenlandsche Zaaken (Foreign Af-
fairs). The exhibition concerns rare
documents from diplomatic and
trade contacts between the Nether-
lands and the Islamic world since
1600 AD. The often exquisitely deco-
rated documents belong to the
Dutch State Archives and include
manuscripts from the Dutch East
India Company. Paintings, engrav-
ings and maps illustrate the long-
standing historical connection.
C o n t i n u i n g




T e l / F a x: +31 53 341 3788
C o n t i n u i n g
• Intercultural Art
M u s i c
RasaNetwerk Non-Western
m u s i c
Pauwstraat 13a
3512 TG Utrecht
T e l: + 31 30 233 0123
F a x: + 31 30 233 0122
E - m a i l: rasa@rasa.nl
U R L: www.rasa.nl
Throughout the year 2001
• Music from Oezbekistan, Iran, Turkey
and Morocco. Concerts are organized
in a number of cities in the Nether-
lands and Belgium. Programme to be
obtained from Rasa.
B A H R A I N




F a x: +973 297 871
E - m a i l: musbah@batelco.com.htm
U R L: www.bnmuseum.com/eng-
l i s h . h t m
8 January 2001 – 10 March 2001
• Islamic Art and Patronage: Treasures
from Kuwait. This travelling exhibition
became widely renowned during its
inauguration in 1990, the year of the
Iraqi aggression toward Kuwait. The
DAI’s collection left for Saint Peters-
burg one week before the Iraqi aggres-
sion toward Kuwait, and thus these
masterpieces serendipitously were ex-
iled in safety during the occupation.
C A N A D A
E x h i b i t i o n
Glenbow Museum
130 - 9th Avenue S.E. 
Calgary, Alberta
Canada, T2G 0P3
Tel: +1 403 268 4100
Fax: +1 403 265 9769
2 December 2000 – 11 March 2001
• Women of the Nile. Explores the essen-
tial role of women and their variety of
responsibilities in the four primary as-
pects of Egyptian life: in the home, the
temple, the palace and the afterlife.
F R A N C E
E x h i b i t i o n
Institut du Monde Arabe
1, Rue des Fosses St-Bernard
75236 Paris
T e l: +33 1 4051 3960/3310
28 November 2000 – 15 April 2001
• Les Andalousies de Damas à Cor-
doue: This exposition shows Andalu-
sia at its height, Andalusia after the
period of the Ottoman emirs who dis-
covered the Iberian Peninsula. It
shows the different influences of the
Orient on art and society and tries to
enlarge the outlook of the visitor
who knows Andalusia only from a
visit to the Alhambra.
G E R M A N Y
E x h i b i t i o n s
Vorderasiatisches Museum
Entrée Pergamonmuseum
M u s e u m i n s e l
Am Kupfergraben, Berlin-Mitte
T e l: +49 30 2090 5401
Expected: 15 May – 
30 September 2001
• Agatha Christie and the Orient. Crim-
inology and Archaeology trace those
two strands in the life of the ‘Queen
of Crime’, displaying diaries, hitherto
unpublished photographs of Christie
and her husband, archaeologist Max
Mallowan, more than 200 artefacts
from his excavations in Iraq and
Syria, and a compartment from the
Orient Express.
Museum of Islamic Art
M u s e u m i n s e l
B e r l i n - M i t t e
T e l: +49 30 2090 5401
C o n t i n u i n g
• The continuing exhibition is dedicated
to the art of Islamic peoples from the
eighth to the nineteenth centuries.
The works of art originate from an
area stretching from Spain to India.
Museum fur Islamische
Fliesen und Keramik
W e s t e r h o f - K l i n i k
Olaf-Gulbranson strasse 19
83684 Tegernsee
T e l: + 49 8022 1810
C o n t i n u i n g
• Dr Theodor Sehmer collected Islamic
Ceramic since the 1950s, in particular
tiles from Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Some
300 pieces of this very interesting col-
lection dating from the 10t h – 19t h
century are to be admired at the




T e l: +49 711 222 5173
F a x: +49 711 222 5194
U R L: www.ifa.de
2 February – 31 March 2001
• ’Mes Arabies’. The photographer
Samer Mohdad, born in Lebanon in
1964, has travelled the Middle East
searching for traces of past civilisa-
tions in the world of today, which has
seen the clash of religions, of cul-
tures, demolition and rebuilding for a
new future, conservation and adap-
tation. The exhibition will be at the
IFA-Galerie in Bonn from 18 April – 31
May and at the IFA-Galerie Berlin




I R A N
Islamic Period Museum
T e h r a n
C o n t i n u i n g
• Continuing exhibition of e.g. Koranic
manuscripts, ceramics, metalwork
and textiles.
K U W A I T
Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah
M a h b o u l a
T e l: +965 565 3006
C o n t i n u i n g
• Al-Sabah Collection of Islamic art.
The Tareq Rajab Museum
Hawelli 32036
T e l: +965 531 7358
F a x: +965 533 9063
C o n t i n u i n g
• Arts of the Islamic world: Koran vol-
umes, calligraphy, pottery, metal-
work, glass, ivory and jade carvings,
costumes, textiles, embroideries and
jewellery. The exhibitions also in-
clude relevant objects from Tibet,
Nepal and Bhutan.





T e l: +60 3 2274 2020
C o n t i n u i n g
• Collections of local and international
Islamic art objects. The museum
holds local and international orient-
ed exhibitions at intervals.
R U S S I A
The State Hermitage Museum
St Petersburg
T e l: +812 110 9079/9625
F a x: +812 312 1550
U R L: www.hermitage.ru
C o n t i n u i n g
• Art of the Near East is represented in
the Museum by an excellent collec-
tion covering the 7t h - 1 9t h c e n t u r i e s
and includes several exquisite mas-
t e r p i e c e s .





• Calligraphy from the Tareq Rajab Mu-
seum Kuwait. The Qur’an was central
to the development of the art of writ-
ing. In this exhibition the various
scripts that developed over the cen-
turies and also calligraphy as a deco-
rative motif on various media like ce-
ramics and metalwork are displayed.





T e l: +41 61 271 2202
F a x: +41 61 272 1861
29 October 2000 – 1 April 2001
• Agatha Christie and the East
T U R K E Y
The Museum of Turkish
and Islamic Art Istanbul
C o n t i n u i n g
• Exhibition of Ottoman and Islamic
Art, Folk Art and Folk Life.
U N I T E D  K I N G D O M
British Museum 
and Museum of Mankind
Great Russelstreet
London WCIB 3DG
T e l: +44 17 412 7111
F a x: +44 17 1323 8614/8480
4 May – 2 September 2001
• The Jewelled Arts from India in the
Age of the Mughals. The exhibition
will display some 300 pieces of Indian
jewellery. The famous Ruby Dagger
will be shown.
C o n t i n u i n g
• Continuing exhibition of the Oriental
collection. Its Islamic pottery is con-
sidered the best outside the Islamic
w o r l d .
Victoria and Albert Museum
Cromwell Road
London SW7 2RL
T e l: +44 171 938 8500
U R L: www.vam.ac.uk
C o n t i n u i n g
• The collection includes a rich collec-
tion of Islamic metalwork.
Egee Art Gallery
9 Chelsea manor studios
Flood Street
London SW3 5SR
T e l: +44 171 351 6818
F a x: +44 171 376 8510
U R L: www.egeeart.com
C o n t i n u i n g
• Arabic Calligraphy 2000 - The Saudi
Show. Presents a breathtakingly
beautiful and diverse collection of
c a l l i g r a p h y .
Contemporary and antique
Middle Eastern art
U N I T E D  S T A T E S
Metropolitan Museum
o f A r t
1000 Fifth Avenue at 82n d S t r e e t
New York 10028
T e l: +1 212 535 7710
19 January – 22 April 2001
• Sultan cA l i of Mashhad, Master of
N a s ta'l i q: This exhibition will exam-
ine the elegant calligraphy of the ac-
knowledged master of n a s ta'l i q — t h e
writing style likened to flying geese
that was favoured in 15t h and 16t h-
century Iran for poetical texts—and
two of his famous pupils. Some twen-
ty examples of manuscripts and
specimen pages, many enlivened
with brilliant illumination, will be
drawn from the Museum’s holdings,
supplemented by a few works from
outside collections.
Harvard University Art
M u s e u m s
Arthur M. Sackler Gallery
Cambridge, Massachusetts
T e l. + 1 617 495 9400
U r l: www.artmuseums.harvard.edu
C o n t i n u i n g
• Harvard’s collection of Islamic and
later Indian art is small but magnifi-
cent. It comprises a broad range of
works, from Samanid pottery and
Mamluk calligraphy to Qajar lac-
quers and Ottoman textiles. Its mas-
terpieces include a group of minia-
tures from the extraordinary 14t h- c e n-
tury Great Mongol (‘Demotte’) Shah-
nama, the Safavid master Mir
Sayyid-’Ali’s Night-time in a Palace,
and the miniatures of the ‘pocket-
size’ Divan of Anvari produced for the
Mughal emperor Akbar. The depart-
ment also has one of the most impor-
tant representations of Rajasthani
painting in the world.
Kelsey Museum of Archaeology
University of Michigan
434 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Tel: +1 734 764 9304
Fax: +1 734 763 8976
C o n t i n u i n g
• Early Islamic Inscribed Textiles. In a
variety of materials, weaves, embroi-
deries and ornamental schemes,
these textiles from the early Islamic
world were most frequently used for
clothing. They also displayed a
wealth of information, keenly sought
after and widely imitated.
Kirkpatrick Library
Central Missouri State University
W a r r e n s b u r g
18 October 2000 – 
15 December 2001
• Saudi Costume and Jewelry from the
Nance Collection: displays more than
100 items of traditional clothing and
mostly Bedouin jewellery.
The Arthur M. Sackler




T e l: +1 202 357 4880
29 October 2000 – 22 April 2001
• Asian Traditions in Clay: the Hauge
Gifts presents 81 vessels from three
important ceramic traditions. On dis-
play are examples of ancient Iranian
painted or burnished earthenware,
low-temperature-glazed earthen-
ware works from Islamic Iran and
Iraq and Khmer stoneware vessels.
3 December 2000 – 25 March 2001
• India through the Lens: Photography
1840-1911 emphasizes the aesthetic
qualities, as well as the social and
historical importance of 135 pho-
tographs taken in the Indian subcon-
tinent. The exhibition shows the ap-
peal of the panoramic photograph,
the British passion for documenting
architecture and ethnography as
well as the aftermath of the Indian
Mutiny of 1857. ‘Picturesque’ views of
the Indian landscape lead into sec-
tions devoted to the maharajas of
princely India and the ceremonial
durbars of British imperial India.
17 September (ongoing)
• Fountains of Light. Islamic Metal-
work from the Nuhad Es-Said Collec-
tion. This collection - arguably the
finest private collection of Islamic
metalwork – consists of twenty-seven
inlaid brass, bronze and steel objects
dating from the 10t h- 1 9t h c e n t u r i e s .
3 May 1998 (ongoing)
• Arts of the Islamic World. Some 60
works – Koran pages, metalwork, ce-
ramics, glass, paintings, and calligra-
phy– from the 9t h- 1 7t h centuries ex-
plore Islamic artistic traditions.
Themes include the forms and func-
tions of the works of art, the role of
calligraphy, the use of figurative dec-
oration, and the meaning of abstract
d e s i g n s .
C o n t i n u i n g
• Luxury Arts of the Silk Route Empires:
In these two galleries connecting the
Freer Gallery of Art and the Arthur M.
Sackler Gallery, examples of metal-
work and ceramics from the collec-
tions of each museum illustrate the
effect of multicultural interaction on
the arts of the first millennium A.D.
Ornaments, bowls, cups, bottles, jars,
mirrors, ewers, and ritual objects in
gold, silver or silver and gilt, earthen-
ware, or porcelain from Iran, China,
Turkey, Syria, and Afghanistan are
included in this exhibition.
U N I T E D  N A T I O N S
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Art & Culture Agenda
The Agenda is produced by
t h e Centre of Islamic Culture in
Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Please send all information
with regard to activities
related to culture and art in
the Islamic World to:
The Centre of Islamic Culture
and Art, 
P.O. Box 361,
3 0 0 0 AJ Rotterdam,
T h eN e t h e r l a n d s
Fax: +31 10 270 7182
E-mail: sikc@wereldmuseum.
r o t t e r d a m . n l
The director of the Dutch settlement of the VOC arrives in Surat.




Financial System of an
Islamic Economy
D a t e: 6 October 2000




Los Angeles, CA 90095-1480
U S A
T e l: +1 310 825 1181
F a x: +1 310 206 2406
The Ethnography 
of Education 
in the Arab World
D a t e: 19 October 2000
V e n u e: Center for Contemporary
Arab Studies
Georgetown University
W a s h i n g t o n
U S A
C o n t a c t: Anne-Marie Chaaraoui
T e l: +1 202 687 6215
F a x: +1 202 687 7001
E - m a i l: chaaraoa@georgetown.edu
God, Life and Cosmos:
Theistic Perspectives
D a t e: 6-9 November 2000
V e n u e: Islamabad
P a k i s t a n
Sponsored by: The Center for Theolo-
gy and the Natural Sciences (CTNS),
the Islamic Research Institute of the
International Islamic University, the
International Institute of Islamic
T h o u g h t
C o n t a c t: Muzaffar Iqbal
T e l: +1 780 922 0927
F a x: +1 780 922 0926
E - m a i l: muzaffar@cis-ca.org
Locating Feminism: The
Collapse of Secular and
Islamic Discourse
D a t e: 13 November 2000
V e n u e: Villanova University
P h i l a d e l p h i a
U S A
Guest speaker: Margot Badran
(Georgetown University)
Sponsored by: The Core Humanities
Program, the Center for Arab and
Islamic Studies, the Center for
Peace and Justice, the History De-
partment, the Women’s Studies
Program, the Islamic Law Forum
3 4t h Middle East Studies
Association Meeting
(MESA): Representations
of the Middle East
D a t e : 16-19 November 2000
V e n u e : O r l a n d o
I n f o r m a t i o n : Middle East Studies As-
sociation of North America
University of Arizona
1643 East Helen Street
Tucson, Arizona 85721
U S A
Tel: +1 520 621 5850
F a x : +1 520 626 9095
E - m a i l : m e s a n a @ u . a r i z o n a . e d u
URL: w w w . m e s a . a r i z o n a . e d u
A Critique of the Mosque
Institution in Malaysia
D a t e : 20 November 2000
Venue: Massachusetts Institute of
T e c h n o l o g y
U S A
Sponsored by: The Aga Khan Pro-
gramme for Architecture
Tel: +1 617 253 1400
E - m a i l : a k p i a r c h @ m i t . e d u
The Merriam Symposium:
Can The World Cope? 
The Challenge of
Ethnopolitical Conflict
D a t e: 29 November 2000
V e n u e: Penn, University of Pennsylva-
nia, Philadelphia
U S A
C o n t a c t: Carrie Savarkos
T e l: +1 215 898 5262
E - m a i l: cstavrak@sas.upenn.edu
The United States and the
Middle East: A Cultural
E n c o u n t e r
D a t e : 8-9 December 2000
Venue: New Haven, Connecticut, USA
Sponsored by: Yale Center for Interna-
tional and Area Studies, Hofstra
U n i v e r s i t y
Contact: Magnus Bernhardsson
Tel: +1 516 463 5607
E - m a i l : H i s m z b @ H o f s t r a . e d u
The Mediterranean Idea
Date: 27-31 January 2001
Venue: Tel Aviv
Contact: Dan Laor Dean of the Faculty
of Humanities
Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv 69978, Israel
Tel: +972 364 0811
F a x : +972 364 07174
E-mail: m e d i t e r @ p o s t . t a u . a c . i l
Islamic Studies After
O r i e n t a l i s m
D a t e : 5 February 2001
Venue: UCLA, Center for Near Eastern
S t u d i e s
10383 Bunche Hall
P.O. Box 951480, Los Angeles, CA
90095-1480, USA
Guest speaker: Vincent Cornell (Uni-
versity of Arkansas)
Tel: +1 310 825 1181




D a t e : 5-7 February 2001
Venue: International Institute of Social





E-mail: m o o r s @ p s c w . u v a . n l
The Texas Association of
Middle East Scholars
(TAMES): 2001 Annual
M e e t i n g
Date: 23-24 February 2001
Venue: University of Texas
Information: Christopher Rose
TAMES General Secretary
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX 78712-1193, USA
Tel: +1 512 471 3881




D a t e : 1-3 March 2001
V e n u e : Washington DC
Organized by: American Historical As-
sociation, the World History Associ-
ation, the Middle East Studies Asso-
ciation, the African Studies Associa-
tion, the Latin American Studies As-
sociation, the Conference on Latin
American History, the Association
for Asian Studies, the Community
College Humanities Association,
the Library of Congress
C o n t a c t : Debbie Doyle
American Historical Association
400 A Street, SE Washington DC
20003-3889, USA
Tel: +1 202 544 88307, 
+1 202 544 88132
Fax: +1 202 544 8307
E-mail: d d o y l e @ t h e a h a . o r g
Rediscovering Religious
Identities: Christianity and
Islam in Modern Eurasia
Date: 9-10 March 2001
Venue: P h o e n i x
Sponsored by: Arizona State University
Graduate College, The Historical
Society, Arizona State University
Departments of History and Reli-
gious Studies, the Russian and East
European Studies Consortium
C o n t a c t : Carol Withers
Russian and East European Studies
C o n s o r t i u m
Arizona State University, SS 2 0 6 ,
P.O. Box 872601
Tempe AZ 85287-2601, USA
Tel: +1 480 965 4188
Fax: +1 480 965 0310





Production and the Market
in the Constitution of
Meaning in the Middle
East and Beyond
D a t e : March-June 2001
Venue: Ben-Gurion University, Beer-
S h e v a
Contact: Relli Shechter
Department of Middle East Studies
Ben-Gurion University
Beer-Sheva, 84105, Israel
T e l : +972 7 647 7763
F a x : +972 7 647 2952
E - m a i l : r e l l i s h @ b g u m a i l . b g u . a c . i l
2 5t h Annual Symposium:
Arab Legal Systems in
T r a n s i t i o n
D a t e : 5-6 April 2001
Venue: Washington DC
Sponsored by: The Center for Contem-
porary Arab Studies at Georgetown








Tel: +1 202 687 5793
Fax: +1 202 687 7001
E-mail: ccasinfo@gunet. george-
t o w n . e d u





D a t e : 18-19 April 2001
Venue: Institute of Arab and Islamic
Studies, University of Exeter
Information: Nadje Al-Ali
Institue of Arab and Islamic Studies,
University of Exeter
Old Library, Prince Wales Road
Exeter EX4 4JZ, UK
Tel: +44 13 92 264 026
Fax: +44 13 92 264 025
E-mail: N . S . A l - A l i @ e x e t e r . a c . u k
Islam in Africa: A Global,
Cultural and Historical
P e r s p e c t i v e
D a t e : 19-22 April 2001
Venue: B i n g h a m t o n
Contact: Michael Toler or Tracia Lea-
c o c k
The Institute of Global Cultural
S t u d i e s
Binghamton University
P.O. Box 6000, LNG-100
Binghamton NY 13905, USA
Tel: +1 607 777 4494
Fax: +1 607 777 2642
E-mail: igcs@binghamton.edu
Religion and the State
i n the Arab World: 
Conflict or Accomodation?
Date: 28-30 April 2001
V e n u e : C a i r o
Sponsored by: The Egyptian Historical
Society and the Higher Council for
Culture in Cairo
Information: Egyptian Historical Soci-
e t y
2 Sekket Nasir al-Din
Sh. Bustan, Cairo, Egypt, or
Assem Desouki and Raouf Abbas
E-mail: l o l l a f a r i d a @ y a h o o . c o m ,
r a o u f @ c o l l e g e m a i l . c o m
Bringing the Middle East
Back In…To the Study of
Political and Economic
R e f o r m
Date: 4-5 May 2001





C o n t a c t : Jean Lawlor
T e l : +1 401 863 1035
E-mail: J e a n _ L a w l o r @ b r o w n . e d u
Evolving Identities
Turks, Kurds, Arabs and
A r m e n i a n s
Date: 5 May 2001
Venue: Breasted Hall, Oriental Hall
Information: Center for Middle Eastern
S t u d i e s
The University of Chicago
Albert Pick Hall for International
Studies 201
5828 S. University Avenue
Chicago 60637, USA
Tel: +1 773 702 8297
Fax: +1 773 702 2587
E - m a i l : c m e s @ u c h i c a g o . e d u
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . c m e s .
u c h i c a g o . e d u
The Economics of Health,
Environment, and Welfare
in the Middle East and
North Africa








New York NY 100115, USA
E-mail: c o n f h e w @ l a u . e d u . l b
URL: w w w . l a u . e d u . l b
Islamic Space and Travel
in the Era of Transnation-
alism: Reflections on
Sainthood and Sacred
C e n t r e s
Date: 18 May 2001
Venue: Research School CNWS, Leiden
Contact: E. van Hoven
Research School CNWS




States in West Africa and
its Diaspora
D a t e : 1 June 2001
Venue: Research School CNWS, Leiden
Guest speaker: Ousmane Kane (Yale
University, New Haven)
Contact: E. van Hoven
Research School CNWS
P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden
The Netherlands
E - m a i l : E.van.Hoven@let. leidenuniv.nl
Primary Solidarities and
Middle East Elite Groups
D a t e : 11-13 June 2001
Venue: University of Haifa
Sponsored by: The Jewish Arab Center
and the Gustav Heinemann Insti-
tute of Middle Eastern Studies
Contact: Amatzia Baram
Head of the Jewish Aran Center
Haifa University, Israel
E - m a i l : f j a r 4 0 1 @ u v m . h a i f a . a c . i l
1s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Conference on Heritage
o f Islamic Thought and
S c i e n c e s
Date: 1-4 July 2001
Sponsored by: Islamic Heritage Foun-




Hoffman Estates, Illinois 60195
U S A
T e l : +1 874 885 4851
Association Française
pour l’étude du Monde
Arabe et Musulman
(AFEMAM): 15e c o n g r è s
2 0 0 1
D a t e : 5-7 July 2001
Venue: S t r a s b o u r g
Information: A F E M A M
c/o URBAMA
BP 7521, 23, rue de la Loire
F-37075 Tours Cedex 02
F r a n c e
T e l : +33 2 473 684 61
Fax: +33 2 473 684 71





Study of the Middle East’
D a t e : 9-19 July 2001
Venue: European University Institute,
F l o r e n c e
Contact: Ann-Charlotte Svantesson
Mediterranean Programme/Robert
Schuman Centre for Advanced
S t u d i e s
European University Institute
Via dei Roccettini 9
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI),
I t a l y
Tel.: +39 55 468 5785
F a x : +39 55 468 5770
E - m a i l : m e d . s u m m e r . s c h o o l @ i u e . i t
U R L : www.iue.it/RSC/MED/ Med-sum-
m e r 2 0 0 1 . h t m
Annual Conference of the
British Society for Middle
Eastern Studies (BRISMES)
D a t e : 15-18 July 2001
Venue: University of Edinburgh
Information: BRISMES 2000
Centre for Middle Eastern and Is-
lamic Studies
University of Cambridge
Faculty of Oriental Studies
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge CB3 9DA, UK
T e l : +44 12 23 335 103
E-mail: o r i e n t a l - m e s -
a d m i n @ l i s t s . c a m . a c . u k
Conceptualizing Political
Succession in the Middle
E a s t
D a t e: 27 August – 
3 September 2001
V e n u e: San Francisco
Hosted by: The annual American Polit-
ical Science Association Confer-
ence, the Conference Group on the
Middle East (CGME)
F a x: +1 410 455 1021





D a t e: 6-8 September 2001
V e n u e: Göttingen
I n f o r m a t i o n: DAVO Congress 2001
Prof. Martin Tamcke
Universität Göttingen, Theologium
Platz der Göttinger Sieber 3
D-37039 Göttingen, Germany
T e l: +49 551 339 588
F a x: +49 551 397 488
E - m a i l: mtamcke@gwdg.de
U R L: www.geo.uni-mainz.de/ davo




D a t e: 25-28 October 2001
V e n u e: Lund
I n f o r m a t i o n: Nordic Society for Middle
Eastern Studies
Centre for Middle Eastern Studies,
University of Bergen
N-5020 Bergen, Norway
F a x: +47 555 898 91
E - m a i l: knut.vikor@smi.uib.no
U R L: www.hf.uib.no/smi/nsm/ nord-
c o n f . h t m l
www.hist.lu.se/hist/middleeast/ mid-




in the Middle East
‘Learning from Regional
Experiences & Building
P a r t n e r s h i p s ’
D a t e: 24-30 November 2001
V e n u e: Amman
Sponsored by: Jordan University of Sci-
ence and Technology (JUST), The
Council for British Research in the
Levant (CBRL), Darat al Funun of
The Abdul Hamid Shoman Founda-
t i o n
I n f o r m a t i o n: Rami Farouk Daher,P.O.
Box 402
Amman 11118, Jordan
E - m a i l: radaher5@just.edu.jo;
t u r a t h @ j o i n n e t . c o m . j o
Anthropology in the
Middle East: Gendered
P e r s p e c t i v e s
D a t e: 30 November – 
2 December 2001
V e n u e: Berlin
C o n t a c t: Anja Peleikis
Centre for Modern Oriental Studies,
Kirchweg 33
14129 Berlin, Germany
T e l: +49 30 803 070, 
+49 30 803 072 31
F a x: +49 30 803 072 10
E - m a i l: anja.peleikis@rz.hu-berlin.de
First World Congress for
Middle Eastern Studies
D a t e: 11-14 September 2002
V e n u e: Centre for Research on the
Arab World (CERAW)
I n f o r m a t i o n: Prof. Guenter Meyer





T e l: +49 61 31 392 2701
F a x: +49 61 31 392 4736
E - m a i l: davo@geo.uni-mainz.de
U R L: http://www.geo.uni-
m a i n z . d e / d a v o





D a t e: 29-30 September 2001
V e n u e: Oxford
I n f o r m a t i o n: Gina Burrows
Institute of Social and Cultural An-
thropology (ISCA)
University of Oxford, UK
T e l: +44 1865 274 687
F a x: +44 1865 274 630




D a t e: 24-25 March 2002
V e n u e: Florence
I t a l y
F a x: +39 055 468 5770
E - m a i l: medmeet@iue.it
U R L: www.iue.it/RSC/MED/ meet-
i n g 2 0 0 2 - c a l l W S . h t m
Academic Meetings
In order for the ISIM Info
Pages to prosper, we kindly
ask for your participation by
filling out the forms for
Vacancy Announcements and
Special Events. These forms
can be found online on the
ISIM website:
h t t p : / / i s i m . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
If you wish to have a formula
sent by e-mail, fax, or post,
please contact the ISIM
S e c r e t a r i a t :
Tel: +31 71 5277905
Fax: +31 71 5277906
E - m a i l :
I S I M @ r u l l e t . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
Ruba Salih
Confronting Modernities: 
Muslim Women in Italy
1
I S I M




Peter van der Veer
2
ISIM Chair 






Matthijs van den Bos
Anthropological Exploration of Modern Self
4
Muhammad Khalid Masud
Muslim Jurists’ Quest for the Normative





F E A T U R E S
Abdullahi An-Na’im
Islam, Human Rights and Secularism: Does it
have to be a Choice?
6
Dale Eickelman
Muhammad Shahrur and the Printed Word
7
John Calvert
Sayyid Qutb in America
8
Hania Mohamed Sholkamy
Why is Anthropology so hard in Egypt?
9
Asma Sayeed
Early Sunni Discourse on Women’s Mosque
A t t e n d a n c e
1 0
Mark Sedgwick
Against Modernity: Western Traditionalism
and Islam
1 1
R E G I O N A L  I S S UE S
Noorhaidi Hasan




Politicizing Islam in Malaysia
1 3
Mareike Jule Winkelmann




The Deendar Anjuman: 
Between Dialogue and Conflict
1 5
Jillian Schwedler




New Social Movements in Iran
1 7
Ahmed Sedky
Regional Cooperation of Urban
Conservation in the Middle East
1 8
Bernard Haykel




Perceptions of cU r f i Marriage 
in the Egyptian Press
2 0 - 2 1
Abe W. Ata




The Dilemma of Palestine
2 2
Samuli Schielke
Pious Fun at Saints Festivals in Modern
E g y p t
2 3
Thomas Eich




Identity, Power and Piety: 
The Druzes in Syria
2 5
Anja Peleikis
Locality in Lebanon: Between Home and
H o m e p a g e
2 6
Rabia Bekkar
Women in the City in Algeria: Change and
R e s i s t a n c e
2 7
Bernard Venema
Roots of Moroccan Political Institutions
2 8
Vladimir Bobrovnikov








Untying the Knot: Divorce and Muslim law
in the UK
3 1
I N S T I T U T I O N A L
Harald Motzki
Methods of Dating Muslim Traditions
3 2





Representations of Turkish Women
3 4
R E S E A R C H
Zakia Belhachmi
The Science Question in Arab-Islamic
Feminist Knowledge
3 5
C O N F E R E N C E  R E P O R T S
Bahey El Din Hassan
Human Rights, Education and
Dissemination: A 21st Century Agenda
3 5
Stefan Zimmermann




Islam and Racism in Europe
3 6
Welmoet Boender
Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the
State: The Position of Islam in the European
U n i o n
3 7
Johannes den Heijer
Ignaz Goldziher (1850-1921) and his
Significance for the 21s t C e n t u r y
3 7
I N F O  P A G E S




C o n t e n t s
The International Institute for
the Study of Islam in the Modern
World (ISIM) promotes and
conducts interdisciplinary
research on contemporary social
and intellectual trends and
movements in Muslim societies
and communities. The ISIM’s
research approaches are
expressly interdisciplinary and
comparative, covering a large
geographic range which includes
North Africa and the Middle East,
Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia,
South and Southeast Asia, and
(Muslim communities in) the
West. Broad in its scope, the ISIM
brings together all areas of
e x p e r t i s e .
4 0 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  7 / 0 1
ISIM Events
ISIM Visiting Fellow: 
Rehana Ghadially
D a t e: March – June 2001
ISIM Post-Doctoral Fellow: 
Karin van Nieuwkerk
D a t e: May 2001 – March 2003
ISIM Post-Doctoral Fellow: 
Matthijs van den Bos
D a t e: March 2001 – March 2003
ISIM PhD Students: 
Joseph Alagha, Egbert Harmsen
a n d Mareike Winkelmann
D a t e: March 2001 – March 2005
Workshop on ‘Family, State and 
Civil Society in Islamic Communities: 
and Sociological Perspectives’
D a t e: 21-25 March 2001
Organized by: ISIM and AKMI
(Arbeitskreis Moderne und Islam in Berlin)
V e n u e: Florence, Italy
Guest Lecture by Ishtiyaq Ahmad Zilli
(Aligarh Muslim University, India)
D a t e: 26 March 2001
Guest Lecture by Maribel Fierro
(Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Científicas (CSIC), Spain)
D a t e: 3 April 2001
V e n u e: Leiden
Workshop Africa and Islam 
D a t e: 18 -21 April 2001
V e n u e: Leiden
ISIM Visiting Fellow: 
Farish Noor
D a t e: 1 June – 15 August 2001
For more information on these and other ISIM Events:
ISIM Secretariat
T e l: +31 71 527 79 05
F a x: +31 71 527 79 06
E - m a i l : i s i m @ r u l l e t . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
U R L: www.isim.nl
